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Executive Summary
The current and programmed defense maritime logistics force of the United States is  
inadequate to support the current U.S. National Defense Strategy and major military  
operations against China or Russia. The Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy 
specifically highlights “resilient and agile logistics” as one of eight capability areas that need to 
be strengthened to prepare the United States for an era of renewed great power competition.  
Despite this, the Navy’s Fiscal Year (FY) 2019 30-Year Shipbuilding Plan submitted to 
Congress decreased the percentage of spending on logistics forces compared to previous 
plans, and the Navy’s FY 2020 30-Year Shipbuilding Plan further reduces the logistics force 
as a proportion of the fleet. Current maritime logistics plans lag behind the projected size of 
the Navy Battle Force, the Navy’s future operating concepts, and the emergence of adversary 
threats to logistics. Decades of downsizing and consolidation with the goal of achieving greater 
efficiency have left U.S. defense maritime logistics forces brittle while simultaneously  
contributing to the decline of the U.S. shipbuilding industry and the Merchant Marine. Failing 
to remedy this situation when adversaries have U.S. logistics networks in their crosshairs 
could cause the United States to lose a war and fail its allies and partners in their hour of need. 
An unsupported force may quickly become a defeated one.
The current and programmed maritime logistics force has been shaped by decisions and  
analyses predicated on now-outdated assumptions and operating concepts. Chief among these 
decisions was the retirement of most Navy expeditionary logistics capabilities in the 1990s 
following the end of the Cold War, along with a heightened reliance on forward shore facilities 
that are now increasingly vulnerable. Today’s world, in which sophisticated adversaries  
challenge the U.S. military across domains, is dramatically different from the futures  
envisioned during the 1990s, 2000s, or even early 2010s. This report identifies five key  
maritime logistics planning assumptions that should shift to reflect the new environment: 
1. from secure, proximate resupply facilities to distant and/or contested basing; 
2. from assumed rear theater sanctuary to global conflict; 
3. from gradual force buildup to forward deterrence and rapid response; 
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4. from short-duration to potentially protracted conflicts; and 
5. from low attrition to high attrition planning. 
The Navy and other Services have already begun responding to current and emerging chal-
lenges in their combat forces, yet commensurate shifts in logistics preparations are lagging 
behind. In general, Navy and other Service concepts emphasize geographic distribution within 
and across theaters, decreased dependence upon fixed sites, and greater force resilience in 
the face of attack, each of which carries logistics costs. With these new concepts in mind, 
CSBA modeling of estimated Navy peacetime and wartime logistics demands for its projected 
FY 2019, 2033, and 2048 Battle Force identified major gaps in logistics capacity that would 
hinder the fleet’s ability to employ its preferred concepts at scale during conflict. 
Beyond what the Navy itself needs to support naval ships and aircraft, DoD also currently 
faces a sealift gap of approximately 200,000 square feet (equivalent to one to two ships, 
depending on their capacity and assuming no attrition) to move joint forces during a major 
conflict and is only able to generate 65 percent of required capacity. It also faces a shortage 
of more than 1,900 mariners during protracted operations. The Government-owned sealift 
fleet is rapidly approaching a capacity cliff; more than half of Ready Reserve Force ships will 
reach the end of their service lives within 15 years despite service life extension efforts and 
suffer from reduced readiness rates. The U.S. commercial fleet—from which DoD draws ships 
and mariners—is either barely stable or continues to shrink. At present, the United States 
is running a dangerous experiment: can a country be the preeminent naval power without 
being a strong overall maritime power? Without action, this will force DoD to rely on foreign 
commercial markets for sealift and other special maritime logistics capabilities at a time when 
China has increasingly dominant positions in these markets and may wield its economic  
influence against the United States. 
Thankfully, there are viable options for the United States to improve the resilience of its mari-
time logistics architecture—provided it acts quickly. Recognizing changes in the operating 
environment and Joint Force demands and prioritizing combat effectiveness over peacetime 
efficiency, a new architecture would meet current and future requirements. This would allow 
the fleet to fight in a more effective, distributed, and sustained manner while supporting U.S. 
Joint Force power projection. This fleet would be numerically larger, more differentiated, 
and—through some of the options highlighted in this report—only moderately more expensive 
than the programmed force.
Through a National Fleet approach coordinated among the Navy, the U.S. Department 
of Transportation (DOT) Maritime Administration (MARAD), and the broader Merchant 
Marine, the United States could transition to a resilient maritime logistics architecture within 
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15 years.1 Employing mature technologies; a mix of modifications, chartering, and stipends; 
and new construction, DoD could acquire or support the key platforms of this proposed archi-
tecture for roughly $47.8 billion (in FY 2019 dollars) over the next 30 years. This added cost 
represents 6 percent above what the agencies are already planning on spending on Navy 
procurement, Military Sealift Command charters, and MARAD Maritime Security Program 
(MSP) stipends over that period. It corrects the Navy’s current logistics deficit while improving 
overall fleet lethality, agility, and resilience, and it would revitalize the U.S. maritime sector.
Beyond concepts and funding, shifting to a new defense maritime logistics architecture will 
require bureaucratic champions inside and outside the Navy. These champions must not 
only articulate new logistics concepts, but also commit to providing the senior support and 
resources necessary to innovate while developing, procuring, and sustaining the next genera-
tion of maritime logistics forces. 
The maritime logistics architecture proposed in this study offers stakeholders options to 
address shortfalls in an affordable and sequenced manner that would increase U.S. opera-
tional, and in turn strategic, resilience. 
This study describes the composition of the current force, identifies challenges to the current 
strategic approach to maritime logistics, and reviews the historical evolution of U.S. mari-
time logistics. It then identifies threats and the operational concepts needed to overcome 
them before assessing the current and programmed force’s expected performance in potential 
scenarios. Informed by these assessments, it proposes a new maritime logistics fleet architec-
ture. The study then examines realistic options for building the future force and concludes by 
synthesizing the top findings, identifying areas for further examination, and offering  
actionable recommendations for DoD, MARAD, and Congress. 
An outline of this study’s top recommendations begins below. It is followed by a table and 
figure summarizing CSBA’s proposed logistics fleet architecture. Appendix A at the end of the 
study lists key near-term recommendations by U.S. Government entity.
1 The National Fleet refers to U.S. Navy, U.S. Coast Guard, U.S. Merchant Marine (supported by MARAD), National 
Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, U.S. Army, and other U.S. governmental and non-governmental maritime 
assets. “The term merchant marine refers to the commercial ships or fleet of a nation, and to the people who operate them. 
The U.S. Merchant Marine also serves as an auxiliary in time of war or national emergency, transporting goods or materiel 
needed by the Armed Forces.” “Frequently Asked Questions,” MARAD, available at www.marad.dot.gov/about-us/
frequently-asked-questions/.) This study focuses on the National Fleet inputs of the U.S. Navy and Merchant Marine.
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Study Recommendations
At-Sea Fleet Support
Refueling. The Navy should field a more diverse refueling fleet that addresses current 
and projected gaps in wartime refueling capacity. A mixed fleet would provide greater fuel 
capacity, would be relatively economical, would have redundancy in multiple platforms, and 
would only require a moderate increase in personnel.
1. “Go Big” by adopting Consolidated Logistics (CONSOL) and Modular Fuel Delivery 
System (MFDS)-equipped commercial tankers that would preposition a portion of war 
reserve fuel afloat and allow other refueling ships to resupply from tankers staged at 
intermediate locations, rather than having to transit longer distances to rear-area fuel 
depots. Some tankers could be Government-owned, while others long-term chartered 
and on a specialized tanker MSP stipend. 
2. “Go Small” by adopting commercial Offshore Support Vessels (OSVs) as light oilers 
(T-AOLs) with MFDS equipment to refuel combatants operating forward.
3. “Go Fast” by adopting a procurement approach of “2 for 1 in ‘21”, the construction of 
two oilers per year for a total of a billion dollars, starting in FY 2021. The Navy should 
buy additional T-AO 205s, its new oiler, to meet wartime demands.
4. “Go Different” by developing low-cost unmanned or minimally manned systems for 
providing fuel at sea in highly contested areas, especially for smaller combatants and 
future classes of medium and large unmanned vehicles.
5. Critically evaluate whether a future fast combat support ship (T-AOE) class provides 
the best value for the future threat environment and, if so, transition from T-AO 205 to 
a new T-AOE class toward the latter half of the accelerated T-AO 205 program (such as 
in FY 2028).
Cargo and Munitions. The Navy should shift to a new scalable and distributed approach to 
distributing cargo and delivering munitions to ships at sea.
1. Transition toward distributed aviation logistics operations, especially through greater 
use of the CMV-22B (the Navy’s cargo delivery variant of the MV-22).
2. Improve efficiency with new Roll-on/Roll-off (RO/RO) Dry Cargo/Ammunition, 
Resupply ships (termed T-AKER) that would transfer cargo and munitions underway 
to other logistics ships.
3. Increase combatant logistical self-reliance through increased stocks of spare parts and 
improved onboard fabrication capabilities. 
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The Navy should also increase combatant effectiveness through new munitions logistics 
capabilities. This should be undergirded by appropriate investments in munitions and other 
expendables and commensurate infrastructure. 
1. Adopt the aforementioned T-AKER ships.
2. Improve capabilities to reload munitions, including Vertical Launch System (VLS) cells 
and torpedoes, at anchor with existing auxiliary ships.
3. Field a capability to conduct VLS rearming at sea underway and at anchor, such as on a 
new class of modified containerships, termed Missile Rearmament Ship (T-AKM).
4. Develop new weapons technologies and concepts that yield greater operational effec-
tiveness and logistical supportability.
5. Consider a new generation of more effective and easily sustained weapons launchers.
Towing and Salvage. Taking into account current and future operating assumptions, the 
Navy should revise its wartime tug requirement from 8 to 15-26 and meet the new require-
ment with a revised acquisition approach. 
Expeditionary Maintenance and Repair. The Navy requires new afloat expeditionary 
maintenance and repair capabilities to provide peacetime and wartime support.
1. Expand the submarine tender fleet and acquire new surface tenders to support distrib-
uted and protracted operations far from shore facilities. 
2. Acquire and obtain assured access to a force of Float-On/Float-Off (FLO/FLO) ships 
to serve as ship transports and mobile floating dry dock repair stations. Some could be 
Government-owned, while others could be enrolled in specialized FLO/FLO MSP slots 
or engaged in a public-private partnership.
3. Acquire a force of light unmanned system tenders to support Navy unmanned surface 
and underwater vehicles. 
Search and Rescue (including Combat Search and Rescue) and Medical Support 
Afloat. 
1. The Navy should develop the capacity to meet wartime high frequency and quantity 
search and rescue requirements, including through the acquisition of new, long-range 
rescue platforms (such as the tiltrotor CMV-22B, the amphibious US-2, and unmanned 
or minimally-manned surface vessels). 
2. Unit-level survival and medical capabilities should be boosted, and the Navy should 
consider a different mix of fleet medical capabilities, including a new class of small 
hospital ships (such as one based on the EPF or other design) and a new class of 
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large hospital ships (such as one based on the Common Hull Auxiliary Multi-mission 
Platform), with priority given to more smaller hospital ships. 
Joint Force Maritime Logistics: Sealift
The current sealift force faces gaps in meeting current requirements, and the DoD’s Mobility 
Capabilities and Requirements Study 2018 (that should reflect requirements articulated in the 
new National Defense Strategy and address current and future levels of risk) may result in a 
larger sealift capacity requirement.
Sealift of Fuel. The Joint Force requires the capability to transport fuel to supply the opera-
tions of different Services.
To meet tanker requirements, DoD and MARAD should:
1. Improve financial incentives for U.S. tanker operators, including reforming the MSP to 
create specialized categories and compensation levels for tankers, consider offering a 
small stipend to Voluntary Tanker Agreement participants in domestic trade to equip, 
organize, and train operators, and pursue other reforms to improve the degree of U.S.-
flagged ship competitiveness on the open market.
2. Increase cargo for U.S.-flagged tankers by having the Defense Logistics Agency raise 
the proportion of fuel purchased from U.S. refineries to increase the amount of fuel 
transported by U.S. tankers and consider mandating that as a condition to export lique-
fied natural gas and crude oil applicants transport a gradually increasing portion of the 
energy on U.S.-built and U.S.-flagged tankers.
DoD also requires the ability to transfer bulk quantities of fuel from the sea to shore in loca-
tions where fuel terminals have been damaged or where existing terminals are nonexistent or 
low throughput. This capability is critical for amphibious and distributed aviation operations. 
As of 2019, DoD only has the capacity to conduct high throughput bulk fuel transfer using two 
ships (soon to be one with the retirement of the SS Petersburg). To address requirements, the 
Navy should:
1. Acquire additional fuel transfer systems
2. Develop more effective ship-to-shore transfer concepts and systems
Sealift of Dry Cargo and Munitions. To recapitalize the sealift force, DoD should:
1. Perform service life extension of select existing Government ships (mostly to 50 years 
and some to 60)
2. DoD should critically evaluate the military utility of RO/RO ships in the U.S.-flag and 
open market and acquire suitable ships for the government fleet. At the same time, 
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DoD should construct RO/ROs similar to existing Large, Medium-Speed, RO/ROs 
(LMSRs) or, alternatively, more smaller RO/ROs for greater resilience. 
3. Improve the Merchant Marine’s contribution to sealift by ensuring MSP is fully funded 
at authorized levels and increasing the length and periodicity of renewal of MSP 
coverage; expanding the MSP fleet and stipend amount (to the full operating differ-
ential level) to extend sealift capacity, global reach and influence, and commercial 
competitiveness of U.S.-flag operations; enacting tax, liability, and policy reforms to 
further increase U.S.-flag competitiveness; and consider chartering U.S.-flag commer-
cially-owned sealift ships to complement Government-owned ones and consider the 
utility of Dual-Use Vessel programs in which militarily useful U.S.-built ships operating 
in coastal trade would be partially sponsored by the Navy and MARAD and operated by 
commercial operators in exchange for contingency access.
Hardening of Maritime Logistics
Navy and Merchant Marine maritime logistics ships and their supporting networks are 
currently soft targets. An analytically-driven approach that identifies key investments in hard-
ening can provide a high degree of operational value at a moderate cost. Specifically, the Navy 
should:
1. Integrate maritime logistics forces with electromagnetic maneuver warfare and infor-
mation operations, including by adding secure command, control, and communications 
and counter-intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance systems on logistics ships 
and by fielding secure U.S. Government, Allied Government, and commercial logistics 
communications systems and networks.
2. Improve Navy concepts and techniques for the protection of logistics ships under 
different conditions, including against kinetic and non-kinetic threats.
3. Incorporate defensive systems on Combat Logistics Force (CLF) and select other mari-
time logistics ships.
4. Implement sealift readiness instruction to prepare Merchant Marine officers and crews 
for operations in contested environments. 
Incorporating Logistics into Navy System Design
The Navy should continue and deepen efforts that ease the logistics requirements of current 
and future platforms. It should modify current and future systems to improve efficiency and 
reduce costs, pursue new technologies with a high logistics impact that can generate major 
tactical and operational advantage, and critically evaluate the logistical impact of future ship 
and aircraft requirements.
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Organization for Sustainment Success
Improvements in the organization of the defense maritime logistics community should be 
pursued to increase specialization, innovation, and flexibility. There are opportunities for 
improvement within the U.S. Government (especially within DoD and MARAD), with the U.S. 
Merchant Marine and broader commercial sector, and with allies and partners. As directed by 
Congress in 2014, the DOT, which oversees MARAD, (and in cooperation with the Navy, the 
rest of DoD, and the Coast Guard) should develop and release a National Maritime Strategy 
that articulates a whole of government approach to revitalizing the U.S. maritime sector.
Table 1 summarizes this study’s proposed maritime logistics architecture, while Figure 1 
summarizes this study’s representative wartime laydown of logistics forces in a notional 
conflict in which U.S. forces fight against China while deterring opportunistic Russian 
aggression. 
TABLE 1: PROPOSED MARITIME LOGISTICS ARCHITECTURE
FY 2019 FY2033 FY2048
Ship Type Navy, Current CSBA, Proposed Navy, Projected CSBA, Proposed Navy, Projected CSBA, Proposed
Fuel
Fast Combat Support Ship (T-AOE) 2 2 2 2 + TBD 0 TBD
Replenishment Oiler (T-AO) 15 19 18 22 20 24
Light Oi ler (T-AOL)*** 12 20 23
CONSOL Tanker (T-AOT)** 6 19 6 20 6 22
Cargo and Munitions
Dry Stores Ship (T-AKE) 12 12 12 13 12 15
CONSOL Cargo Ship (T-AKER)*** 4 4 4




5 15 8 16 8 17
Float-On/Float-Off Heavy Li ft Ship** 8 8 8
Maintenance and Repairs
Submarine Tender (AS)* 2 5 2 5 2 5
Surface Combatant Tender (AD)* 4 4 4
Unmanned System Tender 5 8
CSAR and Medical
Hospital Ship (T-AH)* 2 2 TBD 2 TBD 2
Expeditionary Medical Ship (T-AHL) 5 5 5
Navy Battleforce Fleet**** 299 315 325 347 337 364
* Potential candidate for the Common Hull Auxiliary Multi-Purpose (CHAMP) vessel.
** Portions of this fleet may be applicable for long-term charter or a variant of the Maritime Security Program. Current CONSOL tankers are MSC longer-term charters and not counted in the Navy Battleforce.
*** Portions of this fleet may applicable for placement into the Ready Reserve Force. 
**** Current Navy Battleforce counting rules omit many types of auxiliaries. The CSBA, Proposed Battleforce count projections have added to the Navy, Projected Battleforce count any additional buys for 
planned Navy programs (T-AO 205, AS(X)), along with Surface Combatant Tenders, Unmanned System Tenders, and Light Hospital Ships. T-AOTs, T-AKERs, T-AKMs, and T-AOLs are, for all intents and 
purposes, part of the CLF in the view of this study, but partial placement into the RRF, in MSP, or on MSC long-term charter complicates their counting as part of the Battleforce.
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Logistics is the lifeblood of military forces. Military strategists routinely recognize the  
importance of adequate logistical support to conduct operations. Despite this, logistics forces 
are seldom appropriately resourced, among the last communities to receive augmentation 
during budget growth, and among the first to receive scrutiny during austerity. 
During World War II, the United States fielded a massive logistics force of thousands of 
vessels and other assets that supported U.S. and Allied forces in an unrelenting advance across 
numerous fronts to defeat the Axis Powers.2 In the Cold War, the core capability of this Navy 
and Merchant Marine force was preserved and improved to sustain a global  
military force that could credibly counter Communist aggression.3 Finally, in the aftermath of 
the Cold War, guiding strategies reaffirmed the importance of U.S. logistics forces in providing 
the United States an enduring power projection strategic competitive advantage against 
potential challengers.4 
In 2019, however, there are numerous indications that this area of U.S. competitive advantage 
now threatens to become a major weakness. Adversaries of the United States—the People’s 
Republic of China and the Russian Federation, in particular—have developed the means to 
degrade, deceive, and exploit the U.S. logistics architecture, with cascading effects on U.S. 
combat forces. Moreover, decades of cuts to logistics capability, capacity, and posture have 
resulted in a relatively small and brittle U.S. logistics force that at times chose and at times 
was forced to prioritize peacetime efficiency over wartime effectiveness and resiliency against 
capable adversaries. 
2 Worrall Reed Carter, Beans, Bullets, and Black Oil: The Story of Fleet Logistics Afloat in the Pacific During World War II 
(Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1953).
3 Thomas Wildenberg, Gray Steel and Black Oil: Fast Tankers and Replenishment at Sea in the U.S. Navy, 1912-1995 
(Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1996).
4 Les Aspin, Report on the Bottom-Up Review (Washington, DC: Office of the Secretary of Defense, October 1993).
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These growing logistics gaps pose three challenges. First, robust logistical capacity, capability, 
and readiness are some of the clearest and most compelling indicators to adversaries of U.S. 
military credibility, not only for short, sharp clashes but more importantly for protracted “gray 
zone” conflicts and high-intensity wars. The United States’ logistics shortfall undercuts U.S. 
deterrence and invites aggression. Second, U.S. logistical gaps threaten the ability of the Joint 
Force to develop and execute novel Concepts of Operation (CONOPS) for contested  
environments that exploit disaggregation and exterior lines of communication. Without 
adequate logistics capable of supporting these new concepts, U.S. forces may be forced to fight 
in ways and from locations that greatly increase their risk, such as in a highly concentrated 
manner or relying on contested basing. Furthermore, U.S. forces may be unable to project 
power to counter aggression and aid allies and partners. Third, and most serious, logistics 
vulnerabilities could cause the United States to lose a war—especially against China in the vast 
Indo-Pacific region—if significant improvements do not take place. 
This report focuses on the U.S. defense maritime logistics force (hereafter referred to as mari-
time logistics), the community of U.S. government and commercial assets that logistically 
support the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps at sea and ashore and provide sealift support to 
the Joint Force. Building on the initial insights on naval logistics generated by CSBA during 
its 2017 Alternative Fleet Architecture study,5 this report answers in detail two questions: Is 
the U.S. maritime logistics force adequate to support U.S. strategy and operational concepts 
against adversaries? If not, how can the United States improve the operational resilience of its 
maritime logistics?6 
This report contends that the current and programmed maritime logistics force is not 
adequate to support U.S. strategy and operational concepts against adversaries, and the 
United States can significantly improve the operational resilience of its maritime logistics 
by adopting new DoD and MARAD maritime logistics concepts, capabilities, capacities, and 
posture, some of which look substantially different than the existing force. In scoping the 
effort, the study analyzes five areas of maritime logistics support at and from the sea: 
1. Fuel: at-sea distribution of fuel to naval forces and sealift to forces ashore from sea 
systems; 
2. Cargo and Munitions: at-sea distribution of dry cargo and munitions to naval forces 
and the sealift of dry cargo and munitions to forces ashore;
5 Bryan Clark, Peter Haynes, Bryan McGrath, Craig Hooper, Jesse Sloman, and Timothy A. Walton, Restoring American 
Seapower: A New Fleet Architecture for the United States Navy (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and Budgetary 
Assessments, 2017).
6 The study employs the following definition of operational resilience developed by RAND: “Operational resilience: The 
capacity of a force to withstand attack, adapt, and generate sufficient power to achieve campaign objectives in the face of 
continued, adaptive enemy action.” Jeff Hagen, Forrest E. Morgan, Jacob L. Heim, and Matthew Carroll, The Foundations 
of Operational Resilience—Assessing the Ability to Operate in an Anti-Access/Area Denial Environment (Santa Monica, 
CA: RAND Corporation, 2016), p. 68. 
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3. Towing and Salvage: at-sea transport and recovery of naval platforms and systems; 
and
4. Expeditionary Maintenance and Repair: austere and at-sea maintenance and 
repair of naval forces;
5. Search and Rescue and Medical Requirements: at-sea rescue of personnel and 
transport and treatment of medical patients. 
This study’s scope is confined to at-sea elements of the U.S. maritime logistics enterprise and 
sealift; other critical areas of the enterprise are not systematically analyzed. For example, 
shore base and Defense Fuel Support Point fuel stores and distribution systems should be 
critically examined to determine whether they are resilient in the face of adversary threats and 
whether they should be rebalanced. Similarly, U.S. naval weapons inventory, naval magazine 
capacity, and stores deserve close study to determine whether there are enough magazines and 
weapons in them at the right locations. Additionally, U.S. Government and commercial logis-
tics networks ashore face documented vulnerabilities that adversaries could exploit.7 Finally, 
maritime logistics cooperation with U.S. allies and partners, such as Australia, Japan, Korea, 
NATO, New Zealand, Taiwan, Singapore, and the Compact of Free Association states, should 
significantly improve. 
This study describes the composition of the current maritime logistics architecture, assesses 
challenges to the current strategic approach to maritime logistics, and reviews the historical 
evolution of U.S. maritime logistics. It then identifies threats and the operational concepts 
needed to overcome them before assessing the current and programmed force’s expected 
performance in potential scenarios. Informed by these assessments, it proposes a new mari-
time logistics fleet architecture. The study then examines realistic options for building the 
future force and concludes by synthesizing the top findings, identifying areas for further exam-
ination, and offering actionable recommendations for DoD, MARAD, and Congress. 
7 General Darren W. McDew, then-Commander of USTRANSCOM testified to Congress in 2017: “The greatest challenge 
USTRANSCOM faces every day is the threat of attack from the cyber domain. Although cybersecurity is a DoD-wide focus 
area, USTRANSCOM is distinctly vulnerable because the majority of the Command’s transportation data resides within 
and travels through the unsecure commercial internet. . . . Due to these challenges, USTRANSCOM is prioritizing our key 
cyber concerns.” General Darren W. McDew, Commander, USTRANSCOM, “On the State of the Command,” statement 
before the Senate Armed Services Committee, May 2, 2017, pp. 17–18, available at www.armed-services.senate.gov/
download/mcdew_05-02-17. 
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CHAPTER 2
Current U.S. Maritime 
Logistics
The United States maritime logistics enterprise involves a diverse array of U.S. Government 
and commercial U.S. Merchant Marine assets that work together as part of a National Fleet 
to meet the demands of the Navy, other Services, and U.S. partners. Figure 2 summarizes 
the U.S. Government organizations responsible for managing, operating, and supporting the 
National Fleet, the focus of this study. 
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In its current form, the Navy’s fleet logistics concepts principally revolve around supporting 
concentrated Carrier Strike Groups (CSGs) and to a lesser degree Amphibious Ready Groups 
(ARGs) and other naval forces. The Navy uses an efficient hub-based model to support 
forward-operating forces, depicted in Figure 3. U.S. Government and predominantly U.S.-flag 
contracted Merchant Marine shipping transports fuel and materiel to forward naval  
logistics hubs, where it is loaded aboard shuttling Combat Logistics Force (CLF) ships that 
either relieve or replenish CLF station ships operating with CSGs.
The current CLF consists of 15 Henry J. Kaiser-class Fleet Replenishment Oilers (T-AO), 12 
Lewis and Clark-class Dry Cargo/Ammunition Carriers (T-AKE), and two Supply-class Fast 
Combat Support Ships (T-AOE). Other fleet logistics assets include five fleet ocean tugs and 
rescue and salvage ships (planned to be replaced with eight new tugs [T-ATS(X)]), two  
submarine tenders (AS), two large hospital ships (T-AH), expeditionary basing and transport 
ships (two Expeditionary Transport Dock [ESD] ships, three of a planned six Expeditionary 
Sea Base [ESB] ships, and eight of a planned 14 Expeditionary Fast Transport [EPF] ships), 
and number of other fuel and cargo auxiliaries. 
Complementing surface logistics for the fleet, Navy Reserve and commercial fixed-wing  
aviation bring urgent cargo and passengers to Navy forward hubs, while aircraft (fixed-wing 
C-2As and in the next few years tiltrotor CMV-22Bs) deliver personnel and supplies to CVNs 
and ship-based rotary aviation (MH-60S, MH-53E, and other helicopters) distribute supplies 
throughout the fleet via vertical replenishment (VERTREP). 
FIGURE 3: MODERN U .S . MARITIME LOGISTICS NETWORK, FROM SHORE TO SHIP 
Figure inspired by Congressional Budget Office, Issues and Options for the Navy’s Combat Logistics Force (Washington, DC: Congressional Budget 
Office, 1988), p. 6, available at http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a530785.pdf.
Afloat forces are employed in all three phases of strategic mobility: prepositioning, deploy-
ment (or surge), and sustainment.8 These sealift assets transport units’ vehicles, equipment, 
and other systems along with necessary supplies to areas of interest. To assemble sealift 
sufficient to support U.S. military requirements, DoD and MARAD rely on a mix of U.S. 





















Government and Merchant Marine ships and personnel. There are four primary compo-
nents of the U.S. strategic sealift force, as described in Table 2. The Navy (through MSC) and 
MARAD jointly manage sealift capabilities to permit the deployment and sustainment of U.S. 
forces during peacetime and war. MSC’s general policy is to use commercial sealift wherever 
possible to support the U.S.-flagged Merchant Marine in peacetime. During contingencies 
requiring significant quantities of sealift, in addition to the Maritime Prepositioning Force, the 
MSC Surge Fleet would be activated to transport forces. If necessary, the MARAD-managed 
RRF would also be activated to transport and sustain forces. Lastly, additional, non-previously 
chartered U.S. Merchant Marine ships would be activated through the Voluntary Intermodal 
Sealift Agreement and Voluntary Tanker Agreement.
TABLE 2: U .S . STRATEGIC SEALIFT FLEET
The United States has developed a maritime logistics enterprise optimized for forward  
presence and power projection under low threat levels. However, as the rest of this report will 
Strategic Sealift Component Function
Prepositioning Fleet • Forward deploys equipment closer to potential conflict areas to facil itate rapid deployment of Marine Corps Air Ground 
Task Forces (MAGTFs) and to provide initial equipment and sustainment support for Army and USAF units.
• Government-owned (MSC operated) purpose-built ships 
Maritime Prepositioning Force (MPF)
2 x Bob Hope-class T-AKR Large, Medium-Speed Roll-On/Roll-Off
(RO/RO)(LMSR)
2 x Watson-class T-AKR LMSR
1 x Shughart-class T-AK Combined Container-RO/RO Ship
5 x Bobo-class T-AK Dry Cargo Container Ships
2 x Lewis and Clark-class T-AKE
2 x Montford Point-class T-ESD Mobile Landing Platforms
Army and Air Force Prepositioning Stocks
5 x Watson-class T-AKR LMSR
4 x T-AK Dry Cargo Container Ships (disparate ships)
Surge Force • Projects forces by rapidly transporting Joint (especially 1st stage Army) vehicles and equipment from CONUS
• Government-owned (MSC operated) purpose-built or converted ships
MSC Surge Force
3 x Sergeant Matej Kocak-class T-AK Dry Cargo Container Ships
2 x T-AK Dry Cargo Container Ships (disparate ships)
5 x Bob Hope-class T-AKR LMSR
2 x Gordon-class T-AKR LMSR
1 x Watson-class T-AKR LMSR
2 x Shughart-class T-AK Combined Container-RO/RO Ship
Ready Reserve Force (RRF) • Continues projecting forces and provides sustainment capability 
• Government-owned (MARAD-operated) former commercial ships, part of National Defense Reserve Fleet
MARAD RRF
35 x RO/RO of mixed capability
6 x Crane Ship (ACS)
2 x Barge Ships (AKR)
2 x Aviation Logistics Support Container Ships (AVB)
1 x Tanker (AOT)
Maritime Security Program (MSP) • Focused on providing sustainment capability, although can project forces; also conducts commerce and provides steady-
state transportation and sustainment  to DoD forces overseas
• Commercially-owned and operated U.S.-flag Merchant Marine ships. Operators make ships, crews, and intermodal 
logistics networks available to DoD in war or national emergency in exchange for participation in Voluntary Intermodal 
Service Agreement or Voluntary Tanker Agreement and receipt of a stipend
MSP
24 x Containership
10 x Geared Containership
6 x Heavy Lift
18 x RO/RO
2 x Tanker
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discuss, the fleet logistics and sealift fleets that served the United States well 15 years ago in 
Operation Iraqi Freedom and support ongoing operations face gaps in capability and capacity. 
Although they have proven their value in the past, they are insufficient for the future. 
DoD now requires a maritime logistics force focused on providing support in combat against 
great power competitors, specifically China and Russia. The transformation of the current 
force will require a renewed pursuit of wartime effectiveness over peacetime efficiency. To 
guide these efforts, DoD should first examine challenges to the current strategic approach. 
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CHAPTER 3
Challenges to the Current 
Strategic Approach
Since World War II, the United States has held three enduring global interests: maintenance 
of a favorable balance of power that prevents the rise of a regional or global hegemon,  
continuation of economic access, and the open promotion of liberal democratic values. In 
support of these interests, the United States has extended economic relationships and security 
commitments across the world, and wherever significant deployments of U.S. forces support 
those commitments, there is a maritime link in the logistics support chain that transports and 
sustains them. This chapter examines relevant U.S. strategy and scenarios that should guide 
the assessment of current and future maritime logistics needs.
Implications for Maritime Logistics from U.S. Strategy
Maintaining global interests requires maritime power to conduct commerce and to deploy, 
project, and sustain U.S. forces. Promoting American economic prosperity has long been a 
pillar of U.S. grand strategy; economic vitality facilitates other U.S. policy goals at home and 
abroad.9 The goods and services underpinning the U.S. economy continue to be linked to the 
sea. Twelve percent of U.S. GDP is derived from exports, and the United States spends 15 
9 Promoting American prosperity is one of the pillars identified in the recently released U.S. National Security Strategy. 
White House, National Security Strategy of the United States of America (Washington, DC: The White House, December 
2017), available at www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/NSS-Final-12-18-2017-0905.pdf.
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percent of GDP on imports.10 More than 69 percent of U.S. foreign trade and 99 percent of 
non-Canada and Mexico trade goes by sea.11 
The combination of the U.S. Merchant Marine and the U.S. military are the ultimate safe-
guards of this seaborne commerce and its place within the U.S. economy. Navy and Coast 
Guard vessels also support the maintenance of a free and open global economic order and 
safeguard U.S. maritime economic zones. 
The other facet of U.S. maritime power is military power projection. The United States has 
maintained forward-deployed and expeditionary power projection capabilities throughout its 
history and especially since the end of World War II to confront challengers at distance from 
American shores.12 Navy combatants and the Navy logistics vessels and services that support 
them constitute part of this first line of U.S. defense. In addition, more than 90 percent of 
the military cargo needed by U.S. forces has been transported by sea.13 Movement of military 
cargos in volume by ship is likely to remain the most efficient and cost-effective method of 
transportation for the foreseeable future. 
This logistical backbone that supports the Joint Force is receiving new attention. The 2017 
National Security Strategy of the United States calls for a force sufficiently large to be “capable 
of operating at sufficient scale and for ample duration to win across a range of scenarios” and 
asserts military “readiness requires a renewed focus on training, logistics, and maintenance. 
We must be able to get to a theater in time to shape events quickly. This will require a resilient 
forward posture and agile global mobility forces.”14 In the face of a changing operational envi-
ronment, the 2018 National Defense Strategy specifically notes “resilient and agile logistics” as 
one of eight capability areas that need to be strengthened to prepare the United States for an 
era of renewed great power competition. The National Defense Strategy states:
Investments will prioritize prepositioned forward stocks and munitions, strategic mobility 
assets, partner and allied support, as well as non-commercially dependent distributed logistics 
and maintenance to ensure logistics sustainment while under persistent multi-domain attack.15 
10 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) data from 2016. “Trade in Goods and Services,” 
OECD Data, March 12, 2018, available at data.oecd.org/trade/trade-in-goods-and-services.htm.
11 Trade percentages are as measured by weight. See “Freight Moved in Domestic and International Trade,” in 
Department of Transportation (DOT), Freight Facts & Figures 2017, Bureau of Transportation Statistics (Washington, 
DC: DOT, updated November 15, 2017), available at www.bts.gov/bts-publications/freight-facts-and-figures/
freight-facts-figures-2017-chapter-2-freight-moved.
12 U.S. Navy, U.S. Marine Corps, and U.S. Coast Guard, A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower, Revised 
(Washington, DC: U.S. Navy, U.S. Marine Corps, and U.S. Coast Guard, 2015), available at www.navy.mil/local/
maritime/150227-CS21R-Final.pdf.
13 John Frittelli, Cargo Preferences for U.S.-Flag Shipping (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, October 29, 
2015), p. 1. 
14 White House, National Security Strategy of the United States of America (2017), pp. 28–29.
15 Department of Defense (DoD), Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy of the United States of America: 
Sharpening the American Military’s Competitive Edge (Washington, DC: DoD, January 2018), p. 7, available at www.
defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/2018-National-Defense-StrategySummary.pdf.
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The current force is not prepared or postured to do this, nor do current modernization plans 
adequately pursue the capabilities necessary to meet this goal. This report examines the mari-
time logistics component and offers some solutions.
Scenarios for U.S. Maritime Logistics
In identifying maritime logistics capabilities that merit the greatest emphasis, this report 
examines relevant notional scenarios to reveal distinct operational needs. Several scenarios 
are mentioned to contextualize how maritime logistics support national defense and U.S. 
commitments abroad and capture, at a general level, expectations regarding how forces might 
be employed in conflicts. The two pacing scenarios for this study involve war with China and 
war with Russia. The former scenario emphasizes naval and air logistics, while the latter 
emphasizes sealift and air logistics. Both will require extensive levels of naval, air, and sealift 
logistics. The scenarios are examined for FY 2019 and FY 2033 (14 years in the future). Two 
additional scenarios are considered: a conflict with North Korea and a concurrent conflict 
against a great power adversary and an opportunistic aggressor. 
This report uses a conflict with the People’s Republic of China (PRC) as one of its two chief 
planning scenarios. Overall, the scenario features U.S. action to counter PRC aggression 
swiftly and reverse PRC gains, backed by the commitment to conduct a prolonged, global 
compellence campaign as necessary. 
A conflict with the PRC would require high levels of maritime logistics support. Conflict with 
the PRC could be instigated by Chinese aggression against Taiwan, Japan, the Philippines, or 
other nations in the region. It could also be caused by efforts to control passage through inter-
national water or airspace. Regardless of the initial cause of the conflict, it may not remain 
localized. Due to spreading Chinese military presence across the world, it is likely that U.S. 
military forces would need to conduct operations not only across the Indo-Pacific region but 
elsewhere. Accordingly, maritime logistics support would be needed in the different areas U.S. 
naval forces would operate. The vast distances of the Indo-Pacific region and high operational 
tempo of naval forces would almost certainly stress elements of maritime logistics. This report 
estimates that to maintain a high tempo of distributed operations in a conflict with China 
the Navy’s forward-operating fleet afloat may consume more than 150,000 barrels (bbl) of 
F-76 naval and JP-5 aviation fuel per day; over the course of a month, the fleet may consume 
greater than 4.5 million bbl—the equivalent of 14 tanker loads.16 The fleet might fire more than 
360 Vertical Launch System (VLS) cells per day (more than 10,800 a month, or more than 
thirteen times the number of Tomahawk cruise missiles, a type of weapon that can be fired 
16 This estimate calculates the refueling demands of the portions of the Navy’s programmed FY 2019 fleet that are forward-
deployed countering PRC aggression in the scenario (96 surface ships, exclusive of oilers and tankers), using the laydown 
and concepts discussed in CSBA’s 2017 alternative fleet architecture study, Restoring American Seapower. For more 
information on the inputs and methodology behind these estimates, see Chapter 6 and Appendix B on Quantitative 
Assessments. Of note, tankers are assumed to have a capacity of 320,000 bbl, the upper limit of militarily useful tankers 
as defined by Joint Publication 4-01.2. There are 42 gallons (approximately 158.9 liters) in a barrel of fuel.
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from VLS, fired by the Navy during Operation Iraqi Freedom in 2003), and employ more than 
10,000 tons of other munitions and expendables over a month.17 These and other supplies 
would need to be transported across the vast Pacific and Indian Oceans, with the 4,000 nm 
journey from Pearl Harbor to the western Pacific taking nearly 10 days at a moderately fast 20 
kn and the 8,700 transit from Pearl Harbor to the central Indian Ocean taking nearly 21 days 
at the same speed.18 
Additionally, rapid, high-capacity sealift would be necessary to project sufficient combat 
power to deny further and roll-back Chinese gains. This would likely focus on the deployment 
and sustainment of ground forces such as ground-based fires (to both primary bases and new 
Expeditionary Advanced Bases and Multi-Domain Battle operating sites the Marine Corps and 
Army, respectively, envision), naval shore-based support, and shore support for air forces. In 
some cases, it may also require the use of sealift to reinforce or sustain partners under attack. 
This would likely involve the deployment of not only prepositioned forces, but also the  
activation of the Military Sealift Command (MSC) Surge Force, MARAD Ready Reserve Force 
(RRF), and the U.S. Merchant Marine’s Maritime Security Program (MSP) ships to project 
forces forward and then sustain them.19 Additionally, with peacetime patterns of fuel trans-
port in the Indo-Pacific likely disrupted by a Sino-U.S. conflict, the Joint Force (the U.S. Navy 
and Air Force in particular) will need to rely on additional organic or chartered tankers and 
over-the-shore fuel distribution systems to bring fuel from beyond the theater and distribute it 
across the theater. U.S. Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM) has identified a  
requirement for 86 fuel tanker ships.20 
During the conflict, it is likely U.S. forces (including MSC and other sealift assets) would come 
under attack, requiring search and rescue and medical, towing and salvage, and expeditionary 
maintenance and repair support. Assuming the attrition of 20 percent of the deployed force in 
a set period of time, more than 30 manned ships could be damaged or destroyed with nearly 
17 This estimate calculates the munitions demands of the portions of the Navy’s programmed FY 2019 fleet that are forward-
deployed countering PRC aggression in the scenario, using the laydown and concepts discussed in CSBA’s 2017 alternative 
fleet architecture study, Restoring American Seapower. It assumes surface combatants fire an eighth of their VLS 
magazine capacity per day and reload from either ships or shore points an average 1,250 nm away. There are an estimated 
5,916 VLS cells in the portion of the fleet that is forward-deployed countering PRC aggression in the scenario. This firing 
rate would equate to approximately 1.8 reloads per cell per month. For more information on the inputs and methodology 
behind these estimates, see Chapter 6 and Appendix B on Quantitative Assessments. As a historical point of reference, 
during Operation Iraqi Freedom in 2003, the U.S. Navy launched 802 BGM-109 Tomahawks. Wallace T. Martin, Arming 
the Fleet: Providing Our Warfighters the Decisive Advantage, 1943–2011, 3rd edition (China Lake and Point Mugu, CA: 
Naval Air Warfare Center Weapons Division, 2013), p. 62. 
18 Transit time estimates assume a 15 percent evasion distance tax and a true speed of 20 kn. 
19 Surge Force and RRF ships are government-owned ships maintained in a reduced operating status by MSC and MARAD, 
respectively. Through the MSP, U.S.-flag operators provide DoD contingency access through participation in the Voluntary 
Intermodal Sealift Agreement or Voluntary Tanker Agreement to their commercial, U.S.-flag ships and intermodal 
logistics network in exchange for a stipend that partially offsets the higher cost of operating a vessel as U.S.-flagged.
20 Lieutenant General Stephen Lyons, U.S. Army, Deputy Commander of USTRANSCOM, “Logistics and Sealift Forces,” 
statement before House Armed Services Committee Subcommittee on Seapower and Projection Forces, March 22, 2016, 
p. 3.
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2,800 personnel killed and more than 5,700 requiring rescue or medical attention, and heavy 
aviation losses could result in scores to hundreds of aviators needing rescue.21 
The second chief planning scenario in this study is a conflict with Russia initiated by an  
invasion of the Baltic states. Overall, the scenario would likely feature a U.S. commitment to 
counter Russian aggression swiftly and reverse Russian gains, backed by the commitment to 
conduct a prolonged, global compellence campaign as necessary. In this scenario, U.S. and 
other NATO forces would engage Russian forces in Europe and may engage Russian forces 
throughout the Mediterranean, the North Pacific, the Arctic, and other parts of Eurasia. 
Maritime logistics support would be needed in the different areas U.S. naval forces would 
operate. 
To deny further and roll-back Russian gains, rapid, high-capacity sealift would be needed to 
project sufficient combat power, especially ground forces. This would likely involve the deploy-
ment of not only prepositioned forces, but also the activation of the MSC Surge Force, the 
MARAD RRF, and the U.S. Merchant Marine’s MSP ships to move forces forward and then 
sustain them.22 USTRANSCOM has identified a requirement for 91 Roll-On/Roll-Off (RO/RO) 
ships in a challenging scenario, in addition to other sealift assets.23 In addition, with Europe 
a net importer of fuel, the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) would need to work with MSC to 
transport additional fuels to the theater (especially military-unique fuels and  
additives) and work with local refineries to increase production. Lastly, as with a China 
scenario, it is likely maritime forces (including CLF and sealift assets) would come under 
attack, requiring search and rescue and medical, towing and salvage, and expeditionary  
maintenance and repair support. 
In a conflict with North Korea on the Korean Peninsula, maritime logistics forces would 
need to use sealift assets to rapidly reinforce U.S. and Republic of Korea military forces. 
Additionally, maritime logistics support, especially from CLF supporting carrier operations, 
would be needed to sustain a high tempo of naval strike operations. 
In the post-Cold War era, the United States adopted a “two major regional contingencies” 
force sizing construct to deter and respond to opportunistic aggression in the event the United 
States became engaged in a major conflict. Although originally sized to defeat two countries 
21 For more information on the inputs and methodology behind these estimates, see Chapter 6 and Appendix B on 
Quantitative Assessments.
22 During the Cold War, the United States annually exercised a rapid division-level reinforcement of Europe known as 
REFORGER (Return of Forces to Germany) to deter Soviet aggression. These exercises, in which forces were deployed 
forward, complemented plans of storing six divisions worth of equipment in warehouses, primarily in Germany. Although 
the U.S. Army never met the objective of six divisions worth of equipment, it did amass multiple divisions of hardware. 
The REFORGER exercises ended in 1993. The theater-prepositioned stocks and forward deployed units that the planned 
division would fall in on have since dwindled to a small amount of brigade-level equipment, increasing the materiel 
that will need to be transported during a contingency. Russian aggression in the Baltics is of particular concern; the 
relative isolation of the Baltic States from the rest of NATO and the Russian ability to contest transit across the Baltic Sea 
precludes easy reinforcement and resupply by sea.
23 Lyons, “Logistics and Sealift Forces,” p. 3.
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approximating Iraq and North Korea, in the contemporary environment, U.S. forces may 
confront both China and Russia or a great power and a smaller regional challenger  
simultaneously. The Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy calls for sizing the fully 
mobilized Joint Force to be capable of “defeating aggression by a major power; deterring 
opportunistic aggression elsewhere; and disrupting imminent terrorist and WMD threats.”24 
Any of the above scenarios would likely require extensive levels of naval and air logistics and 
sealift. Therefore, some aspects of the maritime logistics force may need to be sized to conduct 
concurrent operations. Through a process of assessment that included modeling, this study 
sized the maritime logistics force to be capable of defeating aggression by a great power adver-
sary and simultaneously supporting modest deterrence forces in another theater.25
Shifting Operational Environment for Logistics
Adversaries of the United States (in particular China and Russia) have developed multi-
domain capabilities that threaten U.S. combat and logistics forces across the spectrum of 
conflict. Coupled with a revisionist intent to expand their territory and influence, eject the 
United States from regions, and change the international order, these adversaries pose major 
threats to U.S., allied, and partner forces. Although much of the current discussion regarding 
anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) capabilities focuses on the sensors and weapons needed to 
destroy U.S. forces in theater and keep reinforcements out, the ability to impose friction deep 
within the logistics chain offers additional means to slow U.S. reactions and undercut support 
for forward forces. For logistics planners supporting operations at any level between gray zone 
and high-intensity conflict, A2/AD begins before U.S. assets even leave the Continental United 
States.26 
In an effort to counter U.S. maritime logistics, PLA forces may employ the PLA’s “Active 
Strategic Counterattacks on Exterior Lines” operational guidance theory.27 Roughly equivalent 
to the doctrine of Western militaries, operational guidance theory asserts the PLA’s interest 
in employing capabilities to target relatively undefended enemy rear echelon deployment and 
support systems. Such an approach would degrade the combat potential of an enemy oper-
ating on exterior lines of communication, such as the United States. 
24 DoD, Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy, p. 6.
25 This force-sizing approach incurs significant risk, since it is not appropriate to defeat two great power adversaries 
simultaneously. This study estimated that the naval non-logistics forces necessary to defeat two great powers 
simultaneously would significantly exceed the planned size of the Navy’s fleet, even at the Navy’s 2016 Force Structure 
Assessment objective Battle Force of 355 ships. To effectively estimate the requisite maritime logistics force to defeat two 
great powers simultaneously, additional non-logistics, primarily combat, forces would be needed. 
26 For more information on gray zone operations, see Bryan Clark, Mark Gunzinger, and Jesse Sloman, Winning in the 
Gray Zone: Using Electromagnetic Warfare to Regain Escalation Dominance (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and 
Budgetary Assessments, 2017).
27 “Active Strategic Counterattacks on Exterior Lines,” or [积极的战略外线反击作战] is a rare Chinese doctrinal term 
introduced in English in Anton Lee Wishik II, “An Anti-Access Approximation: The PLA’s Active Strategic Counterattacks 
on Exterior Lines,” China Security 19, 2011, p. 37. 
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The PLA’s counter-logistics approach is informed by its post-Operation Desert Storm anal-
ysis of vulnerabilities in the U.S. methods of warfare likely to be brought against China.28 
Specifically, Chinese authors highlighted the logistics challenges associated with U.S. air 
and naval operations in the Western Pacific as a major vulnerability.29 Accordingly, Chinese 
campaign concepts call for consideration of preventive or preemptive attacks on U.S. forces to 
achieve strategic and operational surprise and deny U.S. forces the ability to mass forces and 
supplies. Given the importance of logistics to U.S. concepts of operation, Chinese concepts and 
capabilities that seek to target them merit close attention. 
China has developed powerful forces capable of challenging the U.S. ability to project power, 
deter and defeat aggression, and operate effectively in the various warfighting domains. Today 
the PLA Navy (PLAN) boasts the largest fleet in the world in terms of numbers of ships and 
second largest in terms of tonnage, with a large portion of ships built in the last decade. The 
PLA also has a very modern air force, which increasingly operates at a significant distance 
from the Chinese Mainland and will likely field new aircraft—such as a low-observable 
bomber—in the near future. The PLA Rocket Force deploys a wide array of conventional land-
attack and anti-ship cruise and ballistic missiles and will likely field new hypersonic missiles in 
the near future. Guiding these weapons, the PLA has a dense long-range surveillance network 
and increasingly adopts new Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance and command 
and control technologies, to include greater use of artificial intelligence. The PLA’s Strategic 
Support Force and intelligence apparatus provide it with information superiority capabilities, 
the capability to conduct cyber and kinetic attacks globally, and the ability to attempt to coerce 
government and commercial actors.30 Collectively, these forces combine to field a potent A2/
AD complex (as shown in Figure 4). The major threat posed by China will grow as the PLA 
continues to develop capabilities, posture, and forces suited for global power projection, in 
addition to its existing regionally-focused forces.31
28 The PLA has also examined historical campaigns and the importance of counter-logistics. For example, PLAN 
analyses of the World War II Guadalcanal campaign point out how “Japanese forces were not only inadequately 
supplied, but also critically failed to target American rear supply depots.” Lyle Goldstein, “China’s Navy Is Studying 
the Battle of Guadalcanal,” The National Interest, August 26, 2018, available at https://nationalinterest.org/feature/
chinas-navy-studying-battle-guadalcanal-heres-why-it-matters-29687.
29 In Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm, it took the United States six months to transport several divisions’ worth 
of ground forces and other supplies to the region. The slow buildup of “iron mountains” of military materiel at forward 
bases in the Persian Gulf furnished coalition forces with the support necessary to deter further Iraqi encroaches into Saudi 
Arabia and then to later expel them from Kuwait in a matter of days. Mark Stokes, China’s Strategic Modernization: 
Implications for the United States (Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, 1999), pp. 79–97, 
135–145.)
30 Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI), The PLA Navy: New Capabilities and Missions for the 21st Century (Washington, DC: 
ONI, 2015), pp. 13–25; and Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), Military and Security Developments Involving the 
People’s Republic of China 2016, Annual Report to Congress (Washington, DC: DoD, 2016), pp. 22–29.
31 China’s Military Strategy (Beijing: The State Council Information Office of the People’s Republic of China, May 2015), 
available at http://news.usni.org/2015/05/26/document-chinas-military-strategy. 
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FIGURE 4: CHINESE ANTI-ACCESS/AREA-DENIAL COMPLEX
Data to build this graphic was derived from IHS Jane’s (2019); National Air and Space Intelligence Center (NASIC), Ballistic and Cruise Missile 
Threat (2017); and CSIS Missile Threat (2019).
Another area that China’s Communist Party has emphasized is developing an integrated mari-
time strategy. In addition to building up its Navy, Coast Guard, and maritime militia, China 
has crafted a global lead in the commercial maritime industry.32 China’s government, in coop-
eration with its State Owned Enterprises, has systematically developed the largest global 
network of ports (as depicted in Figure 5), the largest shipbuilding industry, and a world-class 
merchant marine that incorporates national defense features and regularly exercises with 
its Navy.33 As part of its Made in China 2025 plan, the Chinese leadership has emphasized 
maritime equipment and high-tech shipping as one of ten key sectors to integrate advanced 
32 Norwegian global quality assurance and risk management company DNV GL and Norwegian consultancy Menon ranked 
China as the “leading maritime nation” in a comparison of global maritime industries in 2018: this was assessed by 
its place in shipping (in terms of ship ownership), finance and law, maritime technology, and ports and logistics. “The 
Leading Maritime Nations of the World,” Menon and DNV GL, DNVGL, 2018, available at www.dnvgl.com/news/
china-tops-the-table-dnv-gl-and-menon-economics-release-leading-maritime-nations-of-the-world-2018-128591.
33 Dennis Blasko, “China’s Merchant Marine,” paper presented at the China as a Maritime Power Conference, July 28–29, 
2015, p. 21, available at www.cna.org/cna_files/pdf/china-merchant-marine.pdf.
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information technology with industry.34 It has also used industrial espionage and joint 
ventures to accelerate its shipbuilding development. In a contingency, the PRC may be able to 
use its network of ports and merchant marine to project power or deny access to the United 
States. Even in ports not directly controlled by China, the PRC’s massive trade footprint 
may allow it to impede the loading/unloading and transshipment of U.S. and allied military 
cargos in a time of crisis. Coupling the scale and sophistication of Chinese capabilities with an 
economy capable of rivaling or surpassing that of the United States in the future results in a 
China that is a peer threat in the Indo-Pacific and an increasing concern in other geographic 
areas.35
FIGURE 5: GLOBAL PORTS WITH MAJOR INVESTMENT OR CONTROL BY CHINESE 
COMPANIES
Today, the PRC is at the forefront of the strategic and operational challenges facing U.S. mari-
time logistics. It is, however, by no means the only country pursuing this approach.36 Russia 
has also made great strides in its capabilities to disrupt U.S. maritime logistics.
Russia has been rebuilding its military over the past decade. It has employed its forces to 
invade and occupy parts of Ukraine, support the Assad regime in Syria, and harass NATO 
34 Michael Brown and Pavneet Singh, China’s Technology Transfer Strategy: How Chinese Investments in Emerging 
Technology Enable a Strategic Competitor to Access the Crown Jewels of U.S. Innovation (Washington, DC: 
Defense Innovation Unit Experimental, 2018), p. 34, available at https://admin.govexec.com/media/diux_
chinatechnologytransferstudy_jan_2018_(1).pdf. 
35 Comprehensive National Power is a Chinese quantitative assessment of a state’s net military, economic, and cultural 
power. China Institute of Contemporary International Relations, Global Strategic Pattern: International Environment of 
China in the New Century (Beijing: Shishi Press, 2000).
36 For a description of the A2/AD challenge and some of the components of the Chinese approach, see Andrew Krepinevich, 
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forces. Moreover, it has rapidly modernized its long-range engagement and targeting capa-
bility by fielding long-range ground, air, and sea-launched missiles. Furthermore, the Russian 
navy has fielded new classes of very quiet and capable submarines.37 The combination of 
Russia’s long-range fires and submarine forces may provide it the ability to interdict U.S. and 
allied logistics at sea and at ports of embarkation and debarkation (as shown in Figure 6). 
FIGURE 6: SOME POTENTIAL THREATS TO SEALIFT SHIPS IN A RUSSIA SCENARIO
As with China, Russia also has sophisticated cyber and unconventional means to target U.S. 
logistics. Among others, U.S. logistics networks are highly vulnerable to cyberattack and 
exploitation. General Darren McDew, then-Commander of U.S. Transportation Command 
testified in March 2018: “threats in the cyber domain pose the greatest threat to our deci-
sive logistics advantage.”38 Although a more detailed discussion of this topic is outside the 
scope of this report, absent major changes in both U.S. Government and commercial logistics 
networks, adversary cyber operations hold the potential of seriously exploiting or disrupting 
U.S. maritime logistics in particular and Joint Force plans in general to disastrous effect. 
37 Kathleen H. Hicks, Andrew Metrick, Lisa Sawyer Samp, and Kathleen Weinberger, Undersea Warfare in Northern 
Europe (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2016), pp. 10–12.
38 General Darren W. McDew, Commander, USTRANSCOM, statement before the House Armed Services Committee, 
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Chinese and Russian counter-logistics capabilities (consisting of an integrated mix of whole-
of-society measures) will surpass those of other countries. Nonetheless, many of the military 
capabilities that China and Russia have developed and deployed are also proliferating to other 
nations such as North Korea and Iran. In particular, technologies for land and anti-ship cruise 
and ballistic missiles and long-range radars are allowing these regional powers to develop 
their own local battle networks to threaten or attack U.S. and allied combat and logistics 
forces.
Conclusion
The world is changing around the U.S. maritime logistics force, whose concepts are still 
designed for late Cold War-style operations but whose reduced size and less-resilient capa-
bilities are those of the post-Cold War era. New operational concepts and investments geared 
toward addressing operating in contested environments should consider how the maritime 
logistics force can become more resilient against the aforementioned threats. With significant 
portions of that logistics network integrated with commercial markets for fuel, shipping, port 
access, and other activities, the Navy, other Services, and MARAD will need to cooperate with 
industry and Congress to ensure the United States can continue to send forces abroad at the 
time and place of its choosing, and then sustain those forces for however long it may take to 
maintain the national interest.
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CHAPTER 4
The Evolution of U.S. 
Maritime Logistics
This chapter identifies key moments in the history of the U.S. maritime logistics force and 
offers select observations on the history of the force in order to illuminate the evolution of 
these forces and inform the remainder of this report.39 
Historical Evolution of the U.S. Maritime Logistics Force
The development of U.S. maritime logistics in the late 19th and 20th centuries paralleled the 
rise of the United States as a global power. Tracking the evolution of the force illuminates 
how critical decisions shaped the force. For the purposes of this chapter, maritime logistics is 
divided into fleet logistics and strategic sealift. 
Fleet logistics support to forward-deployed naval vessels has been the main conceptual driver 
of maritime logistics for the U.S. Navy. Encapsulated by changes in concepts and technology, 
modern fleet logistics can be divided into four distinct eras (and a possible fifth) as shown in 
Figure 7. 
39 This chapter is a small subset of a larger, forthcoming work by the authors on the evolution of U.S. maritime logistics. It 
is heavily informed by the following works: Wildenberg, Gray Steel and Black Oil; Carter, Beans, Bullets, and Black Oil; 
and Robert O. Work, Thinking About Seabasing: All Ahead Slow (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and Budgetary 
Assessments, 2006).
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FIGURE 7: ERAS OF U .S . NAVY FLEET SUPPORT LOGISTICS
In the Anchorage Era, Navy ships resupplied either in port or at anchorage. The Spanish-
American War and the subsequent Great White Fleet expedition revealed the Navy’s 
challenges deploying long distances. During the early 1910s, Navy ships made evolutionary 
improvements to speed the loading of coal at anchorage and began a transition to oil-fired 
ships, with longer cruising ranges and requiring less personnel to man powerplants. 
In 1917, however, the second era began: the Expeditionary Era. During this period, innovative 
officers and bureaucratic champions impelled changes in fleet logistics. Lieutenant Chester 
Nimitz conducted the first operational underway replenishment of fuel in 1917, based on 
concepts and equipment he and a small team designed. Subsequent developments in this era 
improved underway replenishment technology using repurposed commercial ships, and by 
1939 then-Rear Admiral Chester Nimitz mandated underway replenishment of not only small 
combatants but also large ones previously deemed too unwieldy to refuel at sea. 
Over the decades, the demands of War Plan Orange, the U.S. plan to combat Japan in the 
Pacific, spurred innovative thinking on both the logistical viability of previous plans and how 
to sustain U.S. naval maneuver forces that later facilitated the Navy’s World War II Pacific 
campaigns. Further innovations during World War II culminated in the ability to transfer 
large amounts of fuel and cargo (including munitions) underway by 1944. The fleet also fielded 
numerous mobile and relocatable ships and platforms able to sustain, maintain, and repair 
or salvage battle-damaged ships, granting the fleet an expeditionary capability not reliant on 
forward bases. 
The Fast Logistics Era began with the Navy’s 1957 Mobile Logistics Conference, in which Chief 
of Naval Operations Admiral Arleigh Burke rejected evolutionary improvements to World 
War II-era technologies and demanded new concepts and major systems improvements. Most 
notably, this phase was manifested in the development of purpose-built, multi-product  





























































technologies (e.g., STREAM and FAST). Fast combat support ships (AOE) were the ultimate 
development of the era, designed to support the Navy’s fundamental operational concept of 
fast maneuver warfare. During this era, the Navy also introduced nuclear-powered submarines 
and surface ships, altering fleet logistics requirements. 
The fourth and current era of fleet logistics, the Forward Presence Era, began in the early 
1990s. During this era, the fleet logistics force has been optimized to minimize cost and to 
provide support from secure, forward bases in generally uncontested waters. This focus on 
cost was reflected in a reduction in the size of its logistics forces, especially its AOEs,  
submarine tenders, destroyer tenders, repair ships, and other auxiliaries. Furthermore, to save 
costs, self-defense systems were either not incorporated on new logistics vessels or removed 
from existing ones. Interestingly, the Navy continues to widely adopt weapons technologies 
(such as VLS) without an effective means to reload them at sea. Finally, the Navy has adopted 
a new ship class (the Freedom-class Littoral Combat Ship) with short range at moderate to 
high speeds that requires a significantly higher frequency of oiler support if shore basing is 
unavailable. 
Logistics architecture development during this period stumbled, as the Navy continued to 
develop and operate logistics vessels and systems only one or two generations removed from 
their World War II forbears that only incorporate modest evolutionary improvements, and 
regressed by shrinking the fleet’s most capable at-sea replenishment platforms (AOEs) from 
a force of eight to a mere two. Whether the Navy enters into a potential fifth era of Agile 
Logistics starting in 2019 remains to be seen. 
In contrast to fleet logistics support, less changed for sealift concepts in the past century. The 
1898 acquisition of merchant sealift for the invasion of Cuba was fundamentally similar to the 
Navy’s World War I seizure of merchant shipping and repurposing and construction of new 
merchant vessels in World War II. From World War II onwards, military features of cargo 
shipping received more attention, but since the Korean War national sealift has been  
dependent on a mix of Government-owned and commercial U.S Merchant Marine shipping 
and largely reliant on high-capacity fixed port infrastructure for access. The introduction of 
RO/RO vessels, national military sealift fleets, and prepositioned equipment stocks afloat have 
changed the speed of response, but not the fundamental approach. A noteworthy exception 
is the near-complete elimination of port access-insensitive sealift platforms, such as Landing 
Ship, Tanks (LSTs), from the force. 
Whereas the first Gulf War demonstrated U.S. proficiency in deployment and sustainment 
en masse in an uncontested buildup, it also laid bare the chronic under-resourcing of U.S. 
Government maritime logistics readiness and the long-term decline of the U.S. Merchant 
Marine since its World War II zenith. U.S. maritime logistics underwent changes following the 
first Gulf War. The 1993 Bottom-Up Review created a new force-sizing construct for the post-
Cold War era that heightened reliance on rapid strategic mobility, even as it reduced overall 
force structure and defense resources. This resulted in new investments in maritime logis-
tics in the early- to mid-1990s, principally in a fleet of Government-owned RO/ROs and in 
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the establishment of the Maritime Security Program (MSP) to secure DoD access to a large 
fleet of U.S.-flag Merchant Marine vessels, their crews, and their global intermodal logistics 
networks.40 
Post-Desert Storm investments in maritime logistics paid dividends during the buildup and 
sustainment of forces for Operation Iraqi Freedom. A large Government fleet of purpose-built 
and converted ships allowed the rapid deployment of intact units of military equipment, while 
a mix of RRF and MSP ships addressed sustainment demands. MSC and MARAD ships were 
quickly activated within an average of three days, and the use of chartered foreign vessels was 
minimized. 
In spite of the success of U.S. maritime logistics in Operation Iraqi Freedom, the fleet’s 
capacity and readiness have atrophied over the past 15 years. One of three U.S. Marine Corps 
Prepositioning Squadrons was disestablished in 2012. Moreover, within the Surge Force and 
RRF, the average age of ships continues to rise, with average ages of 28 and 43 years in the 
respective fleets—far beyond most of the ships’ expected service lives. Significant portions 
of the sealift fleet face aging out within a decade. The U.S. Merchant Marine is either barely 
stable or continues to shrink, and the Government and commercial sealift fleets would face a 
manning shortfall in a protracted war.41 
Overall, the U.S. maritime logistics architecture has significantly evolved throughout the 20th 
and early 21st Centuries to overcome challenges. In the contemporary force, DoD has devel-
oped an effective and efficient maritime logistics enterprise optimized for forward presence 
and power projection under low threat levels. However, as the rest of this report will discuss, 
the fleet logistics and sealift fleets that served the United States well 15 years ago in Operation 
Iraqi Freedom and support ongoing operations face gaps in capability and capacity when 
facing great power competitors. 
Observations on the Evolution of the Force
This study’s review of the history of the U.S. maritime logistics force generated a number 
of observations that shaped the report’s subsequent analysis. This section articulates major 
observations that informed the work. 
Putting Naval Logistics Concepts into Practice. The Navy has identified innovative 
logistics concepts in both peacetime and conflict but often fails to resource logistics capabili-
ties adequately until urgently required—usually only once the deficiency has become painfully 
40 “Maritime Security Program,” MARAD, available at https://www.marad.dot.gov/ships-and-shipping/strategic-sealift/
maritime-security-program-msp/. The MSP stipend was adopted as a more economical way of partially replacing the 
previous Operating Differential Subsidy Program (ODSP). ODSP was instituted in the Merchant Marine Act of 1936.
41 Maritime Workforce Working Group (MWWG), Maritime Workforce Working Group Report (Washington, DC: DOT/
MARAD, 2017), p. 24, available at https://www.maritime.dot.gov/sites/marad.dot.gov/files/docs/mariners/1026/mwwg-
report-congress-finalr3.pdf.
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obvious. Logistics innovation has rarely been a priority. Emerging naval concepts of operation, 
particularly those involving significant demands on logistics, need to be exercised in peacetime 
with significant portions of the fleet to identify and remedy logistical shortfalls. The Navy’s 
Fleet Problems of the 1920s and 1930s may not have spurred the Navy to correct its logis-
tics deficiencies, but they did call attention to what would need to be corrected at greater scale 
during a conflict. Similarly, the large-scale Nifty Nugget mobilization exercise of 1978 exposed 
the flaws behind decades of assumptions regarding mobilization and deployment for a large-
scale conflict in Europe and prompted major revisions to DoD’s organization. Today, almost 
as much time has passed since Desert Storm (1990-1991) as passed between the end of World 
War II and Nifty Nugget. Without critical self-assessment and opportunities for exercise, the 
U.S. military will be unable to adopt new concepts on a widespread basis or have in hand road-
maps for action if conflicts break out. The passage of time also allows assumptions to ossify, 
even if they no longer comport with reality. 
Mobilization. Modern acquisition processes are not configured for major mobilization and 
surge production. Immediate production requires existing designs. Maritime Commission 
efforts prior to World War II created Government-owned designs with broad industry input 
that could be handed out to shipbuilders, of all sizes, so that they could contribute to the war 
effort. While pre-war warship and tanker production was concentrated at a few major firms, 
wartime efforts were able to involve many more companies thanks to government organiza-
tion and information sharing. Beyond production, major wars reveal shortfalls in technology, 
and new developments obsolesce prior designs. In both world wars, ships built during the war 
had been outclassed by the end of the conflict.42 Surge production needs to be prepared for 
well in advance of conflict and wartime emergency acquisition does not need to be built for the 
same service life standards to which the Navy and other Services are now accustomed. “Good 
enough” designs relied upon in extremity may look quite different than what the Navy or other 
Services sought in peacetime. This point is not limited to logistics. 
Furthermore, the growing divergence in commercial and military logistics ship designs over 
the latter half of the 20th Century, the shrinking size of the U.S. Merchant Marine, and the 
competitive nature of the international maritime market challenge approaches that defer 
peacetime acquisition of an appropriate maritime logistics force in favor of wartime recruit-
ment of logistics assets from the commercial sector. If DoD requires logistics support quickly 
in order to deny enemy gains, slow approaches that take numerous months or years to 
generate sufficient logistics capacity will likely be inadequate. 
Finally, to fully utilize the commercial maritime sector (and other components critical to the 
U.S. maritime logistics force), DoD will need to assess commercial capabilities and capaci-
ties closely in peacetime and coordinate with and integrate their capabilities. Rather than 
assuming the market will provide necessary capabilities, DoD must understand and exercise 
42 For more on this topic, see: Thomas Hone, “Naval Reconstitution, Surge, and Mobilization: Once and Future,” Naval War 
College Review 18, no. 3.
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the U.S. commercial logistics force structure, just as it understands and exercises its military 
logistics force structure. 
U.S. Merchant Mariner Base. So long as the U.S. Government holds logistics shipping in 
reserve for conflict, it will need to find mariners to crew those assets. Patriotic U.S. Merchant 
Mariners—the “Fourth Arm of Defense” in words spoken by President Franklin D. Roosevelt 
and echoed by former Secretary of Defense James Mattis—will be willing to go into harm’s 
way.43 During every major conflict, from the shipwrecked convoy routes of the North Atlantic 
to the sweltering waters of the Mekong, U.S. civilian crews have sailed into war zones. During 
World War II, the Merchant Marine suffered a higher casualty rate than any of the military 
Services.44 
Troubling, however, is the likely shortage of Merchant Mariners in a contingency. The acti-
vation of the National Defense Reserve Fleet (NDRF) during Vietnam and of the RRF during 
Desert Storm strained the number of available crews, and the Merchant Mariner base 
continues to decline. Engineers, radio operators, and other mariners with special skills will 
be in particularly high demand, while the increasing complexity of and certifications required 
for modern ships will increase the training time for volunteers or draftees during a conflict. If 
the U.S. Merchant Marine withers, the community of sailors on which U.S. maritime logistics 
currently depends will decline with it. Just as carefully as they assess naval logistics or sealift 
ship assets, Navy and MARAD logistics planners should assess and steward U.S. Merchant 
Mariner readiness and capacity. Similarly, the United States should view the availability of 
militarily useful sealift and logistics auxiliaries as a strategic capability and shift away from the 
assumption that market activity alone, unsteadily supported by the U.S. Government, will be 
sufficient to maintain this community. 
Lessons from and Differences with World War II. The Second World War has been 
the last time the U.S. Navy faced a peer naval power in combat and had to provide maritime 
logistics in a highly contested environment. A perusal of the lessons of World War II—espe-
cially the Pacific Campaign—may illuminate many logistics areas rich for reconsideration by 
the Navy in a contemporary conflict with China. For example, during the war, Japanese forces 
overran the Dutch fuel refineries upon which the Asiatic Fleet relied, dramatically extending 
U.S. fuel lines of communication to the Middle East and Pearl Harbor. Similarly, U.S. access to 
43 In support of the Merchant Marine Act of 1936, President Franklin D. Roosevelt described the Merchant Marine as the 
Fourth Arm of Defense (along with the Army, Navy, and Marine Corps). In 2018, Secretary of Defense James Mattis 
used the same language. James N. Mattis, “Commencement Address by Secretary Mattis at U.S. Merchant Marine 
Academy,” DoD News, June 16, 2018, https://dod.defense.gov/News/Transcripts/Transcript-View/Article/1552464/
commencement-address-by-secretary-mattis-at-us-merchant-marine-academy/.
44 Of the 243,000 Merchant Mariners serving in World War II, 9,521 died. This includes total killed at sea as well as those 
that died as prisoners of war and from combat wounds ashore. Accordingly, 3.9 percent of Merchant Mariners were killed. 
The Marine Corps was the Service with the next highest casualty rate, with 2.94 percent of serving Marines killed during 
World War II. Arthur R. Moore, A Careless Word—a Needless Sinking: A History of the Staggering Losses Suffered by 
the U.S. Merchant Marine, Both in Ships and Personnel, during World War II (Kings Point, NY: American Merchant 
Marine Museum, U.S. Merchant Marine Academy, 1998). Cited at “U.S. Merchant Marine Casualties during World War 
II,” U.S. Merchant Marine, available at www.usmm.org/casualty.html. 
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many of the East Asian refineries from which DLA Energy acquires fuel in peacetime could be 
contested, forcing the United States to secure fuel from refineries much farther away and dedi-
cate more tankers to transport fuel. Additionally, during World War II, the Navy developed a 
robust, expeditionary logistics force capable of supporting forces afloat and at anchor. Most 
notably, a Service Squadron 6 was established to provide underway support, and a Service 
Squadron 10 was established to provide sustainment, maintenance, and repairs and salvage 
at anchor. Aspects of these forces could be adopted by the Navy. Furthermore, in the Pacific 
campaign, the Navy developed units to establish expeditionary airbases ashore; a similar 
approach could support contemporary distributed naval and Air Force aviation. Lastly, the 
Navy and Army developed capabilities to provide inter and intra-theater transport and logis-
tics in austere, archipelagic environments; much of the same geography that was contested 
in World War II could be contested in a contemporary war in which Army and Marine forces 
would need to land to deploy sensors, fires, and other capabilities. 
However, a contemporary war with China would differ from World War II’s Pacific Campaign 
in a number of ways. Most significantly, China’s industrial capacity and Comprehensive 
National Power is much greater than that of Imperial Japan and may match or eclipse that of 
the United States. This may provide China with a massive capacity for wartime mobilization. 
Second, modern Chinese battle networks are capable of detecting and targeting forces at great 
ranges, complicating World War II-inspired approaches that would rely on staging logistics 
forces at intermediate bases ashore or at anchor. Finally, Chinese operational guidance theory 
emphasizes the targeting of information systems and logistics. Accordingly, U.S. maritime 
logistics forces would likely be targeted across their entire effects chains. In contrast, during 
the Pacific Campaign in World War II, Japanese submarines and aircraft “never aggres-
sively went after U.S. supply ships.”45 As Admiral William F. Halsey, Commander Third Fleet, 
observed in 1944: “There has been too great a tendency to discount the need for adequate 
escorts for oiler and CVE groups. We have been extremely lucky; our oiler groups […] were 
pure submarine bait.”46 It is likely that Chinese and possibly Russian forces would contest U.S. 
maritime logistics in a conflict. 
U.S. maritime logistics history offers many parallels to the present. Although the details of 
modern challenges may differ due to technology, geography, or other factors, the processes 
and concepts employed to overcome past challenges hold lessons applicable to the challenges 
the Navy faces today. More sobering, this history should also illustrate that the Navy is prone 
45 This was observed by then-Captain Henry Eccles (subsequently Rear Admiral and among the U.S. Navy’s most influential 
logistics thinkers of the 20th Century) in his lecture at the Naval War College on logistics and the employment of Service 
Forces during the war in the Pacific, held March 30, 1946. Hal M. Friedman, Digesting History: The U.S. Naval War 
College, the Lessons of World War Two, and Future Naval Warfare (Newport, RI: Naval War College Press, 2010), p. 59. 
46 Admiral Halsey made this comment in his after-action report for Operational Stalemate II, the operation to seize Peleliu 
Island in the Palau archipelago. In response to the threat, he recommended that “a minimum of one escort per oiler and 
two per CVE should be provided. This will become important as we move closer to Empire waters. Also, for extensive long-
range operations, one fleet tug and one salvage ship should be assigned with each group of three oilers which are kept at 
sea in advanced positions.” Carter, Beans, Bullets, and Black Oil, p. 194.
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to making the same logistics mistakes time and again unless those logistics communities are 
championed by leaders who allocate appropriate levels of resources and explain the impor-
tance of logistics to broader audiences. 
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CHAPTER 5
New Operating Concepts & 
Implications for Logistics
A combination of changes in the threat environment and Joint Force demands are driving 
the need for new maritime logistics operational concepts and capabilities. By understanding 
the character of adversary threats and demands levied by Navy and other Service combat and 
logistics concepts, DoD can develop new and refine existing concepts and capabilities for  
maritime logistics that improve the current force and shape the development of a future  
maritime logistics fleet architecture. This chapter reexamines current operating assumptions 
and explores new operational concepts.
Changing Assumptions
Mounting threats from China, Russia, and other adversaries utilizing modern technology 
targeting U.S. military vulnerabilities will increase the risk to combat and logistics forces 
ashore and at sea. To adapt to these changing circumstances and maintain the viability of the 
future U.S. maritime logistics architecture, DoD leaders should reexamine assumptions for 
current and future warfighting scenarios. Review of a few long-held assumptions reveals how 
adversaries may critically undermine U.S. operations, especially maritime logistics operations. 
From Secure and Proximate to Distant and/or Contested Basing. For the past 
several decades, the United States has enjoyed uncontested access to logistical support bases 
in the territory of allies and partners and forward U.S. territory near potential conflict areas. 
This proximity permitted combatant resupply directly from shore facilities. It also allowed 
rapid CLF resupply, reducing time spent in transit and increasing available station time to 
provide greater replenishment capability to combatants. This efficiency through proximity 
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reduced the overall CLF required during contingencies.47 Figure 8 compares Operation Desert 
Storm CLF shuttling distances in the Arabian Gulf with potential shuttling distances in the 
Pacific. Furthermore, access to overseas, fixed infrastructure led the Navy to reduce its mobile 
logistics support force of tenders, floating dry docks, and other auxiliaries, expecting  
maintenance and repair activities to take place at uncontested forward locations, rather than 
afloat, expeditionary ones.48 Finally, access to proximate bases facilitated the buildup and 
intra-theater movement of U.S. forces and supplies once disembarked from Strategic Sealift. 
FIGURE 8: COMPARISON OF DISTANCES IN ARABIAN GULF AND PACIFIC
As noted earlier, access to these close-in bases will be increasingly contested. The Navy and 
other U.S. planners should anticipate that adversaries will threaten U.S. access to these 
forward facilities in multiple dimensions. Although the United States should increase its own 
efforts and cooperation with allies and partners to defend forward bases, it is likely that—at 
least for the early stages of a conflict—the locus of logistical support will need to come from a 
mix of bases far from the area of operations and contested bases at sea and ashore closer in. 
This will likely increase the required number of logistics assets, as extended transit distances 
raise the number of logistics assets needed. 
From Rear Sanctuary to Global Conflict. In the past, the United States has benefited 
from rear area sanctuaries.49 This includes not only a homeland separated from challengers by 
two oceans but the sanctuaries within operational theaters afforded by the strategic depth of 
47 It also reduced the type and variety of cargos carried; if the CLF were not properly loaded, it could (presumably) return to 
port for more.
48 James W. Hammond, “The United States Needs Mobile Afloat Basing,” Proceedings 143, no. 11, November 2017. 
49 This report defines rear area sanctuaries as areas that support a conflict but are not subject to the conflict.
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U.S. partners. Enemies generally lacked the ability to perform sustained, conventional attacks 
on U.S. theater logistics hubs and combat force marshaling points with mass and  
precision. Now, China and Russia have the ability to attack U.S. military and commercial 
assets globally—including in the Continental United States—with conventional military forces, 
paramilitary or special operations forces, and cyber-attacks. Depending on their strategic aims 
and operational campaign plans, adversaries may choose to limit strikes against U.S. assets 
in rear areas, or they may choose to strike in force. In addition to mass attacks, they could 
choose to employ a variety of limited kinetic and non-kinetic attacks against U.S. rear targets 
to degrade or exploit U.S. logistical force flow. This reality breaks the old paradigm of regional 
conflicts and has the implication that a reinforcing maritime logistics force flow from the 
United States may be delayed, placing a priority on robust maritime logistics in or near  
potential areas of interest.
From Gradual Buildup to Rapid Response. In the run-up to Operations Desert Storm 
and Iraqi Freedom, the United States methodically transported combat and logistics forces 
to Southwest Asia over the course of months before attacking Iraqi forces. It is unlikely the 
United States would be able to accomplish such a force flow against a peer challenger for two 
reasons. First, adversaries—especially China—have concluded that they should interrupt any 
potential large force buildup, including through preventive or preemptive strikes, before it 
takes place in order to maximize their advantage. Second, adversaries may seek to swiftly 
execute a fait accompli, or operations that accomplish aims, such as seizing territory, before 
the United States could respond in support of its allies and partners. In response, maritime 
logistics forces should prepare to rapidly support combat forces that, through either forward 
presence or rapid deployment, deny adversary objectives. 
From Short to Potentially Protracted Cross-Domain Conflicts. Over the past few 
decades, U.S. conventional dominance allowed planners to envision rapid and decisive 
operations to defeat regional foes, thus lowering logistical transportation and sustain-
ment requirements.50 Today, the decreasing margin of U.S. conventional superiority relative 
to China and to a lesser degree Russia may mean that maritime logistics forces should be 
prepared to support cross-domain conflicts ranging from long-running sub-conventional 
conflicts (gray zone warfare) to short, sharp conflicts of high-intensity violence to protracted 
high-intensity wars. The growing possibility of U.S. engagement in protracted conflict 
increases the need for large pre-war stocks of supplies (from parts to fuel to weapons), 
resilient capabilities to sustain forward forces, and capabilities for inter and intra-theater 
transportation and distribution of forces and critical supplies even under adversary threat. 
50 This attitude of rapid dominance is not unique. Notable examples of other “rapid” military plans that yielded longer and 
unexpected results include not only historical cases, such as Napoleon Bonaparte’s 1812 invasion of Russia or the early 
20th century German General Staff’s so-called Schlieffen Plan, but also contemporary cases, such as U.S. operations in 
Afghanistan (which, at the time of this report, are in their 18th year). For an examination of how political and military 
planners of war have often taken insufficient account of the possibility of long wars, see Lawrence Freedman, The Future 
of War: A History (New York: Public Affairs, 2017).
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From Low Attrition to High Attrition Planning. Over the past few decades, U.S. 
planners assumed little to no attrition among either major combat or logistics forces. This 
assumption reduced the requirement for both combat and logistics forces since combat losses 
would not increase the total number of assets required.51 Additionally, light levels of attrition 
meant that the maritime logistics force’s ability to tow and repair damaged ships and care for 
wounded soldiers, sailors, and airmen could be small, in some cases relying on complemen-
tary commercial support close to the conflict. 
In a future conflict with a peer adversary, U.S. armed forces would likely suffer high levels 
of attrition. There would be high demand for the ability to tow and repair damaged ships—
perhaps without access to commercial towing and heavy-lift support—and to provide care 
for mass casualties in a short period of time. Moreover, maritime logistics forces them-
selves would likely suffer significant attrition: logistics facilities ashore would be targeted and 
ships would be sunk. This attrition would likely extend to not only maritime logistics assets 
supporting Navy operations, but also the full range of government and commercial Strategic 
Sealift shipping. Therefore, the United States will be required to procure more maritime logis-
tics assets than it would if zero to low attrition is assumed. 
Overall, the scale and sophistication of adversary capabilities call into question the viability 
of traditional U.S. concepts of operation as well as the validity of many long-held planning 
assumptions, including those involving maritime logistics. 
New Operational Concepts
Faced with challenges to its ability to counter adversary aggression, the U.S. military has 
developed operational concepts and capabilities in an attempt to achieve campaign objec-
tives and minimize U.S. vulnerabilities. This section reviews Navy and other Service operating 
concepts to identify their impact on maritime logistics. 
Navy Operational Concepts
The U.S. Navy is developing operational concepts that levy new demands on logistics forces, 
including Distributed Lethality (DL), Electromagnetic Maneuver Warfare (EMW), and 
Distributed Maritime Operations. The Navy has also adopted new operational concepts 
focused on logistics: Distributed and Agile Logistics (DiAL) and Operational Logistics in a 
Contested Maritime Environment (OPLOG). Each of these concepts has implications for 
current and future maritime logistics forces.
51 These assumptions have formed, in some cases, unfortunately, a self-reinforcing cycle, in which staffs do not plan for 
attrition of logistics assets, and analysts assume that it will not happen or that it is outside the scope of their analysis. 
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Distributed Lethality
The Navy’s DL concept calls for individual or small groups of platforms, organized into Surface 
Action Groups (SAGs), to operate across a wide area in contested environments.52 These units 
are to “seize maritime-operations areas for subsequent activities (including power projection), 
perform screening operations for larger formations, and hold adversary land targets at risk.”53 
By geographically distributing networked forces that are capable of defending themselves, the 
concept aims to complicate adversary targeting and rapidly engage adversaries. 
To maximize its effectiveness, DL requires high levels of maritime logistics support. DL envi-
sions that SAGs would operate independently of CSGs. Since World War II, the CSG has been 
the primary U.S. Navy power projection and sea control formation. Accordingly, CLF support 
has focused on addressing the logistics requirements of a small number of forward-operating 
CSGs. By concomitantly deploying multiple CSGs and DL SAGs across large theaters such as 
the Indo-Pacific, the requirement for CLF support would increase, as the CLF T-AOs, T-AKEs, 
and T-AOEs focused on supporting CSGs would not be in the same location to support DL 
SAGs.54 This could require more CLF assets to support the SAGs, or it would reduce the 
on-station time of CLF ships supporting CSG operations as they leave station to support 
nearby SAGs. In addition, greater dispersal requires individual surface combatants to spend 
more time transiting to rendezvous points with CLF ships (or shore logistics sites), decreasing 
the relative percentage of time and fuel burned on station fulfilling their mission. 
In the future, force dispersal under the DL concept is likely to increase through the introduc-
tion of two new classes of capabilities: new Low Probability of Intercept/Low Probability of 
Detection (LPI/LPD) beyond line of sight communications and longer-range weapons (such as 
the anti-ship enabled Tomahawk Block IV, the Long-Range Anti-Ship Missile, and the future 
Next Generation Strike Weapon). These capabilities will allow DL SAGs to disperse farther 
while remaining networked and retaining the ability to concentrate fire when required. 
By operating in contested environments, it is likely that DL SAGs would rapidly expend large 
quantities of munitions, which would need to be resupplied in theater. Without theater muni-
tions replenishment, surface combatants would need to transit back to a protected base, 
which could entail roundtrips of weeks or over a month. Since DL SAGs might be operating in 
contested areas where shore-based logistics would be at considerable risk, surface combatants 
52 Thomas Rowden, Peter Gumataotao, and Peter Fanta, “Distributed Lethality,” Proceedings 141, no. 1, January 2015. 
A SAG is a “temporary or standing organization of combatant ships, other than carriers, tailored for a specific tactical 
mission.” JCS, DoD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms (Washington, DC: DoD, February 2019), p. 226, 
available at www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/pubs/dictionary.pdf?ver=2018-07-25-091749-087.
53 Rowden, Gumataotao, and Fanta, “Distributed Lethality.”
54 In a 2017 report, the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) expressed concern with the Navy’s lack of assessment 
regarding the impact of more distributed operations on the required number and type of logistics ships. John Pendleton, 
Navy Readiness: Actions Needed to Maintain Viable Surge Sealift and Combat Logistics Fleets (Washington, DC: 
GAO, 2017). Similarly, U.S. Navy Captain Kevin Eyer (ret.) wrote, “Naval Surface Forces’ new distributed lethality (DL) 
strategy seems to be a fine idea. . . . Where are the oilers necessary to support this wide, sustained dispersion?” Kevin Eyer, 
“Distributed Lethality: Don’t Drink the Kool-Aid,” Proceedings 143, no. 4, April 2017.
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would likely need to rely on at-sea maritime logistics support, such as that provided by CLF 
ships, to not only refuel but also to rearm. Although the Mark 41 Vertical Launch System 
(VLS) is the Navy’s primary surface combatant weapon launch platform, the Navy lacks the 
means to rapidly reload VLS cells at anchor or underway. 
It is likely that surface combatants will be damaged or sunk in a high-intensity conflict. Given 
the cost of modern warships and the time it takes to build new ones, the requisite capacity to 
tow to an area of relative safety and repair damaged warships will be important. Finally, it will 
be important to have medical support capabilities suitable for retrieving and caring for poten-
tially large numbers of casualties resulting from a high-intensity conflict. 
Electromagnetic Maneuver Warfare. 
The Navy is implementing the Electromagnetic Maneuver Warfare (EMW) concept to exploit 
the electromagnetic spectrum (EMS) in future naval operations.55 Under EMW, the Navy seeks 
greater control over its radio frequency (RF) emissions and will incorporate “low-to-no power” 
communications and sensor systems.56 
The Navy may also change the operating profiles of its ships in ways that make surveillance 
and targeting more difficult but may also increase maritime logistics demands. This may 
include greater dispersion of formations, which would, as discussed above, increase CLF 
capacity requirements. Even more significantly, ships may operate at higher average speeds in 
order to maneuver to avoid detection by adversary ISR systems. This high-speed maneuvering 
over considerable distances would be a significant departure from the slow, efficient cruise 
speeds of ships loitering at designated stations during recent power projection operations. 
Another component of EMW may include the greater use of distributed and unmanned 
systems for counter-ISR missions.57 In order to carry out counter-ISR missions, unmanned 
platforms—such as unmanned surface and undersea vehicles—would likely need to operate 
separately from the units they would seek to protect. Consequently, these platforms may need 
to receive their own logistical support (such as fuel and maintenance) from maritime logistics 
assets distinct from those that support the units they are protecting. Additionally, EMW may 
entail the use of additional expendable EMS systems, such as decoys, which may increase rates 
of resupply for ships. Both factors would increase overall fleet logistical requirements. 
55 Mark Coffman, “Advancing Electromagnetic Maneuver Warfare,” Navy Warfare Development Command NEXT 3, no. 2, 
Summer/Fall 2015, available at www.nwdc.navy.mil/NeXT%20Assets/ current/NeXTw2016.aspx.




In 2015 the Navy revealed it had developed a Distributed Agile Logistics (DiAL) concept to 
improve logistics resiliency and reliability in contested environments.58 DiAL represents a 
major departure from earlier Navy concepts of logistics in uncontested environments. 
First, DiAL “shifts reliance from vulnerable shore bases to more survivable afloat and ashore 
hubs.”59 This shift will likely result in a need for survivable afloat hubs, such as Consolidated 
Logistics tankers for fuel and ESB and ESD ships or other ships as intermediate supply and 
distribution points for dry cargo at sea. While some existing ships may potentially be repur-
posed or re-tasked to accomplish these missions, it is likely that this shift will generate 
requirements for greater maritime logistics capacity. 
Second, DiAL identifies a need for the Navy to improve its ability to conduct expeditionary 
maintenance in theater. To do so, it will likely require more ships than the two aging subma-
rine tenders presently in service. 
Third, DiAL calls for an increase in in-theater rearmament capabilities, including rapid at-sea 
VLS rearming. Some existing ships—including select sealift platforms—could possibly be used 
for this mission. Given anticipated high rates of weapon expenditure, however, it is likely that 
the Navy will need to either integrate VLS rearming capability more widely onto existing ships 
or procure dedicated assets for this purpose. 
Fourth, as the name suggests, DiAL calls for the future maritime logistics force to be distrib-
uted and to support increasingly distributed combat operations. This distribution will require 
more and differently-arrayed platforms to sustain missions than a force previously sized to 
provide support at a limited number of concentrated hubs through an efficient but brittle 
hub-and-spokes model. DiAL will need to accommodate the increased logistics requirements 
of dispersal alongside efforts to address the emerging logistics needs of future systems and 
planned fleet growth. 
Distributed Maritime Operations. 
In 2017 the Navy announced that the Navy Warfare Development Command had developed a 
new concept titled Distributed Maritime Operations (DMO). DMO is “a central, overarching 
operational concept that will weave together the principles of integration, distribution, and 
maneuver to maximize the effectiveness of the fleet Maritime Operations Centers to synchro-
nize all-domain effects.”60 Although little information has been publicly released on the 
concept, its overarching nature suggests that it will encapsulate and preside over subordinate 
58 Ray Mabus, “Innovation in Logistics,” Secretary of the Navy, December 12, 2015, available at www.secnav.navy.mil/
innovation/Documents/2015/12/InnovationInLogisticsMemo.pdf. 
59 Navy Project Team, Alternative Future Fleet Platform Architecture Study (Washington, DC: U.S. Navy, October 27, 
2016), pp. 10–11, available at news.usni.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/02/FFA-Final-Review-2-Feb-17.pdf. 
60 “CNO Visits Navy Warfare Development Command,” Navy Warfare Development Command, April 13, 2017, available at 
www.navy.mil/submit/display.asp?story_id=99893. 
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DL, EMW, and DiAL concepts. As conveyed in its title and reiterated by its lead author, DMO 
will allow the fleet to operate effectively while “distributed over vast distances,” which would 
require considerable logistical support.61
Operational Logistics in a Contested Maritime Environment.
Following the public announcement of both DiAL and DMO, the Chief of Naval Operations 
signed a new concept paper on 10 September 2017 entitled “Operational Logistics in a 
Contested Maritime Environment” or OPLOG.62 According to a Navy press release, “the 
OPLOG concept presents a warfighting approach to logistics support which incorporates the 
fundamentals of maneuver warfare, encourages the development of new logistics capabili-
ties, and envisions improved operational protection, increased mobile logistics capacity, and 
well-defended logistics information to enable sustained logistics.”63 OPLOG aims to transform, 
refine, and develop naval logistics capabilities across seven core logistics functions: deploy-
ment and distribution; supply; maintenance; logistics services; operational contract support; 
engineering; and health services.64
A Design for Maintaining Maritime Superiority, Version 2.0.
In December 2018, the Chief of Naval Operations released A Design for Maintaining 
Maritime Superiority, Version 2.0. The document provides a framework to guide Navy behav-
iors and investments. Although not a concept, it identifies as a priority area effort to “posture 
logistics capability ashore and at sea in ways that allow the fleet to operate globally, at a pace 
that can be sustained over time. [and] Assess and develop options for improved ability and 
resilience to refuel, rearm, resupply, and repair.”65 The document signals Navy leadership’s 
growing recognition of the criticality of improved logistics concepts and capabilities. 
Other Service Operating Concepts
In addition to the Navy, other U.S. Services have developed operating concepts that have 
considerable implications for maritime logistics, especially the sealift component of the force. 
For example, the Air Force and Marine Corps have adopted aviation concepts that emphasize 
distributed operation from numerous bases in order to complicate adversaries’ ability to target 
aircraft at bases in mass. In order to provide logistics at different locations, the Air Force and 
Marine Corps could consider maritime logistics options to support their new concepts, partic-
ularly for fuel. An increase in the number of locations where maritime logistics assets would 
61 Ibid.
62 “Navy Warfare Development Command Publishes Operational Logistics in a Contested Maritime Environment 




65 John M. Richardson, A Design for Maintaining Maritime Superiority, Version 2.0 (Washington, DC: U.S. Navy, 
December 2018), p. 8, available at https://www.navy.mil/navydata/people/cno/Richardson/Resource/Design_2.0.pdf.
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need to sail to would increase the requirement for ships, such as tankers. Additionally, many 
potential locations—especially in the Pacific—from which austere air operations could be 
conducted lack well-developed port facilities and have either low-throughput or non-existent 
bulk fuel storage and distribution infrastructure, placing a premium on Joint Logistics Over 
the Shore transfer capabilities. 
As another example, the Marine Corps’ Expeditionary Advance Base Operations (EABO) 
concept calls for establishing “dispersed and largely mobile forward basing infrastructure that 
enables a persistent alternative force capability set that is similarly designed to be difficult to 
target and inherently resilient.”66 Furthermore, the Army’s Multi-Domain Battle concept calls 
for ground combat forces capable of outmaneuvering adversaries through the extension of 
combined arms across all domains, including by providing offensive and defensive fires within 
the littorals. These concepts envision transport to and in some cases maneuver in the littorals, 
which will likely require maritime logistics support in the littorals.67
Although some portion of the assets and supplies for these and other Joint concepts can be 
transported by air, most will require sea transport given their size, weight, and quantity. This 
will place a premium on a large and responsive Strategic Sealift force. 
Observations
The current maritime logistics force is the product of a series of force structure decisions 
taken since the 1990s that in general assumed an uncontested or lightly contested operating 
environment. Key choices and studies informing those choices include the 1990s decision 
to reduce the Navy’s fleet of nine destroyer and eleven submarine tenders and two repair 
ships to only two submarine tenders, the 2005 cancellation of the T-AOE(X) Fast Combat 
Support Ship project, the 2011 T-AO(X) Analysis of Alternatives that determined the capa-
bilities and capacity of the refueling fleet, the 2012 Towing and Salvage Ship Recapitalization 
Analysis of Alternatives that established an eight-tug requirement, the 2013 Dry Cargo 
Sufficiency Analysis that examined the sufficiency of the CLF’s dry cargo force, and the 
Mobility Capabilities and Requirements Study 2016 that did not factor attrition in setting 
sealift requirements. Breaking with these past assessments, future maritime logistics decisions 
should adopt planning assumptions consistent with current and coming challenges. The world 
of 2019 in which adversaries challenge U.S. military forces across domains is dramatically 
different from the world anticipated during the 1990s, 2000s, or even early 2010s. 
66 “Innovation Industry Day Announcement—Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory—EABO 2019,” FedBizOps, Marine 
Corps Warfighting Laboratory, February 2, 2018, available at www.fbo.gov/index?s =opportunity&mode=form&id=5ad0e
3a3809bf73ddeda57b1bd32aaf1&tab=core&_cview=1. 
67 “Multi-Domain Battle: Evolution of Combined Arms for the 21st Century, 2025–2040,” U.S. Army Training and Doctrine 
Command (TRADOC), Version 1.0, October 2017, p. 59, available at https://admin.govexec.com/media/20171003_-_
working_draft_-_concept_document_for_multi-domain_battle_1_0.pdf. 
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Changes in the threat environment and emerging Joint Force concepts are changing the 
demand for future maritime logistics force. Without a capable and appropriately sized mari-
time logistics force, many of the operational concepts envisioned by the Navy and the other 
Services cannot be fully executed. Furthermore, whereas the Navy’s logistics force is already 
inadequate for the current fleet, if as planned the Navy grows in size, it will likely require an 
even larger maritime logistics force than programmed. 
To prevail in future conflicts, the Navy and other Services should develop new maritime logis-
tics concepts that build on DiAL and OPLOG and encompass all elements of the National 
Fleet to both identify and resource the requisite maritime logistics capabilities, capacity, 




A New Maritime Logistics 
Architecture
The United States should adapt its maritime logistics architecture to address Joint Force 
demands and changes in the threat environment. There is no single solution to current U.S. 
maritime logistics challenges. Rather, the U.S. maritime logistics enterprise needs to improve 
its concepts, capabilities, capacity, and posture, collectively and with an overarching plan. 
Further, these improvements should prioritize combat effectiveness and resiliency over peace-
time efficiency. Given competing fiscal demands in other warfighting areas, DoD will need to 
consider the full range of logistics options available carefully and choose those that result in 
the greatest operational benefit relative to cost as expressed in both money and operational 
risk. Collectively, this process should result in a maritime logistics force that is larger, more 
differentiated, and affordable. 
This chapter proposes systems and concepts to help address gaps in the current and future 
U.S. maritime logistics architecture. It is organized into sections on fleet fuel logistics; fleet 
cargo and munitions; towing and salvage; expeditionary maintenance and repair; search and 
rescue (including Combat Search and Rescue) and medical support afloat; and Joint maritime 
logistics for both fuel and unit equipment/sustainment sealift (also referred to as Strategic 
Sealift). Although focused on logistics assets afloat, the chapter takes into account the contri-
butions of shore logistics infrastructure and forces. The chapter also highlights potential 
solutions to harden maritime logistics networks and assets, changes to current and future ship 
and aircraft design, and how to organize the maritime logistics community for success. 
Navy Fleet Fuel Logistics
Fuel is the lifeblood of modern naval forces. Naval surface vessels and aircraft will likely 
continue to rely on carbon-based fuels as their primary source of energy for the foreseeable 
future. Over a century ago, U.S. naval officer and historian Alfred Thayer Mahan emphasized 
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the enduring importance of maintaining access to this critical supply: “Fuel stands first in 
importance of the resources of the fleet. Without ammunition, a ship may run away, hoping to 
fight another day but without fuel she can neither run, nor reach her station, nor remain on it, 
if remote, nor fight.”68 Today, the U.S. Navy needs to develop new concepts and capabilities to 
provide fuel to allow its forces to reach their stations, to maneuver, and to fight. 
Towards a Different Fleet Refueling Capabilities Mix
This study recommends the U.S. Navy adopt a mixed approach to fuel distribution that lever-
ages the specialized attributes of both government and commercially-derived vessel designs to 
improve the Combat Logistics Force’s (CLF) capacity, efficiency, and resilience. As shown in 
Figure 9, this approach can be summarized as, “Go Big, Go Small, Go Fast, and Go Different.” 
FIGURE 9: NEW REFUELING CAPABILITIES MIX
Photos courtesy of U.S. Navy, Eastern Shipbuilding, GD NASSCO, and Trelleborg.













The Navy should begin by buying and long-term chartering more fuel product tankers.69 
Tankers (T-AOTs) can store far greater quantities of fuel than current CLF oilers. For example, 
Military Sealift Command’s (MSC) long-term chartered tanker MT Empire State can store 
approximately 331,000 barrels (bbl) of fuel, more than twice the 156,000 bbl capacity of the 
Navy’s new John Lewis-class oiler (T-AO 205). 
Tankers can be modified relatively easily to receive the refueling equipment from CLF ships 
on either two or four stations in order to support Navy CLF operations. These Consolidated 
Logistics (CONSOL) tankers can transfer fuel from their larger stores to replenish T-AOs, 
T-AOEs, or T-AKEs underway, as shown in Figure 10, in low to moderate sea states. The 
Navy developed this CONSOL capability during the Cold War and over the past few years has 
re-initiated its ability to transfer fuel from MSC CONSOL tankers to CLF ships.70 
FIGURE 10: CONSOL TANKER AND FAST COMBAT SUPPORT SHIP CONDUCT CONSOL 
TRANSFER OF FUEL
CONSOL tanker MT Empire State and fast combat support ship USNS Rainier conduct CONSOL transfer of fuel. Photo courtesy of U.S. Navy.
69 As of 2019, MSC has one Government-Owned tanker, the USNS Lawrence H. Gianella, and five tankers under long-term 
charter. 
70 “MSC Ships USNS Rainier and MT Empire State Conduct CONSOL-at-Sea During RIMPAC 2016,” 
Sealift blog, Military Sealift Command, July 18, 2016, available at mscsealift.dodlive.mil/2016/07/18/ 
msc-ships-usns-rappahannock-and-mt-empire-state-conduct-consol-at-sea-during-rimpac-2016/. 
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The Modular Fuel Delivery Systems (MFDS) is a Navy standard fuel Standard Tensioned 
Replenishment Alongside Method (STREAM) delivery system that has been packaged into a 
module to allow rapid installation on a tanker. MFDS enables a tanker to offload fuel from two 
to four stations simultaneously to logistics and other surface vessels, effectively mimicking the 
refueling capabilities of an oiler. This capability is beneficial for naval operations as a redun-
dancy measure in the event of high oiler demand or attrition. MFDS should be installed on 
Government-Owned tankers and should be considered for installation on tankers under long-
term charter. 
CONSOL and MFDS capabilities have three primary benefits. First, they increase the amount 
of fuel stored at sea, which if properly postured and protected, can be relatively safer and more 
rapidly accessible than many ashore fuel storage options. Second, they increase the efficiency 
of the refueling architecture by enabling specialized T-AOEs, T-AOs, and T-AKEs to operate 
more forward as station ships that distribute fuel and other supplies to combatants, while the 
T-AOTs operate farther back as large fuel stations from which other logistics ships can refuel. 
This refueling efficiency is depicted in Figure 11. Third, equipping T-AOTs with CONSOL or 
MFDS capabilities (instead of simply relying on less-expensive skin-to-skin exchanges, known 
as lightering) has the major benefit of enabling T-AOTs to transfer fuel in a wider range of 
sea states. This capability maximizes the efficiency of the refueling architecture and reduces 
the vulnerability of T-AOTs, which otherwise may have to conduct lightering operations at a 
smaller number of sheltered or in low sea-state locations. 
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Product tankers can be either built new in U.S. shipyards or purchased new or slightly used on 
the open market. Contingency access to commercial U.S.-flag tankers can also be secured via 
an expanded MARAD Maritime Security Program (MSP). Small and medium tankers would 
be small enough to fit into a large number of government and commercial ports and moorings 
and yet large enough to provide a significant quantity of fuel. While a sizing decision should 
be subject to further analysis, a CONSOL tanker that could carry 280,000-330,000 bbl may 
be an appropriate range commonly found on the open market. 330,000 bbl would be equiv-
alent to more than 9 days of endurance for a Carrier Strike Force, consisting of two CVNs 
(conducting 100 aircraft sorties per day each), 14 cruisers and destroyers, two T-AKE, two 
EPF, and one T-ATF.71 
Go Small
The second recommended refueling fleet change for the Navy is a “Go Small” approach 
of acquiring a fleet of Offshore Support Vessels (OSV) that can serve as light oilers. OSVs 
are ships used by the commercial oil and gas industry for energy exploration and platform 
support.72 OSVs normally carry sizable tanks (between 4,700-35,000 bbl depending on the 
size of the vessel) for storing fuel, water, and drilling mud and are designed to hold position 
well with dynamic positioning systems in open seas. 
Equipped with lightering and underway replenishment equipment, 300-foot class OSVs with 
a fuel capacity of approximately 25,000-30,000 bbl could allow the Navy to distribute fuel 
to forces afloat and ashore in more contested areas, where employing larger logistics ships 
would be prohibitively risky, and multiple OSVs could operate across a broader geographic 
area than a single, larger CLF vessel. Equipped with UNREP equipment and acting as light 
oilers (T-AOL) (as depicted in Figure 12), OSVs would be well suited for resupplying fuel to 
independent surface combatants and SAGs. For example, a large OSV could have approxi-
mately 28,000 bbl of fuel storage.73 It would be capable of refueling a SAG consisting of two 
DDG-51s and one FFG-7 (a surrogate for future FFGs) twice at a 50 percent safety fuel level 
before shuttling back to shore or other logistics vessels to refuel.74 OSVs could also provide 
fuel to unmanned vessels, including large unmanned surface and undersea vehicles. OSVs 
are unlikely candidates to support CVNs or LHAs, given the large amount of fuel required for 
71 CSBA analysis of Navy ship fuel consumption rates.
72 This report uses the term OSVs to refer to the broad range of vessels of this type. Some Platform Support Vessels could 
also be promising candidates for the light oiler role. 
73 In comparison, a T-AKE carries 23,450 bbl of cargo fuel, which does not include the T-AKE’s own sizable bunker fuel 
tanks. “Lewis and Clark (T-AKE 1) Class Dry Cargo/Ammunition Ship,” General Dynamics NASSCO fact sheet, available at 
https://nassco.com/pdfs/T-AKE-Fact-Sheet.pdf.
74 This analysis uses estimated DDG-51 and FFG-7 fuel capacities and consumption rates drawn from: Troy C. Morse, 
Optimization of Combat Logistics Force Required to Support Major Combat Operations (Monterey, CA: Naval 
Postgraduate School, September 2008), pp. 43–44, available at https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a488887.pdf.
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flight operations and LHA propulsion.75 OSVs are versatile platforms that could also be config-
ured to support a number of other missions, such as resupplying expeditionary operations 
ashore, rescue operations, and light tenders for unmanned vehicles. 
FIGURE 12: T-AOL BASED ON OSV WITH STREAM GEAR REFUELING DDG-51
OSVs are attractive because of their modularity and because they are inexpensive. This, 
coupled with small crew sizes, may justify OSV operations in environments too dangerous for 
more expensive CLF assets with far larger crews. For example, a U.S.-built 300-ft class OSV 
with extensive UNREP modifications to provide one refueling station on each side and other 
changes could cost less than $40 million and require a crew of approximately 20; in contrast, 
at currently planned rates of production, a T-AO 205 will cost approximately $550 million 
and require a crew of approximately 95.76 For the cost of a single T-AO 205, the Navy could 
buy and modify more than 13 OSVs, potentially increasing force resiliency and flexibility 
in contested operating areas. Given the T-AO’s greater capacity and centralized efficiency, 
OSVs would complement rather than substitute T-AOs. A future logistics architecture could 
75 Other disadvantages of OSVs include slow speed and that, even if equipped with UNREP gear, most would only be capable 
of refueling with one station on each side, compared to two to three on oilers. This limitation effectively doubles the 
amount of time refueling would take for a combatant capable of refueling from two stations, such as a cruiser or destroyer, 
as compared to refueling from an oiler. 
76 This $40 million figure assumes a 5-year old U.S.-built OSV on the open market valued at $25 million and up to $15 
million in additional modifications. Estimates drawn from Horizon Ship Brokers and Compass Maritime. A new U.S.-built 
OSV may cost between $50–60 million.
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capitalize on the operational advantages of both systems. This report hereafter refers to OSV 
used by the Navy for refueling as light oilers (T-AOLs). 
Go Fast
The third recommended approach is “Go Fast,” in which the Navy accelerates procure-
ment of new oilers (T-AOs). The T-AO 205 shipbuilding program (previously the T-AO(X)) 
is a program to build a new class of 20 double-hulled oilers for the Navy. T-AO 205s will be 
capable of carrying 156,000 bbl of fuel in addition to dry cargo capacity and aviation capabil-
ity.77 Embarking a large MSC crew and Navy complement of approximately 95 (with additional 
berths available), T-AO 205s are designed for sustained, high-tempo refueling and resupply 
operations for the full range of Navy ships. 
These 20 oilers are designed to replace the aging T-AO 187 Henry J. Kaiser-class oilers, which 
were procured between FY 1982 and FY 1989 and have a 35-year service life. The first T-AO 
205 was procured in FY 2016 and is scheduled for delivery November 2020. The Navy’s ship-
building plan calls for procuring the ships at a rate of one per year, apart from three years in 
which a second ship will be procured.78 This rate of acquisition will result in only a modest 
increase in the size of the oiler fleet (from 17 T-AO/Es to 20) by the end of T-AO 205 construc-
tion, and this increase will likely be offset by two factors. First, the fuel storage capacity of 
new, double-hulled T-AO 205s will be 13 percent less than 12 of the 15 T-AO 187 oilers (the 
single-hulled variants) that they replace.79 Second, the overall size of the Navy fleet is projected 
to increase (by 8 percent by FY 2033 and 12 percent by FY 2048, compared to FY 2019), so 
that despite the increased number of oilers, the ratio of T-AO/Es to the rest of the fleet is 
projected to increase only slightly (from 5.6 percent in FY 2019 to 6.1 percent in FY 2033 and 
back down to 5.9 percent in FY 2048). This modest net increase of between one to three oilers 
(depending on when the Navy retires its two AOEs) falls short of what is logically necessary 
to support the Navy’s projected fleet expansion, let alone support the Navy’s new distributed 
operating concept, or be resilient in the face of emerging adversary threats to the U.S. mari-
time logistics enterprise. 
To increase the size of the oiler fleet, the Navy should accelerate the procurement rate of T-AO 
205 oilers. The proposed procurement strategy is shown in Figure 13. This approach will 
generate multiple benefits. First, it will increase the total number of oilers in the fleet, as T-AO 
205s enter the fleet in numbers before T-AO 187s are retired. Second, it generates cost-savings 
as the shipbuilder (General Dynamics NASSCO) can shift to a more economical two-per year 
77 “General Dynamics NASSCO Awarded Contract to Build Next Generation of U.S. Navy Fleet Oilers,” 
General Dynamics NASSCO press release, June 30, 2016, available at https://nassco.com/press-releases/
general-dynamics-nassco-awarded-contract-to-build-next-generation-of-u-s-navy-fleet-oilers/. 
78 Ronald O’Rourke, Navy John Lewis Class Oiler Shipbuilding Program (Washington, DC: Congressional Research 
Service, 2018), p. 5.
79 12 of the 15 T-AO 187s (the single-hulled variant) have a fuel capacity of 180,000 bbl, while three (the double-hulled 
variant) have a fuel capacity of 159,000 bbl. “Fleet Replenishment Oilers,” U.S. Navy factsheet, available at www.navy.mil/
navydata/fact_display.asp?cid=4400&tid=600&ct=4.
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build rate, possibly reducing the unit cost to $500 million. Accordingly, this study recom-
mends the Navy consider a procurement approach of “2 for 1 in ’21,” which procures two T-AO 
205 per year at the cost of $1 billion total (or $500 million each) starting in FY 2021. Third, 
this accelerated procurement approach has the benefit of enabling the Navy to grow the size 
of the oiler fleet once T-AO 187s retire.80 This growth in the T-AO 205 force will be essential 
to meet current and emerging demands, especially in light of the drop in fuel storage capacity 
that T-AO 205s provide compared to the single-hulled variants of the T-AO 187 class. 
FIGURE 13: “GO FAST” OILER PROCUREMENT STRATEGY
Go Different
The final recommended approach is “Go Different,” in which the Navy would field unmanned 
or minimally manned systems for providing fuel at sea. This class of systems would provide 
attritable refueling options in highly contested areas, especially for smaller combatants and 
future classes of larger unmanned vehicles. This approach would permit disaggregated and 
scalable logistics for large numbers of forward-operating vessels. 
Candidate systems include dracones, Pipefish, and unmanned or minimally manned surface 
vessels (including barges). Dracones are large fuel bladders that can be towed into position 
(as shown in Figure 14). Used by the Royal Navy for supporting expeditionary operations, 
dracones are predominantly used for providing fuel and water to forces ashore. The Navy is 
currently working on the Pipefish concept, an unmanned, double-walled bladder system, to 
80 T-AO 187s that retire should be placed in the NDRF to retain capacity until the entire T-AO 205 class is delivered and can 




















































provide fuel to forces afloat or ashore.81 The Navy could also develop unmanned or minimally 
manned surface vessels, like OSVs or barges, to transfer fuel to forces afloat and ashore. Going 
“different” would field large numbers of low signature and attritable refueling systems suit-
able for supporting limited scale naval maneuver or expeditionary operations ashore in highly 
contested environments. 
FIGURE 14: TUG TOWING A DRACONE
Photo Courtesy of Trelleborg.
Other Refueling Vessels
The Navy should also examine the role of other refueling vessels in its force. In particular, 
Navy Fast Combat Support Ships (T-AOE) and Dry Cargo/Ammunition ships (T-AKE) can 
play a major role in current and future Navy refueling fleet architecture. 
T-AOEs
MSC operates two Supply-class T-AOEs, the USNS Supply and USNS Arctic. In 2014, the 
Navy decommissioned two other T-AOEs, the USNS Rainier and the USNS Bridge, as a cost-
cutting measure.82 These multi-product ships carry large quantities of fuel, ammunition, and 
supplies at high speeds of over 26 kn, enabling the AOE to remain on station with a fast-
moving CSG.83 
In the early 2000s, the Navy planned to replace the four aging Sacramento-class AOEs with 
four new T-AOE(X) to join the four Supply-class T-AOEs and form an eight-ship AOE fleet. 
However, the T-AOE(X) program was canceled in 2005 due to competing fleet demands and 
81 U.S. Marine Corps, Maritime Expeditionary Warfare Annual Report 2018 (Washington, DC: U.S. Marine Corps, August 
2018), p. 32, available at https://www.mccdc.marines.mil/Portals/172/Docs/Seabasing/1%20Seabasing-What_Is_
It/3%20Seabasing_Capabilities_Report/2018%20ANNUAL%20REPORT.pdf. 
82 Sam LaGrone, “Navy to Decommission Two Oilers in Cost Saving Scheme,” USNI News, April 29, 2013, available at 
https://news.usni.org/2013/04/29/navy-to-decommission-two-oilers-in-cost-saving-scheme. 
83 “T-AOE,” U.S. Navy factsheet, available at www.navy.mil/navydata/fact_display.asp?cid=4400&ct=4&tid=300. 
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a high anticipated cost of approximately $1 billion per ship.84 Considering options for new 
T-AOE and Dry Cargo/Ammunition ships (T-AKE), the Navy saved funds by choosing to 
acquire zero T-AOE and twelve T-AKE allocated to support Navy missions, instead of a more 
expensive but capable mix of four new T-AOE and nine T-AKE.
Although the Navy’s predominantly T-AO and T-AKE CLF force has performed well in 
supporting recent operations, the unique attributes and versatility of T-AOEs could provide 
tactical and operational advantages in high-intensity, contested operations. An AOE for every 
CSG (and possibly more for other major naval formations) would capably support the fleet; 
this was the Navy’s intended fleet support concept during the late Cold War and early 2000s, 
before the Navy abbreviated the development of the AOE force in order to save cost. As a point 
of comparison, the PLAN has begun fielding new Type 901 AOEs, similar to the U.S. Navy 
T-AOE 6 Supply class, to support their growing number of Carrier Battle Groups and other 
distantly-operating naval forces.85 
Despite the advantages of T-AOEs, procuring additional T-AOEs may come at a considerable 
cost. They are large, expensive vessels. High costs may crowd out funding for other logistics 
efforts, potentially decreasing resiliency across the entire logistics enterprise. 
Accordingly, in the near-term, this study recommends the Navy retain its two active AOEs and 
shift them from supporting the 5th Fleet (responsible for operations in Arabian Gulf, Gulf of 
Oman, Gulf of Aden, Red Sea, and the Arabian Sea) to supporting the more demanding threat 
posed by China in the 7th or 3rd Fleets (responsible for operations in the Pacific). Additionally, 
the Navy should assess and, if appropriate, maintain the material condition of its two decom-
missioned AOEs to safeguard reserve AOE capacity. Finally, the Navy should evaluate whether 
a future T-AOE may be appropriate for the current and future threat environment and fleet 
demands. One option would be to begin construction of a new T-AOE class toward the latter 
half of the T-AO 205 program.86 For example, in FY 2028 the Navy could begin transitioning 
from T-AO to T-AOE construction, ensuring new T-AOE would be available a few years later 
84 Richard R. Burgess, “Navy Eyes $1 Billion Support Ships to Supply Carrier Strike Groups,” Seapower, October 2004, p. 
24.
85 The PLAN’s 25-kn Type 901 AOEs are highly similar in design to the U.S. Navy T-AOE 6 Supply-class. In contrast to the 
U.S. Navy, the PLAN has armed its Type 901 with four 11n-barrel H/PJ-11 30mm close-in weapons systems guided by 
radars, electro-optical and infrared systems, and a fire control system. There has been speculation the PLAN may adopt 
nuclear-powered AOEs, which could further increase the degree of logistical independence of PLAN formations. Richard 
D. Fisher Jr., “China’s CSIC unveils concept for nuclear-powered combat support ship,” Jane’s Defence Weekly, December 
8, 2017.
86 In CSBA’s 2017 Alternative Fleet Architecture study, a new T-AOE derivative of the John Lewis-class T-AO 205 was 
considered. The estimated lead ship cost of the new-build T-AOEs was $770 million, about 10 percent greater than the 
T-AO 205. This was to account for modifications that would enable it to carry ammunition as well as fuel and limited 
cargo. Like T-AKEs and T-AO 205s, this ship would be built to commercial standards and would likely be significantly 
more economical than the T-AOE 6 class or the T-AOE(X) class considered in the early 2000s. The feasibility and relative 
utility of such a ship merits additional examination. In order to achieve higher speeds, the T-AOE would likely need to be 
considerably longer to improve its fineness ratio and would need to have much more powerful engines. While a modified 
T-AO 205 may be suitable, this may result in a largely or wholly new ship design. Clark, Haynes, McGrath, Hooper, 
Sloman, and Walton, Restoring American Seapower, p. 122.
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to replace existing T-AOE that will be nearing the end of their service lives and provide addi-
tional T-AOE to support CSGs and other naval forces. 
T-AKE
MSC operates 14 Dry Cargo/Ammunition ships (T-AKE), of which 12 provide multi-product 
combat logistics support to the Navy and two support the Marine Corps via the Maritime 
Prepositioning Force. In addition to their dry cargo and refrigerated stores, T-AKEs can 
distribute fuel from their 23,450 bbl cargo fuel tanks.87 Multi-product replenishment capa-
bility allows T-AKEs to complement T-AOs in support of large naval task forces or serve as the 
lead logistics asset for independent SAGs. This report modeled the impact of T-AKE presence 
in calculating fleet refueling requirements. Although T-AKEs’ fuel storage capacity is insuffi-
cient to satisfy the demands of large naval formations, T-AKEs can assist with fuel distribution 
by refueling task force surface combatants and maintaining a fuel reserve in case shuttling 
oilers are delayed. T-AKEs’ multiproduct capability also makes it a prime candidate to provide 
support to small SAGs or ships operating independently as part of a dispersed operating 
concept, thus allowing the Navy to husband its T-AOs and T-AOEs for more concentrated 
naval maneuver formations. 
Recommended Refueling Fleet Composition 
In assessing the appropriate type and quantity of logistics assets to support the fleet, including 
how and where to posture them, this study conducted qualitative and quantitative analysis 
to identify a promising mix of capabilities suitable for peacetime and wartime operations.88 
Specifically, the study examined the logistics requirements of the Navy’s FY 2019, FY 2033, 
and FY 2048 programmed fleets. Naval forces were arrayed in peacetime and wartime 
laydowns in a manner consistent with the global posture described by CSBA in its Alternative 
Fleet Architecture study, and peacetime and wartime assessments were conducted. 
CSBA analysis suggests that the currently programmed afloat refueling fleet is ‘right-sized’ to 
support the Navy’s FY 2019, FY 2033, and FY 2048 programmed fleets in peacetime and could 
support a modest amount of additional peacetime demand. Accordingly, if the Navy effectively 
stewards its fleet of T-AOs and T-AOEs, the 17-20 it plans on having until FY 2048 should 
suffice for peacetime presence requirements, even as the size of the overall Battle Force is 
planned to grow to 325 ships by FY 2033 and 338 ships by FY 2048. 
However, assessment of two scenarios (conflict with China while deterring Russia and vice 
versa) identified major gaps in the refueling capacity of the programmed CLF. For example, 
were the FY 2019 fleet to operate at a high operational tempo and in a highly distributed 
87 “Lewis and Clark (T-AKE 1) Class Dry Cargo/Ammunition Ship,” General Dynamics NASSCO fact sheet, available at 
https://nassco.com/pdfs/T-AKE-Fact-Sheet.pdf.
88 CSBA maritime logistics models based on methodologies used by the Navy’s Strategic Mobility/Combat Logistics Division 
(N42) and CNA in its T-AO(X) analysis of alternatives and subsequent analyses. For additional information, see Appendix 
B on Quantitative Assessments.
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fashion against China, and if CLF ships did not have access to forward bases to resupply, an 
all-T-AO/E force would require 37 T-AO/Es—20 more than the 17 currently in the force and 
costing an additional approximately $10 billion to acquire.89 Given the 20-ship gap in the 
current force, the Navy would need to develop an operational design that was more logisti-
cally supportable but could reduce combat potential or incur additional risk to the force. In 
contrast, a mixed T-AO/E, T-AOT, and T-AOL force would require 19 T-AO/Es, 16 T-AOTs, 
and ten T-AOLs. This is two T-AO/Es, eleven T-AOTs, and ten T-AOLs more than currently in 
the force and would cost an additional $2.0–3.04 billion, depending on the provenance of the 
T-AOTs. Therefore, a mixed force that includes T-AO/Es, T-AOTs, and T-AOLs would not only 
likely be more resilient, but also would cost $6.9–8.0 billion less than an all-T-AO/E force. 
FIGURE 15: PROPOSED REFUELING FLEET
89 A T-AO 205 is estimated to cost $500 million per ship, assuming faster than currently planned construction rates. A 
320,000 bbl T-AOT is estimated to cost $140 million for a new U.S.-built tanker and $46 million for a 5-year old foreign-
built tanker, including $20 million in modifications. A T-AOL is estimated to cost $50 million for a 5-year old U.S.-built 

















This study recommends the Navy develop a new refueling architecture emphasizing greater 
capacity and resilience. It should slightly increase the number of T-AOs it acquires, consider-
ably increase the number of CONSOL and MFDS tankers it acquires (or otherwise acquires 
long-term access to), and acquire a fleet of T-AOLs for supporting independent units and 
small formations of naval forces in contested environments. The Navy should also develop 
new minimally manned or unmanned refueling systems, critically examine whether it should 
build T-AOEs in the future based on changes in the threat environment and fleet demands, 
and maximize the utility of T-AKEs to support small formations of naval forces. The proposed 
fleet, sized for a 20 percent attrition rate in the primary theater, is depicted in Figure 15. 
Navy Fleet Cargo and Munitions Replenishment
Beyond fuel, Navy CLF assets distribute cargo (such as food, repair parts, and store items) 
and munitions to ships at sea. This allows combatants to remain forward, instead of having to 
retire periodically to resupply from naval bases. The Navy’s fleet of T-AKE ships is the prin-
cipal means of distributing cargo and munitions to ships at sea. Additionally, the Navy’s fleet 
of C-2A aircraft delivers high-priority personnel and parts to aircraft carriers in a procedure 
known as Carrier Onboard Delivery (COD), while a variety of Navy helicopters deliver dry 
cargo and munitions to ships via Vertical Replenishment (VERTREP). 
The Navy’s current model of at-sea delivery has been effective in recent decades of uncon-
tested operations. T-AKEs and aircraft rapidly shuttle from a network of unhardened and 
centralized forward shore depots to support ships at sea. This hub-and-spoke approach to 
cargo delivery has reduced on-ship storage requirements while simultaneously reducing 
redundancy and waste in the Navy parts and equipment supply chain. In many cases, the Navy 
has reduced, or even eliminated, stores of onboard spares and ships’ ability to conduct inter-
mediate-level at-sea maintenance of ship systems and aircraft. T-AKEs operating from similar 
weapons depots also replenish munitions expended by carrier aviation. Surface combatants 
and submarines have, since the end of the Cold War, had to reload at fixed shore facilities 
capable of handling munitions (with the exception of a small number of reloads from subma-
rine tenders). 
This approach will be inadequate in contested operations against China or Russia. Adversary 
strike systems are highly capable of identifying and attacking fixed shore facilities and large 
logistics vessels in port. Reviewing these challenges, and following a best-value approach, this 
study recommends the Navy adopt three initiatives to improve its ability to deliver cargo at sea 
and five initiatives to improve its ability to deliver munitions to ships at sea. 
Distributing Cargo 
To improve cargo distribution resilience, the Navy should pursue three initiatives: shift 
towards distributed aviation logistics operations, gain improved efficiency with supporting 
CONSOL Cargo and Munitions ships, and increase combatant logistical self-reliance. 
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Shift to Distributed Aviation Logistics Operations
The Navy should accelerate its shift away from the current hub-and-spokes model centered on 
the aircraft carrier and towards distributed aviation logistics operations.90 Although the hub-
and-spokes model has served the Navy well, the ability of the tiltrotor CMV-22B aircraft to 
either fly directly to a CVN or to a range of other ships with flight decks is the leading edge of a 
new set of capabilities that can enable a more effective model. To accelerate a shift to distrib-
uted aviation logistics operations, the Navy should pursue three initiatives. 
First, the Navy should significantly increase the number of V-22-capable flight decks in the 
fleet, raising interoperability and in turn resilience throughout the fleet. Otherwise, the Navy 
risks underutilizing the CMV-22B’s tiltrotor capability and continuing a Carrier Onboard 
Delivery (COD) model with the CVN as the central hub and few additional hubs. 
Second, the Navy should reassess the required number of V-22s in its fleet to support avia-
tion logistics. The Navy currently plans on acquiring 44 CMV-22Bs solely to support the 
COD mission. The Marine Corps has a large fleet of MV-22 aircraft, which, while not as well 
suited to the aviation logistics mission as the CMV-22B, could play an ancillary role in some 
Amphibious Ready Group (ARG) aviation logistics support. Additional procurement beyond 
44 CMV-22Bs, coupled with fleet modifications, would assist the Navy’s distributed oper-
ating concepts.91 Additional CMV-22Bs would also be needed to account for attrition or to 
take advantage of the CMV-22B’s improved range and lift for other missions, such as Combat 
Search and Rescue or medical evacuation. 
Third, the Navy should consider the utility of current and potential vertical-takeoff Unmanned 
Aircraft Systems (UAS) to distribute essential, time-sensitive cargo to address relatively light-
weight Casualty Reports (system failures). Incorporating UAS into the Navy’s aviation logistics 
model would permit a more scalable and responsive approach to time-sensitive logistics. 
Small- and medium-sized UAS could support low-weight, low-volume support requirements, 
while V-22s and rotary aviation could address larger payloads. This approach could improve 
combatant ship operational availability while giving each individual logistic ship greater 
“reach” with which to support the fleet. A depiction of the proposed approach is shown in 
Figure 16.
90 Of note, separate fleets of Navy and Joint aircraft and extensive commercial support provide inter and intra-theater 
logistics that deliver supplies to Forward Logistics Sites. The delivery of supplies from Forward Logistics Sites to CVNs is a 
small and critical portion of the logistics chain. The other portions of the logistics chain also require critical examination, 
especially in terms of the ability to swiftly and securely surge adequate levels of cargo but are outside the scope of this 
study. 
91 For example, if the Navy wanted to provide dedicated CMV-22B support to three ARGs (or SAGs near the ARGs), the 
CMV-22B requirement could be approximately 23 additional aircraft. This estimate assumes two operational CMV-22B 
for each ARG, an aircraft availability rate of 60 percent, three aircraft for a forward-deployed attrition reserve of 40 
percent, five aircraft for training, and five aircraft for peacetime attrition. 
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FIGURE 16: DISTRIBUTED, SCALABLE, AND RESPONSIVE AVIATION LOGISTICS SUPPORT
Photos courtesy of U.S. Navy, U.S. Marine Corps, DARPA, and seaforces.org.
Improved System Efficiency with Supporting CONSOL Cargo and Munitions 
Ships 
The Navy should improve the system efficiency of its cargo and munitions distribution 
architecture. The Navy could pursue several methods to improve its ship-based cargo and 
munitions distribution capabilities. One includes the adoption of new transfer systems, 
including E-STREAM on CLF ships and Heavy UNREP capability on T-AKEs, CVNs, and 
LHAs, to reduce the time spent in this vulnerable evolution and enable the UNREP transfer of 
heavy F-35B and F-35C engines.92 
Another improvement would be to adjust the Navy’s cargo and munitions distribution archi-
tecture by introducing consolidated logistics vessels for dry cargo and reducing reliance on 
fixed shore support facilities. If adversaries disrupt access to forward shore-based logistics 
sites, Navy logistics ships, particularly T-AKEs, will need to transit long distances to logistics 
hubs farther back in theater.93 This could increase the number of T-AKEs needed to support 
operations and/or reduce T-AKE UNREP availability (as illustrated in Table 3). Although the 
Navy’s current fleet of T-AKEs could support several CSGs at these longer distances, it would 
92 “UNREP,” NSWC Port Hueneme, available at www.navsea.navy.mil/Home/Warfare-Centers/NSWC-Port-Hueneme/
What-We-Do/Test-Evaluation/UNREP/. 
93 Of note, it is likely that these intermediate and rear shore bases will also be contested kinetically and non-kinetically, 


























54  CSBA | SUSTAINING THE FIGHT
be challenged to support a larger deployment of the battle force—especially if operational 
availability and attrition reserves were taken into account. 
TABLE 3: IMPACT OF DISTANCE ON T-AKE REQUIREMENTS 
This modeling calculates shuttle and station T-AKE requirements for a CSG consisting of one CVN, two CG-47s, five DDG-51s, and one T-AO 187. A 
15 percent evasion distance multiplier is factored into the distances.
To address these challenges, the Navy could use an approach that maximizes the efficiency of 
forward-operating T-AKE through the use of supporting CONSOL ships for dry cargo.94 The 
Navy could acquire or long-term charter a small number of commercially derived, converted 
heavy roll-on/roll-off (RO/RO) ships modified for UNREP CONSOL logistics. These Dry 
Cargo/Ammunition, Resupply (T-AKER) ships should be large enough to reload between 
two and three T-AKEs in a single run, with additional room for selective discharge, broken 
stowage, cargo staging areas, and aviation support. 
FIGURE 17: POTENTIAL MODIFIED-COMMERCIAL T-AKER DESIGN
Image of Commercial Expeditionary Resupply Ship concept design courtesy of Maersk Line Limited.
94 While some aspects of this proposed approach are new, others are informed by the Navy’s experience using Modular 
Cargo Delivery Systems for RRF ships during the 1980s.
Resupply Point for CSG Operating Near Marianas Approximate One-Way Distance (nm) T-AKE Required
Guam, U.S. 100 1
Yokosuka, Japan 1,250 1
Changi, Singapore 2,750 2
Honolulu, U.S. 3,300 2
San Diego, U.S. 5,250 3
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Including T-AKERs in the future fleet would serve at least three purposes. First, it would maxi-
mize the efficiency of existing T-AKEs by allowing them to resupply from intermediate at-sea 
locations, instead of losing time on station transiting to distant bases. Second, T-AKERs could 
serve as a partial substitute for T-AKE if the required number of T-AKE exceeds the number 
of T-AKE in the fleet (12 in the CLF and two in the Maritime Prepositioning Force). Third, 
T-AKERs would provide an important hedge capability in case the Navy’s distant resupply 
locations were degraded by an enemy.
Increased Combatant Logistical Self-Reliance
Beyond methods of UNREP or the means of getting dry cargo forward, the Navy should also 
take steps to increase combatant logistical independence and reduce cargo demand. Increased 
combatant self-reliance would aid in lowering the demands of logistics platforms while raising 
the operational availability of combatants. 
There are three particularly promising areas the Navy could pursue. First, the Navy should 
increase stocks of supplies and spare parts aboard combatants and logistics vessels to increase 
readiness. Second, the Navy should increase maintenance conducted aboard ships at sea 
to improve the ability of ships and their aircraft to maximize operational availability, while 
reducing dependence on supply chains that may be disrupted. Third, the Navy should pursue 
increased Additive Manufacturing, also known as 3D printing, aboard ships to similarly 
reduce their dependence on contested supply chains.95 
Munitions Rearmament 
The ability to reload munitions is critical for protracted combat. Reloading munitions forward 
or at intermediate locations maximizes combatant time on station, where they can contribute 
to operations. Without some means of forward rearmament, ships that expend their maga-
zines are compelled to depart station and undertake lengthy transits to and from rear 
reloading facilities. 
The U.S. Navy’s current ability to reload most ship and submarine munitions in an expedi-
tionary manner is limited and hinders the Navy’s operational effectiveness against capable 
adversaries. Navy ships and submarines currently lack an effective means of reloading the 
fleet’s principal weapons launch system underway, Vertical Launch Systems (VLS). This 
system is used to fire weapons such as the Tomahawk Land Attack Missile (TLAM), the 
Standard Missile (SM) series, Evolved Sea Sparrow Missile (ESSM), and Anti-Submarine 
Rockets (ASROC), among others. At present, ships and submarines must retire to a suit-
able pier or harbor with a reloading barge or submarine tender, to replenish empty VLS cells. 
Similarly, submarines reload their torpedoes, missiles, and other large expendables pierside or 
with one of the two submarine tenders in service capable of slowly reloading weapons within 
95 A Design for Maritime Superiority calls for the U.S. Navy to maximize the use of additive manufacturing. Richardson, A 
Design for Maintaining Maritime Superiority, p. 11. 
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sheltered anchorages. The Navy used to have an at-sea VLS reloading capability organic to 
most surface combatants but phased the capability out for reasons of cost and difficulty main-
taining it following the end of the Cold War.96 
To improve the resilience of the Navy’s logistical capability, the Navy should start by acquiring 
appropriate stores of munitions and other expendables. Ample stores of advanced munitions 
and other expendables enable the force to fight more effectively using preferred CONOPS 
over a protracted period of time. Without appropriate stores, the force is obligated to rely 
on less effective or riskier CONOPS that use fewer preferred munitions and expendables or 
may lack the ability to fight altogether. Numerous reports and Congressional testimony have 
highlighted shortages in DoD’s and the Navy’s overall and forward-based preferred muni-
tions stocks.97 Most analysts expect that at current stocks of munitions, “Peacetime inventories 
of precision-guided munitions would be exhausted quickly in a high-intensity war against a 
powerful enemy.”98 In its current configuration, the U.S. defense industrial base is unlikely to 
be able to sufficiently surge production in the near term to offset wartime expenditures—even 
without taking into account potential attacks on defense-industrial facilities.99 Accordingly, the 
Navy should rapidly increase its inventory of preferred munitions and expendables and more 
adequately configure the defense-industrial base to be capable of supporting surge production. 
Furthermore, the force requires appropriate numbers of protected, hardened, and geographi-
cally distributed magazines and commensurate protected piers suitable for loading munitions. 
Limitations that restrict munitions loading to a small number of locations facilitate enemy 
targeting of forces at those locations. Consequently, the Navy should develop an improved 
capability to load munitions from multiple locations, leveraging the mobility of shore teams. 
Stocks of munitions (and reload sites) should be dispersed among forward, intermediate, 
and rear locations; however, the focus should be on fully loading forward-operating ships 
with munitions and storing the bulk of munitions at intermediate and rear sites. There is 
significant potential to improve forward munitions stocks, storage, and distribution capabili-
ties. Cooperation with close allies on shared magazines and distribution procedures could 
yield major dividends. While forward magazines and distribution points will likely be more 
contested than intermediate or rear locations, they will continue to be critical in order to main-
tain the operational tempo of platforms, especially emerging classes of unmanned systems. 
For example, large unmanned underwater vehicles or large unmanned surface vehicles could 
96 U.S. Navy cruisers and destroyers had a VLS reload capability using an organic strikedown crane. However, this slow and 
maintenance-intensive system was removed from combatants in the 1990s. 
97 David Ochmanek, RAND Corporation, “Recommendations for a Future National Defense Strategy,” testimony presented 
before the Committee on Armed Services, November 30, 2017, available at www.rand.org/pubs/testimonies/CT484.html.
98 Jan Van Tol, Mark Gunzinger, Andrew Krepinevich, and Jim Thomas, AirSea Battle: A Point-of-Departure Operational 
Concept (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, 2010), p. 90.
99 “Every major combat operation since the 1973 Yom Kippur war has seen a far higher than expected expenditure rate for 
precision-guided munitions. Nonetheless, given 1) ordnance accounts are generally early “go-to” sources for funds when 
defense budgets tighten, 2) the high cost of most precision-guided munitions, and 3) fears of block obsolescence, the 
Services have tended to keep overall inventories relatively small.” Ibid., p. 32.
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potentially be resupplied from a wider range of locations forward in a lower-signature manner 
than large manned combatant platforms. Further back in theater and the homeland, magazine 
survivability will remain important. Facility hardening and protection will continue to be vital 
at this distance, where it should aim to drive the number of munitions (or the scale of a special 
forces attack) required to disrupt operations to a high, challenging level.
In terms of munitions distribution, five primary initiatives could potentially improve the 
Navy’s capabilities. First, as previously discussed, it should adopt T-AKER ships to increase 
the efficiency of forward-operating T-AKEs and T-AOEs. This initiative would primarily 
support naval aviation aboard CVNs and LHAs and gun-based weapons and other expend-
ables on surface combatants. 
Second, the Navy should continue improving its ability to reload at anchor with current 
classes of auxiliary ships with cranes that use traditional mooring technologies, i.e., fenders 
and lines.100 Although VLS reload at anchorage is an attractive intermediate step toward a 
more agile rearmament capability, it has limitations: in particular, the necessity of favorable 
weather conditions and slow transfer rates. Accordingly, the Navy should adopt improved 
crane technology for some existing auxiliaries. 
Third, the Navy should develop a capability to conduct VLS Rearming at Sea (RAS). Although 
long desired, technical barriers have hindered previous VLS RAS efforts. Poor experiences 
with the 1980s shipboard strike-down cranes and the slow rate and complications involved in 
VLS reload at anchorage has led to the widespread belief that VLS reload between two moving 
ships is impractical. This may no longer be the case. The Navy may be able to leverage mature 
technologies predominantly derived from the commercial maritime sector and seabasing 
experimentation to field an effective capability. Principally, there are new crane, mooring, 
and weapon canister transfer system technologies that could enable the swift unloading 
and loading of VLS canisters in low to moderate sea states while underway or at anchor, in 
a manner that maintains a safe, fully-positive, and precise control of canisters and does not 
require modifications to combatants.
Operationally, VLS RAS would provide numerous benefits. First, it would increase fleet opera-
tional tempo by maximizing the presence of fleet assets forward vice in long transits to reload. 
For example, a VLS RAS capability in the Central Pacific on two to three ships could improve 
the forward presence of a wartime laydown of 48 cruisers and destroyers by an additional 
100 In 2017 the U.S. Navy Chief of Naval Operations Admiral John Richardson expressed interest in “bringing 
back” expeditionary or underway VLS reloading. Hunter Stires, “CNO Announces the Return of Vertical Launch 
System At-Sea Reloading,” The National Interest, July 5, 2017, available at http://nationalinterest.org/feature/
exclusive-cno-announces-the-return-vertical-launch-system-21425. 
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approximately 5-18 cruisers and destroyers, depending on the fallback rearmament location.101 
Viewed in this light, a fleet VLS RAS capability provides a “value” in equivalent combatants of 
about $11-37 billion.102 Second, VLS RAS would decrease fleet risk by increasing the number of 
reload locations from a fixed few to a mobile many. Third, this capability would enable more 
efficient use of high value or scarce munitions by allowing ships to unload munitions from 
combatants leaving the theater.
Starting with an at-sea demonstration leveraging these technologies on an existing ship, 
the Navy should progress to field a dual-crane capability on a suitable ship, such as a feeder 
containership (such as one similar to the ship depicted in Figure 18), which would allow the 
simultaneous rearmament of combatants’ fore and aft VLS cells while underway. This report 
refers to this ship as a Missile Rearmament Ship (T-AKM). 
FIGURE 18: ILLUSTRATIVE CONTAINERSHIP SUITABLE FOR VLS RAS
Image courtesy of Henk Jungerius.
A fourth initiative the Navy should pursue to enhance fleet supportability is new weapons 
technologies and concepts that provide sustained effects with a reduced logistical tail. Some 
new weapons (such as electronic warfare systems, high powered microwaves, lasers, and 
101 This estimate subtracts the number of cruisers and destroyers of the 48-ship force that could be maintained on station 
if a VLS RAS capability could be provided to conduct reloads in the Central Pacific (17.8) from the number of cruisers 
and destroyers that could be maintained on station if the ships had to transit to Pearl Harbor, HI for reloads (12.3), for a 
difference of 5.5. It then subtracts the number of cruisers and destroyers of the 48-ship force that could be maintained on 
station if a VLS RAS capability could be provided to conduct reloads in the Second Island Chain (27.8) from the number of 
cruisers and destroyers that could be maintained on station if the ships had to transit to Seal Beach, CA for reloads (9.3), 
for a difference of 18.5. Including an attrition reserve of 40 percent and assuming a 90 percent operational availability 
rate, up to five VLS RAS ships would be needed to support operations of a 48-ship cruiser and destroyer force. Moreover, 
a VLS RAS capability could be highly useful even if forward ports were accessible, since the capability would alleviate 
reloading bottlenecks caused when multiple ships need to reload within a short period of time and also provide a means of 
transporting magazines farther forward. Similar analyses are applicable to the value of tenders for the submarine force. 
102 This estimate assumes a cost of $2 billion for each cruiser or destroyer. 
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future hypervelocity projectiles) require less logistical resupply per engagement than missile 
interceptors.103 Similarly, the Navy can further emphasize short-to-medium range missile 
interceptors (such as ESSM) that can fit multiple weapons within each VLS cell, increasing 
combatant defensive capacity per VLS cell dedicated to defense.104 Another source of poten-
tial improvement would be to augment manned combatants with weapon-carrying unmanned 
systems that act as offboard magazines. As shown in Figure 19, if utilized principally as 
command and control assets, future surface combatants could increase their endurance 
forward while their large unmanned surface vehicles (LUSV) fire and shuttle back and forth to 
reload from a shore facility, tender, or T-AKM. 
FIGURE 19: LUSV OFFBOARD MAGAZINES
Figure ranges not drawn to scale. Figure ESSM and SM-6 range estimates are drawn from IHS Jane’s. Tomahawk range is drawn from U.S. Navy, 
“Tomahawk Cruise Missile,” U.S. Navy Fact File, available at www.navy.mil/navydata/fact_display.asp?cid=2200&tid=1300&ct=2. LRASM range 
estimate is drawn from Alan Jackson of Lockheed Martin in Oriana Pawlyk, “Live LRASM Test from F/A-18 Super Hornet Expected This Year,” 
DoDBuzz, April 10, 2018, available at https://www.military.com/dodbuzz/2018/04/10/live-lrasm-test-f-18-super-hornet-expected-year.html.
Finally, the Navy should consider the next generation of surface missile launchers. Mk41 
and Mk57 VLS systems have served the U.S. Navy and its allies and partners well for over 
four decades. However, as the Navy considers future surface combatant designs, it should 
examine whether there may be more effective or logistically supportable approaches to 
weapons launch. For example, as some missile types become larger, the Navy may find merit 
in new hot, cold, or electromagnetic-launch systems (diversifying from solely hot-launch 
103 Of note, these systems will not obviate the need for long-range missiles—especially since many of these technologies 
are limited to line of sight engagement. Additionally, as a countervailing factor, Navy ships may need to expend larger 
quantities of expendables such as sensors and decoys for EMW operations. 
104 Mark Gunzinger and Bryan Clark, Winning the Salvo Competition: Rebalancing America’s Air and Missile Defenses 
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VLS systems).105 In addition, adoption of container-form factor launchers could facilitate 
global transport and installation across multiple Navy ship types, introducing additional fleet 
flexibility, and could provide rapid options for reload afloat and ashore.106 Small, trainable 
launchers could also provide a reloadable means to deploy numerous small payloads. 
Overall, by implementing new concepts and adding new platforms, the Navy can shift to a 
more resilient cargo and munitions replenishment architecture. Figure 20 depicts the key 
elements of CSBA’s proposed fleet, sized for a 20 percent attrition rate in the primary theater.
FIGURE 20: PROPOSED CARGO AND MUNITIONS FLEET
105 Both Russian Navy and PLAN surface combatants utilize both hot- and cold-launch on different ship designs and for 
different weapons. The U.S. Navy currently uses only hot-launch VLS systems, in which the missile ignites in the cell, 
onboard its surface combatants. A cold-launch weapon (used by U.S. submarines when firing missiles) is ejected by a gas 
generator. Hot-launch systems generally achieve faster initial acceleration compared to cold-launch systems. Cold-launch 
systems allow larger and more energetic missiles to be fired from combatants due to reduced concerns for ship damage 
from rocket exhaust. An electromagnetic launch system would use a changing magnetic field to accelerate a payload.
106 Of note, China, Russia, and Israel have developed missile systems that can be disguised within containers and aboard 
cargo ships. Jamie Seidel, “Israel and Russia Testing Missile Systems That Can Be Hidden Aboard Cargo Ships,” News 
Corp Australia Network, June 23, 2017, available at www.news.com.au/technology/innovation/israel-and-russia-
testing-missile-systems-that-can-be-hidden-aboard-cargo-ships/news-story/84fddac3db50330c41972e252e7fcd25. New 
weapon reload technologies, including containerized launchers, could have a major impact on fleet design, increasing the 
combat utility of auxiliaries and a wide variety of commercial ship designs. For a discussion of using merchant designs as 
warships, see Steve Wills, “Merchant Warships and Creating a Modern 21st Century East Indiaman,” CIMSEC, September 














The Navy’s towing and salvage fleet supports at-sea transport and recovery of naval plat-
forms and systems. Five MSC tugs (three T-ATF Fleet Ocean Tugs and two T-ARS Rescue and 
Salvage Vessels), complemented by contractor tug support, currently perform this mission. 
FIGURE 21: FORMER USS BELLEAU WOOD TOWED BY USNS NAVAJO 
Photo courtesy of U.S. Navy.
In peacetime, this force is responsible for towing damaged ships, salvaging military vessels 
and aircraft, rescuing personnel from damaged submarines, and debeaching ships. In general, 
the fleet has required regular ocean towing support; regular salvaging of military aircraft 
and occasional salvaging of contemporary or historic ships; and constant standby subma-
rine rescue services. Debeaching requirements for amphibious landings have diminished over 
recent decades with the retirement of the Navy’s Landing Ship, Tank ships and a reduction in 
the size of the Army amphibious watercraft fleet.107 Navy ships do occasionally run aground or 
collide, however.108 
In wartime, the towing and salvage force would be responsible for the same set of peace-
time missions, but their character and frequency will likely change and increase. Navy vessels 
must be towed periodically due to equipment failure. As documented by the U.S. Government 
Accountability Office, since 2012 the readiness of the surge sealift and combat fleets has 
107 The Army is currently recapitalizing its Landing Craft Mechanized, Mark 8 (LCM-8) fleet with the Army Maneuver 
Support Vessel Light (MSVL). It plans on acquiring future Army Maneuver Support Vessel Medium and Large vessels. All 
three ship classes are capable of beaching and may increase the demand for debeaching support. Additionally, emerging 
concepts for the amphibious landing of heavier equipment (especially offensive and defensive fires) in support of Multi-
Domain Battle and Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations may contribute to an increase in debeaching support. Of 
note, the U.S. Army has six MGen. Nathanael Greene-class large coastal tugs used for coastal and ocean towing, docking 
operations, and undocking operations of large ocean vessels.
108 Recent grounding incidents include the 2009 case of the USS Port Royal off Hawaii, the 2013 case of the USS Guardian 
off the Philippines, and the 2017 case of the USS Antietam off Japan.
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declined, with annual mission-limiting casualty reports rising.109 Given the fleet’s lower 
state of readiness, more ship steaming days during conflict may result in a higher number of 
propulsion failures that require towing support. 
Beyond accidents and equipment failure, a future war against a capable adversary would 
likely result in significant attrition. Throughout the latter half of the 20th Century, a mix of 
robust ship design, professionalism, and heroism has resulted in crews saving U.S. Navy ships, 
despite successful shell, torpedo, bomb, mine, anti-ship missile, and suicide boat strikes.110 If 
unable to proceed on their own, and if a commander deems it prudent to attempt to tow a ship 
given the state of conflict, damaged ships may require one of three towing options. First, a 
nearby combatant or support ship could take the ship under tow. Second, an MSC or commer-
cial tug can tow the ship to an intermediate location, where it can receive expeditionary repairs 
or be lifted onto a heavy-lift ship for transport. Finally, tugs may tow the damaged ship all the 
way to a rear location. 
Other wartime towing and salvage missions include salvaging military vessels and aircraft 
(especially rapid recovery of sensitive equipment), rescuing personnel from damaged subma-
rines, and debeaching ships. The debeaching mission extends beyond support to amphibious 
and other grounded ships to also include the rapid clearance of ports and channels of damaged 
friendly ships and sunken enemy blockships. 
To improve its towing and salvage capability, the Navy should pursue five initiatives. First, the 
Navy should refine its concepts and posture for wartime towing and salvage (and subsequent 
repair, as discussed in the next section). 
Second, the Navy should reexamine its wartime towing and salvage requirements. Informed 
by the 2012 Towing and Salvage Ship Recapitalization Analysis of Alternatives, the Navy set its 
tug requirement at eight and plans to acquire eight through the T-ATS program.111 Since 2012, 
a number of operating assumptions have likely changed, such as the level of fleet attrition, 
access to nearby bases, wartime geographic distribution of forces, and projected fleet size. 
This study’s quantitative analysis estimates that the Navy’s FY 2019 fleet may have a revised 
109 Pendleton, Navy Readiness.
110 Incidents include the 1967 bomb, torpedo, and shell attack by Israel of the USS Liberty, the 1987 Exocet ASM attack by 
Iraq of the USS Stark, the 1988 mine attack by Iran of the USS Samuel B. Roberts, the 1991 mine attacks by Iraq of the 
USS Tripoli and USS Princeton, and the 2000 suicide boat attack by al-Qaeda of the USS Cole. 
111 Bill Hardy, “Towing, Salvage, and Rescue Ships,” 2016 Salvage Executive Steering Committee briefing slides, March 10, 
2016, available at http://seawaves.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/T-ATSX-Update-Brief.pdf. 
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wartime demand for 15-26 tugs, as depicted in Figure 22.112 This estimate considerably exceeds 
the five current and eight planned tugs. 
FIGURE 22: ESTIMATED FY19 WARTIME TOWING AND SALVAGE REQUIREMENT
Third, with an expanded force, the Navy should improve the peacetime posture and wartime 
laydown of its tugs, prepositioning them at key ports ready to debeach or salvage sunken ships 
to maintain effective port operations and deploying them in battle group operating areas, 
ready to recover damaged ships and tow them to rear shipyards or to Float-On/Float-Off 
(FLO/FLO) mobile dry docks or transports located at intermediate areas (as discussed in in 
the next section). 
Fourth, the Navy should consider reevaluating its T-ATS acquisition strategy to meet revised 
requirements. The current program is scheduled to procure eight new-build ships one a 
year, with the final ship delivered in 2025. Total program cost is projected to cost over $680 
112 In summary, this analysis sets levels of attrition to the forward-deployed battle fleet (20 percent and 40 percent). It then 
assumes 60 percent of ships hit will not be immediately sunk or rendered non-recoverable; tugs will be tasked to recover 
75 percent of damaged floating ships; and the probability a damaged ship stays afloat is a function of the time in which 
a tug can arrive to provide assistance. This analysis assumed that the probability a tug would be able to tow a damaged 
ship that does not immediately sink decreases by 10 percent every 12 hours. The requirement for tugs includes two tugs 
supporting submarine rescue and other emergent missions on the East Coast of the Continental United States, two tugs 
supporting submarine rescue and other emergent missions on the West Coast of the Continental United States, one tug 
supporting port clearance at another port, and seven to sixteen tugs supporting towing requirements forward, plus the 
requisite number of tugs to reach a 90 percent availability rate. Tug 20 percent and 40 percent attrition rates are applied 


























64  CSBA | SUSTAINING THE FIGHT
million, with all but $50 million occurring within the FY 2019 FYDP.113 As a point on value, 
if the fleet of tugs rescues a single incapacitated major combatant that otherwise could not 
be rescued, the entire fleet of tugs will have paid for itself. To meet revised requirements, the 
Navy should shift to producing two tugs per year to rapidly meet the estimated tug require-
ment of 15-26 tugs.114 Additionally, if deemed necessary to close urgent gaps, the Navy could 
acquire or long-term charter some U.S.-built Anchor Handling Tug Supply vessels on the open 
market to partially meet gaps, while T-ATS are built. 
The fifth initiative the Navy should pursue is a deepening of contingency agreements with 
other countries (especially allies) and commercial ship operators for towing support. 
Figure 23 below depicts the proposed towing and salvage force. It includes FLO/FLO vessels 
that are discussed in the next section. It is sized to provide wartime support, assuming 20 
percent battle fleet and 20 percent tug attrition rate in the primary theater.
FIGURE 23: PROPOSED TOWING AND SALVAGE FLEET
Expeditionary Maintenance and Repair 
In peacetime, U.S. forces draw upon a global network of forward commercial partner-
ships, allied and partner locations, and bases to conduct naval maintenance and repair.115 In 
wartime, as the number of naval forces operating surges and as battle damage occurs, demand 
for maintenance and repair will increase. In contrast with peacetime operations, though, the 
113 The Navy has budgeted approximately $75 million for each vessel, while ship construction costs are estimated at $63 
million for each vessel. Cost and timelines available via Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (OUSD)(Comptroller)/
Chief Financial Officer (CFO), Department of Defense Fiscal Year 2019 Budget Request, Shipbuilding and Conversion, 
Navy, vol. 1-1 (Washington, DC: DoD, February 2018), pp. 215–218, available at https://www.secnav.navy.mil/fmc/fmb/
Documents/19pres/SCN_Book.pdf.
114 The Navy may consider it useful to build two blocks of T-ATS, the latter block with diesel-electric capability that increases 
fuel efficiency at low speeds. 
115 Of note, there are significant opportunities to deepen partnerships with allies to improve the maintenance and repair of 







same convenient fixed forward maintenance and repair sites supporting ongoing naval opera-
tions are likely to be easy targets for an enemy. Naval forces would either need to conduct 
maintenance and repairs at intermediate expeditionary locations or retrograde—if capable—to 
rear facilities. 
Wartime demand for expeditionary maintenance and repair would largely consist of two func-
tions. First, as in peacetime, routine maintenance and voyage repairs would be necessary to 
sustain combatant operations, especially to keep pace with higher ship operational tempo. 
Second, battle damage, salvage, and repair would be needed. This study bifurcates battle 
damage repair into two sets of demands: light and heavy. 
Light battle damage repairs would fix minor external structural damage and swap damaged 
parts, components, and even small systems with operating ones. Improving light repair capa-
bilities could allow surface combatants sustaining minor damage to return to battle more 
quickly than if they retrograded to a major shipyard.
In contrast, expeditionary heavy battle damage repair capabilities would emphasize ship stabi-
lization over returning combatants to battle-worthy condition. Heavily damaged ships are 
likely to require lengthy, invasive repairs. Expeditionary heavy repair capabilities closer to the 
combat area would consequently serve a triage function. The extent of damage suffered by 
ships coming in under their own power or via tow will need to be assessed. Those ships that 
can be patched up to steam onwards to a rear area drydock on their own should, freeing up 
additional tow assets. Other ships may require battle damage repairs to enable their towing 
to a rear area drydock. Ships requiring additional assistance should be prepared for transit 
aboard FLO/FLO heavy lift ships to a rear-area drydock.
This tiered approach to battle damage repairs is consistent with the historical record. In World 
War II, Service Squadron 10 and other units were equipped with repair ships and tenders, tugs 
and barges, and floating docks, to repair and salvage damaged ships at intermediate locations. 
During and shortly after the Cold War, the Navy retained tenders, repair ships, and floating 
dry docks to serve as intermediate maintenance and repair and command and control sites for 
submarines and destroyers. In 1990, the Navy had 11 submarine tenders, 9 destroyer tenders, 
and 2 repair ships in service. In the Gulf War, destroyer tenders and repair ships aided stabi-
lizing the USS Samuel B. Roberts, the USS Princeton, and the USS Tripoli after the ships 
struck mines. In 2005, emergency repairs by the submarine tender USS Frank Cable repaired 
the nuclear attack submarine USS San Francisco sufficiently, after it had a catastrophic 
collision with an undersea mountain, to enable it to transit on the surface to Bremerton, 
Washington for more extensive repairs.116 Overall, the historical record demonstrates the enor-
mous utility of expeditionary maintenance and repair capabilities afloat for not only routine 
maintenance or minor repairs, but also major damage. 
116 Patrick T. Rawlinson, “The Importance of Submarine Tenders to a Modern Naval War: Naval Combat Logistics and Sea 
Basing,” The Submarine Review, September 2017, p. 14.
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Despite the historical record, Navy expeditionary repair capabilities have atrophied (as 
shown in Figure 24): two submarine tenders and fly-away teams are all that remain of Service 
Squadron 10’s descendants.117 In scenarios in which the United States lacks safe access to 
forward bases to conduct maintenance and repair, a dearth of expeditionary maintenance 
and repair would result in lower wartime operational availability rates and an increased loss 
percentage of damaged ships and submarines. 
FIGURE 24: SIZE OF NAVY TENDER AND REPAIR SHIP FORCE OVER TIME
To improve expeditionary maintenance and repair, the Navy should take three major steps. 
These initiatives would have significant utility in peacetime, particularly in the event of major 
accidents, while enhancing fleet resiliency and survivability during conflict. 
First, the Navy should expand the tender fleet. The Navy requires tenders to conduct expe-
ditionary maintenance and repair for both submarines and surface combatants. Although 
a single class of tenders, built on a common design, like the Common Hull Auxiliary Multi-
mission Platform (CHAMP) or another design (such as one based on the ESB hull), may be 
sufficient to support both submarines and surface ships, additional analysis could deter-
mine whether differentiated tenders (in terms of design, equipment, and personnel onboard) 
117 This capability was in part replaced by the development of qualified yards and maintainers in forward locations. 
However, this shore-based capability is less flexible and more sensitive politically and militarily than afloat expeditionary 
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should be pursued or not.118 The CHAMP concept is examining the utility of a common hull for 
five missions: strategic sealift, aviation intermediate maintenance support, medical services, 
command and control, and submarine tending.119 A common hull approach may generate ship-
building and fleet maintenance cost efficiencies; however, the distinct requirements for these 
different missions will likely mean a single hull will not be suitable for all missions. 
Second, the Navy should acquire a force of Float-On/Float-Off (FLO/FLO) ships.120 These 
ships would have two purposes: ship transport and mobile dry dock. In their role as ship 
transports, Navy FLO/FLO ships could support the peacetime regular movement of small 
ships (such as patrol craft and minesweepers) between theaters, as well as irregular ship 
movements (such as transporting damaged ships, as was necessary in 2017 for the USS John 
S. McCain and the USS Fitzgerald, both displayed in Figure 25). In wartime, FLO/FLO ships 
would be postured at intermediate locations to receive heavily damaged ships unable to 
continue on their own or under tow for transport to rear-area repair yards. 
FIGURE 25: ARLEIGH-BURKE-CLASS DDGS LOADED ABOARD FLO/FLO
USS Fitzgerald being loaded onto the FLO/FLO MV Transshelf, with the ship submerged for loading (left). USS John S. McCain loaded aboard the 
FLO/FLO MV Treasure (right). Neither FLO/FLO is U.S.-flagged. Photos courtesy of U.S. Navy and Singapore Ministry of Defence.
The second primary purpose of FLO/FLO ships would be to serve as mobile dry docks at 
intermediate locations to assist tenders in repairing ships. If additional ballast and other 
modifications were made to new Expeditionary Transfer Docks (ESD), then they could serve 
118 While tenders should be capable of reloading weapons on surface combatants and missiles and torpedoes on submarines, 
this study recommends the tender force focus principally on expeditionary maintenance and repair, while the 
aforementioned VLS RAS T-AKM ships focus on rearmament. The large quantity of VLS cells to be reloaded would either 
greatly increase the size of tenders or force tenders to reduce time on station spent on maintenance and repair of ships 
due to the need to shuttle weapons from rear magazines. Another concept worth additional analysis is the potential utility 
of differentiation in the submarine tender fleet. One class of larger submarine tenders would provide a broad range of 
support to submarines, including maintenance, repair, and reloads, while another class of smaller submarine tenders 
would focus on resupplying weapons, food, and other key supplies.
119 Justin Katz. “Navy Still Eyeing CHAMP, but Not Ruling Out Single-mission Ship Designs,” Inside Defense, October 19, 
2018, available at https://insidedefense.com/insider/navy-still-eyeing-champ-not-ruling-out-single-mission-ship-designs. 
120 FLO/FLO ships are sometimes referred to as Heavy Lift Ships or Semi-Submersible Heavy Transport Vessels (SSHTV). 
The term Heavy Lift Ship also refers to other ships capable of carrying large loads. Therefore, for clarity, this report uses 
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as an FLO/FLO ship in the ship transport or mobile dry dock roles. Alternatively, the Navy 
could acquire new or used open-stern FLO/FLO based on a commercial design or long-term 
charter ones with U.S. crews on the open market. Another option to secure access to some of 
these ships may be a public-private partnership in which a commercial company leased a U.S. 
Government-owned FLO/FLO for commercial use, with the Navy maintaining contingency 
priority. A final option would be to establish a specialized, higher MSP stipend and slots for 
FLO/FLO, incentivizing currently foreign-flagged and operated FLO/FLOs to join the U.S. 
fleet.121 This could be a cost-effective option to secure necessary FLO/FLO access.
Overall, the Navy should shift to an approach that secures assured access to FLO/FLO ships, 
rather than relying on the financially, politically, and threat-sensitive services of FLO/FLO 
ships on the open market. As opposed to other segments of the global maritime industry, the 
FLO/FLO market is small (with only 41 vessels 15,000 gross tons or more, a minimum size to 
transport U.S. destroyers, across the world), and ownership is concentrated in five countries.122 
As shown in Figure 26, Chinese companies own more than half of the FLO/FLO market and 
continue to gain greater market share through a mix of shipbuilding, scrapping, and oper-
ating subsidies. There are no U.S.-flagged or owned FLO/FLOs, and only 17 are owned by 
U.S. allies.123 During a conflict involving China or Russia, their FLO/FLO operators would not 
charter their ships to the United States, and China and Russia would likely exert pressure on 
other FLO/FLO operators to not cooperate with the United States or else face repercussions. 
Additionally, the availability of FLO/FLO ships for chartering fluctuates due to market factors, 
primarily driven by the oil and gas sector. There is an inverse relationship between the price of 
oil and gas and slack capacity in the FLO/FLO market. Therefore, if a conflict took place at a 
time when the price of oil or gas was high, it may be difficult for the Navy to charter one of the 
17 FLO/FLO ships owned by allies (assuming the operators or their owner’s countries were not 
dissuaded from working with the United States due to Chinese or Russian coercion)—even if 
the Navy offered higher spot charter rates since many of these ships would be locked in longer-
term contracts. Lastly, foreign FLO/FLO crews may be reluctant to operate in a warzone. In 
summary, the FLO/FLO market is small, competitive, and contested, and the Navy should 
shift from an approach that optimistically assumes the market of foreign-owned ships will 
provide requisite capacity during conflicts. 
121 Market research indicates the current annual stipend of $5 million per vessel would be inadequate to offset FLO/FLO 
operating differentials. However, a specialized annual stipend of $8.5 to $12 million may incentivize select operators to 
join the U.S.-flag fleet through MSP. 
122 As an example of this growing trend, in August 2018, Dutch dredging and heavylift firm Boskalis (the parent company 
of Dockwise, the company that transported the USS John S. McCain and USS Fitzgerald after their 2017 collisions) 
announced that due to lower demand in offshore energy and “Asian” (i.e., Chinese) overcapacity in the market, it would 
exit the lower-end of the heavy lift market and scrap 12 of its smaller vessels, leaving it with a fleet of eight large open stern 
ships. This reduction in the number of vessels in the market will accelerate the trend of a small and decreasing number 
of vessels available for DoD to contract. “Boskalis 2018 Half Year Report,” Boskalis, August 2018, available at https://
boskalis.cld.bz/Boskalis-2018-Half-Year-Report/7/#zoom=z. 
123 The MV American Cormorant (AK-2062) was the last U.S.-flagged or owned FLO/FLO ship. It was under long-term 
contract to MSC for the prepositioning of Army lighterage until 2002.
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FIGURE 26: FLO/FLO SHIPS IN GLOBAL MARKET
The third initiative the Navy should pursue to improve its expeditionary maintenance and 
repair capability is to acquire a force of light unmanned system tenders to maintain, repair, 
and rearm future fleets of unmanned surface and subsurface vehicles. These smaller tenders 
would maximize the operational availability of forward-operating unmanned vehicles by mini-
mizing the time unmanned vehicles would need to spend in transit. For small to medium-sized 
unmanned vessels, a modified EPF could be configured with a suitable crane for launch and 
recovery while retaining sufficient space to conduct internal maintenance and repair. The EPF 
flight deck could similarly support unmanned aerial systems, particularly if configured with a 
hangar. For larger unmanned surface vehicles and undersea vehicles, Multi-Purpose Support 
Vessels (MPSVs) could be good candidate support platforms. MPSVs have a low freeboard to 
work alongside lightering unmanned vehicles, large cranes to lift large unmanned vessels out 
of the water, and ample deck space (some of which could be enclosed) to work on unmanned 
vessels. 
In summary, although the Navy has continued to devote modest resources to its at-sea replen-
ishment force, its expeditionary maintenance and repair capabilities have dwindled. As a 
result, the Navy has largely shifted to a forward “garrison force” that relies on a network of 
forward ports, vice expeditionary capability, to sustain itself in forward combat theaters.124 
Faced with major threats to the current way of operating, the Navy should restore its expedi-
tionary capability. Figure 28 below depicts CSBA’s proposed force. 
124 The Cold War and post-Cold War “Garrison Force” contrasts with World War II “Expeditionary Force.” Robert O. Work, 
To Take and Keep the Lead: A Naval Fleet Platform Architecture for Enduring Maritime Supremacy (Washington, DC: 
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FIGURE 27: POTENTIAL OPTIONS FOR LIGHT TENDERS
Modified EPF (left) or Multi-Purpose Support Vessels (right) could serve as light tenders. Images courtesy of U.S. Navy and Hornbeck Offshore.
FIGURE 28: PROPOSED EXPEDITIONARY MAINTENANCE AND REPAIR FLEET 
SAR (to include CSAR) and Medical Support Afloat
Robust Search and Rescue (SAR)—to include Combat Search and Rescue (CSAR)—and 
medical support afloat are critical to the Navy’s ability to fight a protracted conflict against 
a capable adversary.125 The two capabilities increase the survival rates of personnel (essen-
tial to being able to sustain a protracted conflict) and increase personnel confidence in the 
125 This section focuses on the Navy’s ability to rescue personnel at sea or in the littorals and provide temporary medical 
support before transfer to a more capable shore facility. In so doing, it does not strictly adhere to some definitions of 
logistics missions. Nonetheless, it is included in this report given its criticality and relatively underappreciated nature. The 
term Combat Search and Rescue is used to refer to the recovery of personnel from contested areas in general, rather than 























operational design since they know there is a reasonable chance of their being rescued if their 
unit is unsuccessful in defending against the enemy.126 This confidence, in turn, enables local 
commanders to exercise a higher degree of calculated risk against deadly enemies. 
The Navy has dedicated SAR organic in the fleet and medical support afloat forces. The 
requirements that have shaped these forces in the past two decades are unlikely to be suffi-
cient, however, for mass rescue and medical support potentially required in a major conflict 
against a peer or near-peer adversary. 
TABLE 4: ESTIMATE OF POTENTIAL SHIP PERSONNEL MEDICAL SUPPORT DEMANDS FOR 
THE FLEET OF FY 2019 IN A CHINA SCENARIO
A high-intensity naval conflict against either China or Russia could greatly exceed any Navy 
combat casualty experience since World War II. Table 4 portrays a potential outcome if, of 
the Navy’s FY 2019 fleet of ships in the primary theater (using the concepts and laydown 
described in CSBA’s Alternative Fleet Architecture study), 20 percent were damaged in which 
40 percent of damaged ships (8 percent overall) either sunk or were rendered otherwise unre-
coverable (either immediately after the enemy attack or in a later period), and 60 percent 
of damaged ships (12 percent overall) stayed afloat and were recoverable.127 The number of 
personnel to rescue from these events and medically treat on or evacuate from ships—even 
if staggered in time—would be considerable. This would be aggravated by the time-sensi-
tive nature of personnel recovery and treatment, coupled with the dangers of rescue in a 
126 As a historical example, during the Battle of Britain, Great Britain’s relative superiority rescuing its downed airmen gave it 
a key advantage over the Luftwaffe.
127 This simple assessment assumes that 25 percent of personnel on ships that sink die, 25 percent are injured, and 50 
percent are uninjured. It also assumes that 15 percent of personnel on ships that stay afloat die, 15 percent are injured, 
and 70 percent are uninjured. In general, these percentages may overestimate casualty rates for personnel on large and 
hardened ships (such as CVNs) and underestimate them for smaller ships and submarines. Factors used in this estimate 
are derived from professional judgement. These figures are similar to results observed during the Falklands War of 1982. 
During that war, of 23 frigates and destroyers sent by the Royal Navy to the South Atlantic, four were sunk and another 
four damaged. Of note, three of four damaged warships that did not sink were struck by bombs that did not explode. Had 
they exploded, the number of ships that sank may have been higher. Andrea Ungaro and Paola Gualeni, “An Overview 
of Warships Damage Data from 1967–2013,” Proceedings of the 12th International Conference on the Stability of Ships 
and Ocean Vehicles, Glasgow, UK, June 14–19 2015, available at www.shipstab.org/files/Proceedings/STAB/STAB2015/
Papers/12.1-2-%20Ungaro.pdf.
Category Number of Ships and Personnel
Number of Total Ships in Primary Theater 190
Number of Ships Sunk 15
Number of Ships Damaged but Afloat 23
Number of Injured Personnel from Damaged Ships that Sunk 1,473
Number of Uninjured Personnel from Damaged Ships that Sunk 2,947
Number of Injured Personnel on Damaged Ships that Stay Afloat 1,326
Total Number of Personnel from Sunk or Damaged Ships 
Requiring Rescue or Medical Attention
5,746
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combat zone. Similar analyses requiring the recovery of scores to hundreds of personnel can 
be conducted for naval aircraft attrition and the over-water attrition of land-based Air Force, 
Marine Corps, and Army aircraft, requiring maritime CSAR. 
A series of Navy wargames and subsequent analysis and exercises involving towing and 
salvage, expeditionary maintenance and repair, and CSAR and medical support of mass sailor 
and aviator casualties in the threat environment could provide significant insights to inform 
Navy options to improve these capabilities. Informed by insights generated, the Navy could 
pursue three lines of effort to improve CSAR capabilities. 
First, it should improve combatant personnel rescue capability and preparedness. Combatants 
entering a combat area are unlikely to be alone, and surviving combatants are likely to be 
the most immediate source of aid. Beyond combatants, T-ATS and T-AOLs could also play 
an auxiliary role rescuing personnel, leveraging their low freeboard and in some cases excess 
berthing capacity to rescue personnel. Moreover, large unmanned and minimally-manned 
vessels may have utility for personnel rescue. 
Second, the Navy should improve its aviation-based CSAR capability. The Navy’s MH-60 
helicopters, while effective for CSAR near a host ship, are ill-suited for long-range CSAR. As 
the Navy both considers employing carrier aviation farther from CVNs to reduce risk to the 
carrier and adopts a more distributed approach to surface warfare, this will increase demand 
for long-range rescue capability. CMV-22Bs could potentially conduct CSAR missions from a 
wide range of flight decks, provided they are procured in numbers greater than solely required 
for the COD mission. Despite this, even CMV-22Bs would face challenges rescuing large 
numbers of personnel at range.128 The Navy should consequently consider acquiring amphib-
ious aircraft for CSAR missions. Although amphibious aircraft have reduced aerodynamic 
efficiency compared to conventional aircraft, they are capable of waterborne and land takeoff 
and landing. They also have greater range than helicopters and, under appropriate conditions, 
can land and recover more personnel in the water than hovering helicopters or tilt-rotors. The 
Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF) and PLAN have procured amphibious aircraft 
for this purpose. If distributed across a theater, a mix of rotary and amphibious aircraft could 
provide a rapid rescue capability. Figure 29 depicts CSAR aviation options.
128 A major limitation of most helicopters and tiltrotor aircraft is the need to hover to hoist personnel onboard when 
conducting water rescues. These aircraft burn a considerable amount of fuel while hovering, which reduces available time 
on station and in turn decreases the ability to rescue large numbers of personnel from the water. Additionally, CMV-22B 
would need to hover at a high altitude.
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FIGURE 29: COMPARISON OF CSAR AVIATION OPTIONS
Photos courtesy of U.S. Coast Guard, U.S. Marine Corps, Jerry Gunner, and aeroprints.com.
Third, the Navy should improve its delineation of CSAR roles and missions with the U.S. Air 
Force and other Joint partners. Commensurately, the Navy should improve its CSAR coopera-
tion with allies and partners, including conducting mass at-sea CSAR and casualty recovery 
exercises. CSAR exercises with the JMSDF, in particular, could be a rapid means of not only 
improving alliance cooperation for this mission in an area of potential conflict but also to test 
the suitability of the US-2 or other amphibious aircraft for the U.S. Navy.
Beyond CSAR, the Navy will also need to change its approach to at-sea medical support. A 
major conflict may result in mass casualties at sea, rather than periodic incidents to which the 
Navy has become accustomed. If confronted with a major influx of patients, it is unlikely the 
Navy will be able to provide the same speed or level of medical care as has been provided in 
recent conflicts. The “Golden Hour” standard of medical care pursued during recent opera-
tions may not be possible given the scarcity of recovery assets, challenges of mass recovery, 
and theater distances.129
129 “The Golden Hour standard used in emergency medicine and trauma care states a person should receive definitive care 
within one hour to ensure optimal outcomes.” Joseph J. Hudak III, The Origins of the “Golden Hour” of Medical Care and 
Its Applicability to Combat Medicine (Fort Leavenworth, KS: U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, December 
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Nonetheless, there are major improvements the Navy could adopt to enable a more distributed 
medical support capability to improve personnel survival in major conflicts. First, the Navy 
should boost unit-level survival and medical capabilities. Areas for improvement include: 
increasing the duration of life support provided aboard ship and aircraft life rafts; preparing 
CMV-22Bs for medical evacuation roles and making them more available throughout the fleet; 
embedding more paramedic-level hospital corpsmen aboard ships; upgrading the medical 
facilities on large ships; and preparing rapid-reaction Navy medical teams at standby sites 
proximate to major naval maneuver operations that may incur casualties. These initiatives 
would distribute medical capabilities to sea, closer to where they may be needed. 
Second, the Navy should change how it thinks about fleet medical treatment. Present fleet 
medical treatment rests in limited capability aboard combatants for routine injuries and 
health, some expanded capability aboard amphibious warfare ships and carriers, two large 
hospital ships configured for a full range of medical support, and larger shore facilities. This 
medical treatment configuration is sufficient for neither a surge in casualties resulting from a 
major naval combat engagement nor the geographic distribution of potential casualties likely 
in a future maritime conflict against a sophisticated adversary. The most immediate way to 
deepen conflict casualty treatment capacity would be to prepare to surge additional medical 
personnel to combatants for mass casualty treatment. This, coupled with mass casualty 
CSAR, should be exercised periodically both in independent exercises and in large scale fleet 
exercises. 
The Navy should consider a different mix of fleet medical capabilities for the future. Subject to 
more analysis, the Navy should consider two new classes of small and large hospital ships. A 
larger number of hospital ships would support a shift to a more distributed maritime opera-
tions construct. 
Small hospital ships would transit to a zone between the intermediate and forward areas to 
receive patients via ship and aircraft (and depending on the location directly recover personnel 
itself). A small hospital ship variant (such as one based on the EPF, depicted in Figure 30, or 
another ship) could treat patients onboard and then transit to an intermediate location, where 
patients could be transferred to a large hospital ship or transferred via aircraft (to include 
MV-22 and amphibious aircraft that landed alongside) to a transportation hub that would 
ferry them to a major shore medical facility. More economical than large hospital ships, the 
Navy could acquire more of these ships and posture them throughout a theater. Additionally, 
these smaller hospital ships would be more economical and responsive to operate in peace-
time for HA/DR or goodwill missions than larger ships.130
130 Alison Vernon, Do Naval Engagement Missions Have an Impact in Host Nations and Why? (Alexandria, VA: Center 
for Naval Analyses, 2008), p. 3. See also Edilberto M. Salenga, Developing Soft Power Using Afloat Medical Capability 
(Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College, 2009), available at www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ada500907. 
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FIGURE 30: EPF-BASED SMALL HOSPITAL SHIP DESIGN CONCEPT
Image courtesy of Austal USA.
A small number of large hospital ships—such as ones based on the CHAMP concept design 
under consideration by the Navy—could provide medical care for a high throughput of mass 
casualties at intermediate staging points. MV-22 aircraft onboard the large hospital ship and 
amphibious aircraft operating alongside would enable the large hospital to receive patients 
from the front and send them farther to the rear. 
As with CSAR capabilities, the Navy should increase its medical treatment cooperation with 
other Services and allies in a third line of effort. Assessments should seek to determine antici-
pated medical requirements more accurately and test those in exercises.
Overall, the Navy should develop a medical support force that is both more disaggregated and 
better suited to high throughput demands. By boosting unit level medical capabilities and 
establishing a larger number of medical hubs, the force can become more responsive and resil-
ient. While additional analysis is required to determine the appropriate number and type of 
CSAR and medical assets, this study proposes a representative mix of small and large hospital 
ships (with priority given to numerous small hospital ships) and a family of CSAR systems (as 
depicted in Figure 31).
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FIGURE 31: PROPOSED CSAR AND MEDICAL SUPPORT FLEET
Joint Force Maritime Logistics: Sealift
The Joint Force also requires an improved maritime logistics architecture. In addition to 
the logistics requirements of naval forces afloat, Navy forces ashore, Army, Air Force, and 
Marine Corps assets require extensive sealift support, the use of cargo ships to transport mili-
tary cargo. Sealift is the foundation of U.S. military power projection, transporting over 90 
percent of DoD wartime transportation requirements.131 Despite this importance, however, 
Government-owned sealift ships are rapidly aging out of usefulness and the U.S.-flagged 
commercial fleet, along with the merchant mariner base vital to both the commercial fleet and 
the government’s Surge and Ready Reserve fleets, continues to shrink under a steady barrage 
of market and policy forces. Absent dramatic improvements, U.S. sealift forces would face 
major challenges and may fail to meet Joint Force demands in a major war. 
This section identifies options to rapidly and decisively improve U.S. sealift. Through a 
National Fleet approach, the United States could leverage an operationally effective and 
fiscally efficient mix of U.S. Government and commercial assets that will meet current and 
future requirements. This section is divided into the sealift of fuel and the sealift of cargo and 
munitions. 
131 McDew (2018), pp. 8–9. Strategic airlift complements strategic sealift by enabling the rapid transportation of relatively 
small quantities of forces and supplies. However, because of its far greater capacity and efficiency, strategic sealift is the 
foundation of U.S. power projection. As a comparison, one Large Medium Speed Roll-On/Roll-Off (LMSR) ship could 
transport approximately 39,700 metric tons in two voyages over 30 days from Norfolk, VA to Antwerp, Belgium, while a 
single C-17 transport aircraft could transport approximately 1,120 metric tons over those 30 days. It would take over 35 




















Sealift plays a critical role in providing fuel to the Joint Force. All modern U.S. military forces 
require large quantities of fuel to conduct operations. As discussed in the previous section on 
afloat maritime logistics, the Navy requires large quantities of fuel afloat to support combat-
ants and naval aviation. This study estimates the Navy’s FY 2019 fleet may require between 16 
and 22 tankers to support Navy afloat distribution demands alone in a major war. Similarly, 
the Navy utilizes bulk quantities of fuel ashore in storage tanks at ports, and the Air Force, 
Army, and Marine Corps also require bulk quantities of fuel ashore. This section on Sealift of 
Fuel examine the capability and capacity of DoD to transport and distribute fuel from the sea 
to the shore.132
Tanker Requirements
In 2016, Lieutenant General Stephen Lyons, U.S. Army, then-Deputy Commander of 
USTRANSCOM, testified that a series of DoD mobility studies, informed by the then-current 
National Military Strategy, validated DoD’s sealift requirement of 86 petroleum tanker 
ships.133 This requirement, based on the Mobility Capabilities and Requirements Study 2016, 
consists of the number of tankers DoD estimates it would need in a planning scenario to 
sustain operations. 
The 2018 National Defense Authorization Act directed a new Mobility Capabilities and 
Requirements Study, which should reflect requirements articulated in the new National 
Defense Strategy and address current and future levels of risk.134 As part of this study, the 
DoD requirement for tankers should be reexamined. There are a variety of reasons why the 
new requirement may need to be greater than the previous 86 tanker requirement. First, the 
tanker requirement should account for anticipated levels of attrition.135 As revealed in Senate 
testimony in April 2018 by then-Commander of USTRANSCOM General Darren W. McDew, 
the previous requirement of 86 tankers did not consider the effects of attrition.136 Second, the 
tanker requirement should adequately account for the increased distribution of forces (such as 
those at air bases) across and within theaters. Lastly, given the resurgence of concepts such as 
using lightering, CONSOL, or MFDS tankers to support naval forces afloat, it is possible that 
tankers used to support the Navy are not included in the sealift requirement of 86. 
This study does not provide an assessment of the required size of the sealift tanker fleet. 
However, given prevailing factors, it is possible it could be in excess of 86 tankers (exclusive of 
those tankers supporting Navy afloat requirements). For the purposes of illustrating potential 
132 This section considers but does not model sources of fuel. In a conflict with great powers, access to fuel will likely be 
politically, economically, and militarily contested by both sides. 
133 Lyons, “Logistics and Sealift Forces,” p. 3.
134 McDew (2018), p. 5.
135 This should include both direct attrition (damage to ships), as well as indirect or functional attrition in which ships are not 
physically damaged but unusable because they are unable to leave port, or other reasons.
136 McDew (2018), p. 5. 
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improvements to the tanker force, this study assumes the tanker requirement remains 
constant at 86. 
To assess whether the United States has access to the requisite number of tankers to address 
increasing wartime demand, it is worth examining the U.S. and global tanker market. As 
shown in Figure 32, the seven MSC owned and chartered tankers and two U.S.-flagged 
commercial Voluntary Tanker Agreement (VTA) tankers are insufficient to meet DoD’s 
current 86-tanker requirement, let alone one that rises to accommodate current and future 
challenges.137 
FIGURE 32: AVAILABILITY OF U .S .-FLAGGED TANKERS
Of note, 46 of the 52 tankers with military utility are engaged in domestic commerce (commercially transporting crude or liquid products from one 
part of the United States to another); therefore, drawing upon these tankers in a contingency (absent replacement tankers) could cause severe disrup-
tions to the U.S. energy system and broader economy.
DoD could pursue several options to meet contingency tanker requirements. One option for 
DoD is to charter foreign-flagged tankers and their crews. However, this approach relies on a 
major assumption: DoD will be able to charter enough tankers in a future war, against a peer 
or near-peer adversary with significant market influence and coercive power, to satisfy U.S. 
military operational demand. There are several ways this assumption could fail. First, reli-
ance on foreign-flagged tankers assumes there is sufficient spare capacity in the tanker market 
to accommodate a surge in demand. If a major conflict were to take place during a period 
137 The VTA is an agreement that facilitates cooperation between tanker operators and the government (and grants 
shipowners anti-trust immunity for cooperating amongst themselves) if the government determines it necessary to 



















































of high utilization and minimal spare capacity, DoD would likely face difficulty obtaining 
adequate capacity. For example, as shown in Figure 33, if a conflict requiring 86 Medium 
Range (MR) tankers were to have taken place in the period between 2003-2008 or 2014-2015, 
there may have been an insufficient number of tankers in the global market to satisfy DoD 
requirements.138
FIGURE 33: GLOBAL MEDIUM-RANGE TANKER SUPPLY/DEMAND POSITIONING, 2003–
2018 (PROJECTED)
Data and graphic provided by George P. Los, Head of Tanker Research at the Charles R. Weber Company. Medium Range Tankers constitute 
40,000–59,999 deadweight ton tankers. This is the class of tankers that most closely fit the definition for tankers with military utility in Joint 
Publication 4-01.2. They are sufficiently large to transport a considerable amount of product, while small enough to enter a large number of ports. It 
may be desirable to use some larger tankers for certain purposes.
Second, assuming there is sufficient spare capacity in the tanker market, it may take weeks to 
months for inactive tankers or tankers engaged in international trade to be made ready to sail 
for DoD use, to arrive at refineries or storage points with military fuels, and to sail to points 
of operational demand. Third, the global tanker market itself is increasingly economically 
and politically contested. Chinese and Russian flagged or owned tankers comprise a growing 
portion of the international market, and China or Russia may seek to exert pressure on tanker 
operators during a major conflict not to cooperate with the United States or else face reper-
cussions. Together, these concerns suggest that the potential pool of commercial foreign-flag 
tankers available during a conflict may be smaller than peacetime size may indicate—even if 
there is slack capacity in the market. Finally, during a conflict, foreign-flag commercial ships 
(such as tankers) may be reluctant to operate in a warzone, especially as Russian and Chinese 
counter-shipping capabilities would dwarf those of previous conflicts. 
138 In these situations, DoD could attempt to reprioritize market demand by paying higher rates to charter tankers, but given 
the risks involved with transporting fuel in a conflict between great powers, and given growing Chinese economic leverage, 
many tanker operators may refrain from responding to the financial incentive. As a countervailing factor, during times of 
conflict, the commercial market may contract, leaving many shipowners with underutilized assets. These underutilized 
assets could be available for charter. 
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Therefore, for a variety of reasons, it is prudent for there to be a sizable core force of U.S.-
flagged oceangoing tankers that DoD can reliably call upon during conflicts. An option 
available to DoD to meet wartime tanker requirements is to acquire a large U.S. Government-
owned fleet of sealift tankers subordinate to MSC and manned by MSC mariners. This would 
cost DoD an additional approximately $8.59 billion to construct and $532 million per year to 
man and operate 76 more tankers necessary to meet the 86-tanker requirement. 
An alternative approach—and this study’s recommendation—is to develop a more cost-effi-
cient National Fleet approach that leverages a mix of U.S. Government and commercial U.S. 
flag tankers. Under this approach, DoD should acquire or long-term charter enough tankers 
to meet immediate contingency demands and support a U.S.-flagged tanker Merchant Marine 
large enough to support surge and sustainment tanker requirements. Figure 34 illustrates 
how this approach would unfold during a conflict to provide a more assured and more rapidly-
available tanker force. 
FIGURE 34: CURRENT AND ALTERNATE APPROACHES TO SECURING DOD SEALIFT TANKER 
SUPPORT IN CONFLICT
A National Fleet approach to tanker sealift is challenged by the small size of the U.S. tanker 
fleet and U.S. mariner force. The U.S. tanker Merchant Marine has shrunk over the past 
decades due to a range of market and policy forces. To develop an effective National Fleet 
approach to tankers, the U.S. Government should cooperate to identify an optimal mix of 
incentives to support an appropriately-sized tanker force. In addition to acquiring or long-
term chartering the requisite number of floating storage and peacetime delivery tankers, two 





































































In terms of incentives, to grow the U.S. flag tanker fleet, Congress should reform the MSP 
(that provides through MARAD a stipend to partially offset the higher cost of operating a 
vessel as U.S.-flagged in exchange for contingency access to DoD) to create specialized catego-
ries and compensation levels for certain classes of ships (such as tankers and FLO/FLO ships), 
rather than the current, uniform approach.139 Militarily-useful tankers would receive a tanker-
appropriate stipend of between $7-10 million per year, participate in the VTA, be equipped 
with appropriate national defense features (to include CONSOL equipment), and crews would 
be trained for support to DoD during contingencies.140 Given the ability of operators to quickly 
purchase or charter and reflag foreign vessels (in approximately 90 days), this could lead to an 
immediate growth in the size of the U.S.-flag tanker fleet. 
Additionally, the Navy should exercise its authority to fund the construction or installation of 
appropriate National Defense Features (to include CONSOL equipment) on newly-built U.S.-
built tankers (and if necessary, the requisite number of existing U.S.-built tankers). These 
features would include CONSOL receive stations and a secure radio room.141 
Another source of financial incentives for U.S. tanker operators should be tax and policy 
reform that positively aligns the tax treatment of U.S. tanker operators with the tax treatment 
of most foreign tanker operators. Changes in mariner taxes, a continuation of the U.S. tonnage 
tax alternative to the corporate income tax, and personal injury and liability reforms are three 
areas where tax and policy changes could help make U.S. flag tankers more competitive in 
international trade.142 
The second major initiative DoD should pursue to grow the size of the U.S. flagged tanker fleet 
is to increase U.S. preference cargo. First, DoD should increase the purchase of fuel from U.S. 
refineries, which would increase the security of the U.S. military operational fuel supply and to 
increase the size of the U.S. flagged tanker fleet. As an estimate using fuel volumes transported 
in FY 2017, if DLA Energy were to shift purchases of 100 percent of its currently tanker-deliv-
ered Outside the Continental United States fuel (6.9 million barrels) from foreign refineries 
to U.S. refineries and 25 percent of its currently pipeline-delivered Outside the Continental 
139 “Maritime Security Program,” MARAD, available at https://www.marad.dot.gov/ships-and-shipping/strategic-sealift/
maritime-security-program-msp/. The MSP stipend was adopted as a more economical way of partially replacing the 
previous Operating Differential Subsidy Program (ODSP). ODSP was instituted in the Merchant Marine Act of 1936.
140 Similarly, reform of MSP should include allowing tanker operators to participate in MSP while carrying preference cargo. 
During periods in which they were chartered by the U.S. Government, the MSP stipend could be decremented by an 
appropriate amount. 
141 Of note, ships would not be equipped with secure radio equipment in peacetime, but rather have an appropriately-
constructed secure radio room and supporting connections for the installation of transmitting and receiving systems. 
142 Most maritime nations (such as the United Kingdom) are granted a complete tax rebate on income earned on vessels in 
international trade. MARAD’s 2017–2021 strategic plan identifies “income tax relief and liability insurance reform” as 
promising areas to reduce the operating cost differential between U.S. and foreign-flagged ships. DOT/MARAD, Maritime 
Administration Strategic Plan: Navigating the Future, 2017–2021 (Washington, DC: DOT/MARAD, 2017), p. 15, 
available at https://www.maritime.dot.gov/sites/marad.dot.gov/files/docs/resources/3606/marad-strategic-plan-2017-
2021-20170119-final-signed.pdf.
82  CSBA | SUSTAINING THE FIGHT
United States fuel (5.75 million barrels) from foreign refineries to U.S. refineries, this would 
likely generate an increase in the tanker lift requirement sufficient to support four and three 
tankers, respectively.143 These seven new tankers would transport fuel for DLA Energy, in 
addition to the six currently engaged in those activities, for a total of thirteen.
Another measure to increase U.S. preference cargo is to mandate that as a condition to export 
crude oil applicants transport a gradually increasing portion of crude oil on U.S.-built and 
U.S.-flagged tankers.144 This approach would increase the number of U.S.-flagged tankers 
engaged in the crude oil trade. During a conflict, these modern, double-hulled tankers could 
be cleaned in a matter of weeks if necessary and loaded with military fuels. Table 5 shows the 
impact of the gradual implementation of such a plan. 
TABLE 5: POTENTIAL IMPACT OF ENERGY EXPORTS ON U .S .-BUILT AND U .S .-FLAG SHIPS 
ON TANKER AND MARINER NUMBERS145
143 While DLA should pursue these goals, it could partially waive these targets if necessary (in contingencies or if demand 
cannot be reasonably met by U.S. refineries). Data for analysis drawn from Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) Energy, 
“Fiscal Year 2017 Fact Book,” DLA briefing slides, December 2017, slide 48, available at www.dla.mil/Portals/104/
Documents/Energy/Publications/E_Fiscal2017FactBookLowRes2.pdf; and Military Sealift Command (MSC), 2017 in 
Review: Empowering Global Warfighting Capabilities (Norfolk, VA: MSC, 2018), p. 50, available at https://www.msc.
navy.mil/annualreport/2017/MSCAnnual17.pdf.
144 The Energizing American Shipbuilding Act of 2018, introduced into the House by Congressman John Garamendi and into 
the Senate by Senator Roger Wicker, proposes this approach for crude oil and liquefied natural gas exports. “Energizing 
American Shipbuilding Act,” S.2916, 115th Congress, 2017–2018, available at www.congress.gov/bill/115th-congress/
senate-bill/2916/text. 
145 Table percentages, dates, and tanker numbers drawn from the “Energizing American Shipbuilding Act” bill. Mariner 
estimates assume an average of 25 crew members per tanker and that there are two mariners for every tanker billet, since 
commercial mariners typically work six months at sea and receive six months of shore leave. 
Percent of 
Product to Travel 
on U.S.-Built and 
U.S.-Flagged 
Vessels
Date Estimated Required 
Number of Tankers 













0% 1% 2023 0 3 150
2% 1% 2024 3 3 300
3% 4% 2026 4 12 800
5% 4% 2028 7 12 950
5% 8% 2029 7 24 1,550
7% 8% 2030 10 24 1,700
8% 10% 2032 12 31 2,150
10% 10% 2034 16 31 2,350
11% 10% 2036 18 31 2,450
13% 10% 2038 22 31 2,650
15% 10% 2040 25 31 2,800
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Another benefit of this approach is that the Merchant Marine’s base of U.S. Mariners with 
tanker qualifications would grow. DoD and MARAD have identified a shortfall of at least 1,929 
U.S. Merchant Mariners to crew U.S. sealift ships over a protracted conflict.146 This cargo pref-
erence initiative would play a major role in addressing the current shortfall in the number of 
U.S. Merchant Mariners. Lastly, this initiative would support the U.S. shipbuilding industrial 
base, improving the efficiency and competitiveness of U.S. yards to build not only tankers but 
also other ships of interest to DoD.
The combination of increased financial incentives and greater preference cargo can combine 
to economically increase the size of the U.S. flagged tanker fleet in the near term. Leveraging 
a mix of 18 MSC Government-Owned and long-term chartered tankers, 60 U.S. Merchant 
Marine MSP and VTA tankers, and eight U.S. Merchant Marine tankers in domestic trade, a 
National Fleet approach could meet the requirement at a total annual cost of $694 million—
significantly less expensive than a government-acquired and operated force.147 This would 
not only meet national security needs but also would foster the creation of a robust Merchant 
Marine with attendant economic benefits to the U.S. maritime and energy industries.148 
Another benefit of this approach is that it would be scalable to a potentially growing tanker 
requirement. 
As a final measure, DoD should carefully track and assess the foreign-flagged tanker market. 
This effort would have two benefits. It would facilitate cooperation with friendly countries and 
the chartering of foreign tankers during conflict, especially to backfill U.S. tankers engaged in 
domestic commerce that may be activated. It would also assist in dissuading third-party oper-
ators from providing fuel to an adversary during conflict. 
Fuel Distribution from Sea to Shore
The sealift tanker force is necessary not only to transport fuel at sea and between ports but 
to transfer it from sea to shore. In addition to normal offloading, DoD requires specialized 
capabilities to transfer bulk quantities of fuel from tankers to shore at locations where ports 
or moorings may have been damaged or where there is no bulk fuel terminal, such as in an 
amphibious landing or an airfield at an austere site. 
To meet these requirements, DoD uses two sets of capabilities that use submerged and 
floating hoses to transfer fuel from amphibious ships, Maritime Prepositioning Ships (MPS), 
and tankers to shore storage systems. The first is the Offshore Petroleum Discharge System 
146 Estimates drawn from “Table 3. Estimation of Demand for Mariners Under Surge Fleet FOS (Full Operating Status) 
Conditions for Initial Activation and Sustained Surge” in MWWG, Maritime Workforce Working Group Report, p. 24.
147 In contrast, an all-government acquired force could cost approximately $9.72 billion to construct and $682 million per 
year to man and operate. This assumes each tanker has an average capacity of 280,000 bbl, each costing $113 million to 
acquire and $15 million annually for each of ten active tankers and $7 million annually for each of 76 tankers in a Reduced 
Operating Status. To fully man these ships, the Government would need to draw upon the Merchant Mariner base, which 
already faces major shortfalls. 
148 Depending on the amount of increased fuel from U.S. refineries, it may be necessary for U.S. refineries to increase their 
utilization rates or expand production (and possibly storage) capacity.
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(OPDS). One OPDS is integrated on the ship USNS VADM K.R. Wheeler (T-AG 5001) and 
is designed to mate with tankers, while the other OPDS is integrated onto the RRF tanker 
SS Petersburg (T-AOT-9101).149 The second, lower-throughput system is the Amphibious 
Bulk Liquid Transfer System (ABLTS), four of which are embarked on each of the two MPS 
Squadrons. Both systems either provide fuel directly to a bulk fuel tank (such as an expedi-
tionary fuel storage facility) or provide it to an Inland Petroleum Distribution System (IPDS), 
which is a series of pipes that could transport it to a port, airfield, or other ground forces. 
In a great power conflict, it is highly unlikely two OPDS (and eight complementary ABLTS) 
to provide fuel support at two or fewer locations would suffice to meet DoD requirements. If 
as previously, discussed DoD adopts more geographically distributed operating concepts, it is 
likely there would be a demand for ship-to-shore bulk fuel transfer capabilities across multiple 
theaters and within multiple locations in theaters. Further, given evidence that major adver-
saries may seek to specifically target U.S. logistics as a way of slowing U.S. military operational 
tempo, over-the-shore fuel logistics may provide a means to reconstitute operations at major 
bases whose fuel storage has been damaged or destroyed during adversary operations. 
The Joint Force requires major improvements in ship-to-shore bulk fuel transfer capability 
and capacity. For capability in the near-to-midterm, the Navy should research and develop 
a ship-to-shore bulk fuel transfer system suitable for both shallow and deep water with 
faster emplacement and relocation times and higher transfer rates.150 The Navy should also 
examine the utility of large dracones and barges to store fuel offshore and transfer it ashore.151 
Considering capacity, DoD should acquire a larger number of ship-to-shore and inland bulk 
fuel transfer systems to better align with the threat environment and corresponding opera-
tional concepts. Although this study does not provide a recommendation on what level of 
over-the-shore fuel distribution systems may be necessary to support current or future joint 
operations, the present capability to support operations at two (soon to be one with the retire-
ment of the SS Petersburg) or fewer locations is likely inadequate, and this issue warrants 
further study. 
Sealift of Dry Cargo and Munitions
The Joint Force requires the ability to transport large quantities of dry cargo and munitions 
in peace and war. The Mobility Capabilities and Requirements Study 2016 validated a DoD 
requirement of 19.9 million square feet of sealift capacity and 11 special capability ships in 
order to meet combat force projection mobility requirements at acceptable risk in DoD’s most 
149 As of 2001, the Navy had five OPDS tankers: USNS Henry J. Kaiser, USNS Mediterranean, SS Chesapeake, USNS Indian 
Ocean, SS Petersburg, and USNS Guam. Kimberly A. Weaver, The Inland Petroleum Distribution System: Can It Fuel 
the Force? (Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College Strategy Research Project, April 10, 2001), p. 16, available at http://www.
dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a391222.pdf.
150 Consulting the marine industry (in particular the offshore energy industry), the Navy should critically analyze the full 
range of technical capabilities to accomplish this CONOPS and, if necessary or advisable, change the CONOPS. 
151 Dracones are large bladders that can be filled with fuel or other liquids and towed through the water.
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demanding wartime scenario.152 To meet this requirement, DoD plans on activating the entire 
force of government and commercial sealift. Specifically, DoD relies on the four elements of 
the sealift force: the MSC Prepositioning Fleet, the MSC Surge Force, the RRF, and the U.S. 
Merchant Marine (primarily through MSP).153 As displayed in Figure 35, estimates of U.S. 
sealift capacity available to DoD in a contingency suggest it would fall short of reaching its 
required capacity of 19.9 million square feet.
FIGURE 35: ESTIMATED 2019 U .S . GOVERNMENT AND COMMERCIAL SEALIFT CAPACITY 
AVAILABLE TO DOD FOR CONTINGENCY
Data from commercial sealift figures in “MSP Brochure,” MARAD, July 1, 2017, available at www.marad.dot.gov/wp-content/uploads/pdf/MSP-
Brochure-7-1-2017.pdf; and Appendix 7 on sealift in Office of the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO), Report to Congress on the Annual Long-Range 
Plan for Construction of Naval Vessels for FY 2019 (Washington, DC: DoD, February 2018), pp. 22–23, available at www.secnav.navy.mil/fmc/fmb/
Documents/19pres/LONGRANGE_SHIP_PLAN.pdf.
Unfortunately, the National Fleet faces grave challenges that will likely exacerbate current 
gaps and hinder DoD’s ability to meet sealift requirements. In particular, of the Government 
sealift fleet, even with service-life extension funding for 22 ships, all 11 special capability ships 
and 30 of 65 RO/RO vessels could age out within the next 15 years.154 Additionally, as the 
Government fleet has aged, it has suffered lowering readiness rates, aggravated by obsoles-
cent propulsion technology and lower levels of maintenance funding.155 As a result of readiness 
issues, General Stephen Lyons, Commander of USTRANSCOM, testified in 2019 that the 
152 Lyons, “Logistics and Sealift Forces,” p. 3; and MWWG, Maritime Workforce Working Group Report, p. 134. 
153 This force is described in further detail in Chapter 2 of this report.
154 McDew (2018). 
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sealift fleet is able to generate only 65 percent of DoD’s required capacity.156 Lastly, the U.S. 
commercial fleet is either barely stable or continues to shrink (as portrayed in Figure 36), 
which endangers commercial sealift capacity available to DoD. As the size of the Merchant 
Marine has declined, there has been a commensurate reduction in the number of U.S. mari-
ners available to work on both commercial and Government ships. In 2017, MARAD and DoD 
conducted a study that concluded the United States faces a deficit of at least 1,929 civilian 
mariners required to simultaneously operate the DoD and commercial fleets—assuming all 
qualified mariners voluntarily went to sea, assuming no augmentation of ships for wartime 
functions, and assuming there was no enemy attrition.157 The frequently used motto, “People 
are our greatest asset” is exceptionally true in the case of the Merchant Marine’s contribu-
tions to sealift. In summary, the United States is likely incapable of independently meeting its 
current sealift requirements. It likely lacks sufficient nominal U.S. Government and commer-
cial capacity, and its gap is likely aggravated by low MSC Surge and RRF readiness rates and a 
dearth of mariners to operate the ships. 
FIGURE 36: U .S .-FLAG PRIVATELY OWNED MERCHANT FLEET, 1991–2017
Includes self-propelled, cargo-carrying vessels of 10,000 gross tons and above. Data from MWWG, Maritime Workforce Working Group Report.
Absent decisive action in the near term to improve the force, DoD will face a major reduc-
tion in the number of forces that can be projected and sustained abroad in the 2020s. The 
U.S. risks losing its power projection competitive advantage. This section examines the sealift 
capacity requirement and provides a National Fleet approach to meet the requirement in an 
operationally effective and cost-efficient manner. 
156 “TRANSCOM Commander: Sealift Fleet Urgently Needs Recapitalization,” DoD, March 8, 2019, available at https://dod.
defense.gov/News/Article/Article/1779895/transcom-commander-sealift-fleet-urgently-needs-recapitalization/.































The 2018 National Defense Authorization Act directed a new Mobility Capabilities and 
Requirements Study, which should reflect requirements articulated in the new National 
Defense Strategy and address current and future levels of risk.158 As part of this study, the 
DoD sealift requirement was reexamined. There are a variety of reasons why the new sealift 
requirement may change and will likely need to be greater than the previous requirement of 
19.9 million square feet of capacity and 11 special capability ships.
First and foremost, changes in the planning scenarios informing the requirement may lead to 
a change in the requirement. For example, the sealift requirements in a Russia scenario would 
likely be different from the sealift requirements for a North Korea scenario. Similarly, different 
scenarios may levy changes in the requirements for special capability ships, such as Offshore 
Petroleum and Discharge Ships. 
The second major factor affecting the development of the new sealift requirement is assump-
tions regarding the threat environment. In particular, the sealift force could suffer attrition, 
which was not factored in the previous sealift requirement. 
FIGURE 37: GROWTH IN VEHICLE SIZE AND WEIGHT OVER TIME
Images courtesy of Gavin Broad, U.S. Air Force, U.S. Navy, and Oshkosh Defense.
The third major factor affecting the development of the new sealift requirement is growth in 
DoD vehicle size and weight. Over the past decades, DoD vehicles have become significantly 
larger and heavier (as portrayed in Figure 37). This decreases the amount of cargo space avail-
able on ships and in turn decreases the level of military utility of many ships in the sealift fleet 
(especially commercial or converted commercial ships), as the militarily usable capacity of 
ships diverges from the nominal capacity.
158 McDew (2018), p. 5.
Era Vietnam Desert Storm Contemporary Category 
Weight 
Growth (%)Vehicle Class System Weight (lbs) System
Weight 
(lbs) System Weight (lbs)
General Purpose Mobility M151 Jeep 3,000 M998 Humvee 7,650 JLTV 16,000 533
Main Battle Tanks M60 Patton 101,400 M1 Abrams 120,000 M1A2 144,000 142
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Finally, if DoD’s assumptions regarding access to forward theater infrastructure change, it 
could have a major impact on the size and composition of its sealift force (both cargo-carrying 
ships and special capability ships). Since the late 1950s, DoD has sized and shaped its sealift 
force with the assumption of assured access to forward theater infrastructure.159 If DoD 
determined that in scenarios of interest ports of embarkation or access to forward theater 
infrastructure could be contested, then it may drive changes in the size and composition of the 
sealift forces. 
Overall, there are a number of factors that may significantly impact DoD’s sealift capacity and 
composition requirements. This study does not provide a specific estimate of the new require-
ments for the sealift force, but assuming the continued use of campaign designs that require 
considerable sealift capacity, it will likely need to be larger and more access insensitive than 
the current force.160 
Meeting Sealift Requirements
DoD should recapitalize its sealift force in partnership with MARAD. Without a swift recap-
italization program, DoD risks a significantly degraded force projection and sustainment 
capability that will not only undercut U.S. warfighting potential but also decrease the effec-
tiveness of U.S. conventional deterrence. The nation should pursue a viable National Fleet 
approach that swiftly leverages the best attributes of the Government and commercial fleets 
to meet its sealift requirement. Cognizant of competing priorities for resources, sealift recap-
italization should be both operationally-effective and cost-efficient. This study proposes a 
three-part approach to meet requirements: service life extension of select Government ships, 
acquiring new ships (foreign and U.S. built), and improving the Merchant Marine (both ships 
and crews). 
SLEP of Select Government Ships. The Navy should perform Service Life Extension 
Program (SLEP) modifications on a select number of aging sealift vessels for which invest-
ment would enhance readiness. SLEP has the advantage of being economical and partially 
supporting the U.S. industrial base by providing work for ship repair yards. It ultimately, 
though, is a short-term investment that defers necessary recapitalization. However, due to 
the fact that the Navy has delayed Sealift recapitalization until beyond 2018, SLEP is a neces-
sary component of the recapitalization plan, since alternate plans would be highly difficult to 
achieve in terms of cost and schedule. 
Acquiring New Ships (Foreign and U.S.-built). The central component of the sealift 
recapitalization strategy should be the acquisition of new ships to replace existing ones. 
Recapitalization of the 11 special capability ship force should be the highest priority since 
nearly the entire fleet will age out in the 2020s, but the rest of MSC Surge and RRF fleets will 
159 Work, Thinking About Seabasing.
160 If DoD adopted new campaign designs or capabilities in the future that required less sealift capacity, then the sealift 
capacity requirement may decrease. The transition to such a force would likely take time.
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also require recapitalization in the 2020s and 2030s. Overall, of the Government sealift fleet, 
even with SLEP of 22 ships, all 11 special capability ships and 30 of 65 RO/RO vessels could 
age out within the next 15 years.161 
The nation will need to buy both foreign- and U.S.-built ships to recapitalize the sealift force. 
This is because the delay of sealift recapitalization by the Navy has compressed the sealift 
replacement schedule to a period within the mid-to-late 2020s and 2030s in which ships will 
likely age out faster than a new construction program could replace them.162 
The United States has experience buying foreign-built ships to incorporate into its sealift 
fleet.163 It was done in the 1980s; it was done in the 1990s; and it will need to be repeated in 
the 2020s. In the National Defense Authorization Act for FY 2019, Congress has recognized 
this situation and accordingly authorized the Navy (through MARAD) to procure up to seven 
foreign-constructed vessels after certifying the Navy has initiated an acquisition strategy for 
the construction of no fewer than ten new U.S.-built sealift vessels, with the lead ship antici-
pated to be delivered no later than 2026.164 In order to achieve delivery by 2026, the Navy will 
need to move swiftly, since construction would need to start in 2023 and as of early 2019 no 
design has been agreed upon or funding allocated to the program. 
This challenging situation provides an opportunity for a division of labor: appropriate foreign-
constructed ships can be used to meet certain RO/RO Surge and Sustainment requirements, 
while unique U.S.-constructed ships can be used to meet specialty sealift ship, other sealift 
RO/RO, and novel auxiliary requirements.165 
In procuring foreign-built ships, the Navy and MARAD generally face two classes of options: 
buy used, foreign-constructed ships on the open market or buy used foreign-constructed U.S.-
flag ships. Both options provide the Navy and MARAD an opportunity to rapidly replace sealift 
capacity that is aging out and will involve the cost to acquire and the cost to modify (likely in a 
U.S. shipyard, which would support the U.S. ship repair industrial base). 
161 McDew (2018). 
162 Even with the SLEP of certain ships, the Navy may need to replace five to ten sealift ships per year within this period. 
This would be in addition to other Navy shipbuilding programs and the continuance by shipbuilders of commercial 
shipbuilding projects. While this replacement rate is within the current industrial capacity of the U.S. shipbuilding 
industry, it may be challenging to achieve. If an all-U.S. new construction program were desired, expansion of existing 
industrial capacity (at existing shipyards or by reactivating inactive shipyards) would make this approach more feasible. 
163 There are 36 foreign-built hulls out of 61 hulls in the MARAD RRF and MSC Surge Force.
164 “Purchase of Vessels Using Funds in National Defense Sealift Fund,” sec. 1012, in “John S. McCain National Defense 
Authorization Act for FY 2019” H.R. 5515, 115th Congress, 2017–2018, available at https://www.congress.gov/
bill/115th-congress/house-bill/5515/text. 
165 Of note, originally-commercial foreign-constructed ships in Maritime Prepositioning Squadrons (MPS) underwent 
extensive modifications to provide for not only RO/RO capacity, but also container cells and tanks needed to provide 
a proportional amount of the 30 days’ worth of sustaining munitions, supplies, fuel, and water. In the early 1980s, 
these modifications cost approximately $150 million, the equivalent of $387 million in 2019. In general, significant 
modifications can match or exceed the cost of a hull.
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New U.S.-built ships should be a critical component of DoD’s sealift strategy. New U.S.-built 
ships offer a solution that will have a long-term effect (compared to alternative approaches of 
extending the lives of existing Government ships or acquiring used foreign ships of varying 
ages). New ship designs can be optimized to maximize military utility, for both sealift and 
specialty ship requirements. This makes new U.S.-built ships the best candidates for replacing 
existing MSC Surge ships (especially LMSR classes) and auxiliaries. 
One approach to U.S. construction would involve the development and acquisition of a 
common, modular hull that would meet different sealift and specialty ship requirements.166 
As the Navy considers a potential Common Hull Auxiliary Multi-Mission Platform (CHAMP) 
acquisition approach, it should consider the relative costs and benefits of pursuing an all-
CHAMP design, compared to one that used CHAMP for specialty ship and other auxiliary ship 
requirements and acquired a more conventional and economical LMSR-based design that 
could provide greater sealift capacity, at the expense of organic aviation and other capabilities. 
FIGURE 38: POTENTIAL RO/RO RECAPITALIZATION ACQUISITION PROFILE
Assuming a recapitalization program of approximately 53 Government ships between FY 2019 
and FY 2048, acquiring approximately 29 foreign-built sealift ships (with an assumed mili-
tarily useful capacity of 150,000 square feet per ship) and 24 U.S.-built sealift ships (with 
an assumed militarily useful capacity of 370,000 square feet per ship, roughly similar to the 
capacity of current LMSRs) would allow the Navy to rapidly acquire enough foreign-built 
ships to offset the projected drop in sealift capacity in the near-term. It would also provide 
U.S. shipyards with enough work to stably produce RO/ROs at a rate of one per year (thus 
avoiding shipbuilding “boom and bust” cycles), in addition to special missions sealift designs 
and other naval auxiliaries discussed elsewhere in this report. This profile is depicted in Figure 
38 below. Acquisition costs could be reduced further if the Navy and USTRANSCOM find 
certain large foreign-built RO/ROs align well with their requirements, allowing a reduction 
166 In addition to sealift and specialty ship (auxiliaries) missions, additional potential missions include sealift, aviation 
intermediate maintenance support, medical services, command and control, and submarine tending. “RFI and Industry 
Day—Common Hull Auxiliary Multi-mission Platform,” FedBizOps, Solicitation Number N00024-18-R-2236, U.S. Navy, 























in the acquisition number of foreign-built RO/ROs, if DoD is able to charter appropriately-
modified U.S.-flagged commercial ships vice owning them, or if DoD identifies novel ways to 
cooperate with the Merchant Marine to generate additional capacity (as discussed in the next 
sub-section).
As an alternative, DOD should consider acquiring U.S.-built RO/ROs with a smaller capacity 
of approximately 185,000 square feet per ship, instead of larger 370,000 square feet per 
ship RO/ROs. These smaller RO/ROs would be capable of accessing a wider range of ports. 
Additionally, they would provide greater fleet resilience than larger RO/ROs, since attrition to 
the same number of individual ships would result in a smaller loss of transported equipment. 
The loss of a single 185,000 square foot RO/RO would result in the loss of approximately half 
of an Army brigade’s equipment set, while the loss of a 370,000 square foot RO/RO would 
result in the loss of a nearly an entire Army brigade equipment set.167 Lastly, a smaller class 
of RO/RO may align well with CHAMP hull requirements, thus maintaining fleet common-
ality. If 185,000 square foot RO/ROs were acquired, this study estimates a total of 73 ships (31 
foreign-built and 42 U.S.-built) would be needed between FY 2019 and FY 2048.
Improving the U.S. Merchant Marine
The third major component of the sealift recapitalization strategy should be improving the 
U.S. Merchant Marine (in terms of both ships and crews). In addition to supporting the U.S. 
economy, the Merchant Marine plays a critical role providing sealift capacity. To develop an 
effective National Fleet approach to sealift recapitalization, DoD and MARAD should coop-
erate to identify an optimal mix of incentives to support an appropriately-sized force. Three 
classes of major initiatives should be pursued: continuation of financial incentives (in partic-
ular robust MSP and preference cargo commitments) and novel ways to cooperate, tax and 
policy reforms, and merchant marine labor reforms. 
First, DoD and MARAD should continue and provide improved stability for financial incen-
tives that lead U.S.-flag operators to retain or expand sealift capacity relevant to national 
security. In particular, the U.S. Government should: ensure MSP is fully funded at authorized 
levels, in cooperation with Congress and the Administration change the MSP law to increase 
the length and frequency of renewal of MSP contracts,168 and informed by the results of the 
new sealift requirement, increase the number of MSP slots to an appropriate number that 
addresses potential gaps in sealift capacity. Additionally, the U.S. Government should 
167 In the 1990s, during a period of uncontested U.S. power projection capability, the Navy decided to select LMSR RO/ROs 
of a large size and capacity. Given the contemporary possibility of attrition, smaller RO/RO designs may be better suited 
for the current operating environment. 
168 For example, in terms of length, MSP’s duration could be changed to 20 years, which would more closely match ship life. 
In terms of frequency, MSP could be authorized for ten years (e.g., FY 2019–2028). Then, in FY 2020, MSP would again 
be authorized for ten years (FY 2020–2029). This approach could also be implemented if MSP were extended for a longer 
period of time, such as 20 years. Overall, this approach would provide operators with greater stability and would decrease 
the risk that, as the end of the MSP period approaches, operators would defer investment into their U.S.-flag fleet.
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maintain preference cargo levels and direct and enforce all departments and agencies to 
comply with cargo preference requirements.169 
In addition to collaborating with the U.S.-flag internationally-trading fleet via MSP, MARAD 
and DoD should consider greater sealift collaboration with the U.S. fleet. For example, 
Dual Use Vessels, militarily useful U.S.-built ships operating in commercial trade, could be 
employed in peacetime by commercial operators to transport goods and in conflict to lift 
sealift assets. Under this approach, the Navy would construct militarily-useful RO/ROs, such 
as fast trailerships, and lease them to commercial operators for a nominal fee in exchange for 
assured contingency access.170 This approach would generate significant cost savings for the 
government since it would be cooperating with industry to fund the operation of the ships. 
Additionally, this would have the environmental benefit of displacing more carbon-intensive 
high-weight road traffic on busy highways with shipping and would alleviate congestion on 
busy highways and rail lines near the U.S. coasts. Lastly, the Navy and MARAD would obtain 
a larger pool of merchant mariners than if the Navy built ships to place them in Reduced 
Operating Status with smaller caretaker crews in RRF. Adopting Dual Use Vessels could 
provide an opportunity to increase the number of U.S.-built ships economically. 
FIGURE 39: ORCA-CLASS AS A POTENTIAL DUAL-USE VESSEL DESIGN
An Orca-class transports cars and other cargo between Washington state and Alaska. TOTE Maritime Alaska’s Orca-class has approximately 360,000 
square feet of deck capacity (approximately 300,000 square feet of which are high and heavy militarily useful decks) and can navigate at 24 kn. 
“TOTE Orca Class Trailership Fact Sheet,” General Dynamics NASSCO, available at https://nassco.com/products/construction/commercial-con-
struction/commercial-ship-portfolio/tote-orca-class-trailership-fact-sheet/. Image courtesy of Tote Services.
169 Government-impelled cargo, or preference cargo, is cargo moving “either as a direct result of federal government 
involvement; or, indirectly through financial sponsorship of a federal program; or, in connection with a guarantee 
provided by the federal government.” This includes “100% of military cargo, 100% of Export-Import Bank cargo, at least 
50% of Civilian Agency cargo, and at least 50% of agricultural cargoes.” “Cargo Preference,” MARAD, available at www.
marad.dot.gov/ships-and-shipping/cargo-preference/. Preference cargos are critical since the current MSP stipend of $5 
million per year “covers about 80 percent of the operating cost differential between U.S. and foreign-flag vessels,” and 
the rest of the differential must be offset. Andrew Von Ah, Maritime Security: DOT Needs to Expeditiously Finalize the 
Required National Maritime Strategy for Sustaining U.S.-Flag Fleet (Washington, DC: GAO, August 2018), p. 17.
170 During contingency activations, these ships could be backfilled by ships on the open market or reflagged ships through the 
use of national security waivers. The use of trailerships would also mean that containers carried on these ships could be 
transported on roads and rail if necessary. 
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Another promising approach would be for MSC to charter commercially-owned and operated 
U.S.-flag ships to meet some surge sealift requirements. Commercial ships could be used for a 
set period of time (such as two to three years) and then cycled back into commercial operation. 
This approach could help the U.S. Government economically meet a portion of strategic sealift 
requirements and would align Government and contractor incentives to ensure surge capacity 
is kept at a high state of readiness and modernization.
Tax and policy reforms are the second class of major initiatives the U.S. Government should 
pursue to encourage a robust Merchant Marine. As discussed in the section on tanker sealift, 
tax and policy reform should positively align the tax treatment of U.S.-flag operators with 
the tax treatment of most foreign-flag operators. Changes in mariner taxes, a continuation of 
the U.S. tonnage tax alternative to the corporate income tax, and personal injury and liability 
reforms are three areas where tax and policy changes could help make U.S.-flag ships more 
competitive in international trade.
The third major initiative the U.S. Government should pursue to improve the Merchant 
Marine are merchant marine labor reforms. Properly resourced, MARAD should more aggres-
sively promote U.S. maritime industry recruitment, maximize mariner retention, incentivize 
the retention of mariner certificates, and more accurately track the pool of qualified and 
recently-qualified mariners. 
Overall, the Navy and MARAD should pursue creative, viable, and economical approaches to 
meet sealift requirements that draw from both the Government and commercial fleets. 
Hardening of Maritime Logistics
Increasing the lethality, agility, and resilience of the fleet requires a comprehensive approach. 
The U.S. maritime logistics community is no exception. The logistics fleet should change in 
composition and operations to match changes in the broader battle fleet. This extends to logis-
tics fleet survivability and logistics auxiliary interaction with other combatants. The harder it 
is for an adversary to disrupt the logistics fleet, the greater the resilience of the total fleet. 
Adversaries have developed doctrine and capabilities to disrupt U.S. logistics forces as a way 
to reduce U.S. operational tempo and gain an operational advantage. CLF ships are currently 
soft targets with modest training for high-end warfare and few means with which to defend 
themselves. Other components of the maritime logistics force, such as other MSC ships and 
the Merchant Marine, are even more vulnerable. Given the importance of logistics forces to 
sustaining distributed or protracted operations and the high cost of many classes of logistics 
ships and the scarcity of U.S. merchant mariners, the Navy should develop new methods to 
protect its maritime logistics force. 
Defense against modern anti-ship weapons is expensive. Extending the same level of protec-
tion afforded to high-end surface combatants to naval auxiliaries could be cost prohibitive. 
At the same time, some defensive investments may affordably enhance logistics survivability, 
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particularly when multiple lines of effort complement each other. Specifically, this study 
recommends focussing on four lines of effort to harden maritime logistics: integration with 
electromagnetic maneuver warfare, convoy and escort concepts and naval augmentation, 
defensive systems, and recoverability. 
Integration with Electromagnetic Maneuver Warfare
The Navy’s Electromagnetic Maneuver Warfare (EMW) concept seeks to integrate and 
exploit the electromagnetic spectrum (EMS) for naval operations.171 One important reason 
for improving the ability to operate in the EMS is to deny or degrade an enemy’s ability to 
find and target naval forces. Maritime logistics operations should be better integrated with 
EMW counter-ISR and information operation (IO) activities to protect logistics by deceiving, 
denying, and degrading enemy battle networks. 
First, logistics forces afloat will need to take practical actions to minimize their signatures 
to prevent inadvertently revealing their location or identity. These actions should not aim to 
make most logistics platforms “stealthy” but rather reduce the type and amount of emissions 
generated by platforms. Second, maritime logistics forces should be integrated with Navy 
C-ISR and IO efforts. To support these efforts, Navy logistics ships and their shore command 
and control organizations will need improved command, control, and communications (C3) 
tools. Third, the Navy should incorporate counter-ISR systems on select maritime logistics 
ships, such as the CLF, to complement other Navy efforts. 
To conduct and support these efforts, permanent Navy Military Detachments should be 
embarked on CLF and select other MSC ships. In other cases, Navy Selected Reservists 
could provide this support during a contingency mobilization. Both permanent Military 
Detachments and Selected Reservist teams would bring knowledge and authorities on board 
the auxiliary to support its military functions, including operating C3 and Precision Navigation 
and Timing (PNT) systems, managing EMS emissions, using counter-ISR systems, and, if 
necessary, overseeing defensive armament.
Convoy and Escort Concepts and Naval Augmentation
A second line of effort to enhance hardening is the improvement of Navy convoy and escort 
concepts and naval augmentation. The Navy should continue to develop and exercise its 
concepts for the convoying and escort of MSC and non-MSC logistics forces. This includes 
defining requirements for escorted or convoy operations and developing or refining tactics, 
techniques, and procedures for escorting and convoying under different ISR and other threat 
regimes.
171 Coffman, “Advancing Electromagnetic Maneuver Warfare.”
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The Navy has traditionally resisted naval escort of its support forces since combatants 
escorting auxiliaries are not executing other missions.172 In 2018, Maritime Administrator 
Mark Buzby stated: “The Navy has been candid enough with Military Sealift Command and 
me that they will probably not have enough ships to escort us. It’s: ‘You’re on your own; go 
fast, stay quiet.’”173
Today, the relatively small CLF and Strategic Sealift force is not sized for high attrition rates. 
Accordingly, the Navy should both increase the size and composition of its logistics forces 
(to create an attrition reserve), as well as protect its valuable logistics forces with new escort 
concepts. Although escort duties may impose virtual attrition on the combatant force, an 
associated increase in logistics survivability likely improves overall operational effectiveness 
sufficiently to justify the deviation.174 There are some indications that the Navy is beginning to 
evaluate future escort requirements as at least one means with which to deal with emerging 
counter-logistics challenges.175
Defensive Systems
Because of the growing number and sophistication of enemy sensors and intelligence 
networks, EMW operations will not be able to completely prevent attacks on logistics. To 
improve the resilience of its logistics architecture, the Navy should also add defensive systems 
to its key logistics platforms. Specifically, the Navy should adopt select defensive systems for 
the CLF and some other MSC logistics ships to complement the capabilities of escort ships. 
These systems would add a second layer of protection to escorts’ defenses and against many 
classes of threats significantly improve logistics ship survivability.176 
Passive defense systems may be promising for the defense of small logistics vessels. However, 
for large ships with unique signatures such as T-AO/Es, T-AKEs, and proposed T-AKER, 
T-AKM, and tenders, the Navy will likely need to predominantly rely on active defense 
systems, such as air and missile defenses (e.g., SeaRAM), torpedo defenses (e.g., Anti-Torpedo 
172 Although the U.S. Navy and merchant marine did convoy and escort in the Battle of the Atlantic, escort requirements in 
the Pacific were not as geographically expansive, since the Imperial Japanese Navy (IJN) did not mount an extensive anti-
shipping campaign. In contrast, China or Russia may decide to conduct anti-shipping operations. 
173 David B. Larter, “‘You’re on Your Own’: US Sealift Can’t Count on Navy Escorts in the Next Big 
War,” Defense News, October 10, 2018, available at www.defensenews.com/naval/2018/10/10/
youre-on-your-own-us-sealift-cant-count-on-us-navy-escorts-in-the-next-big-war-forcing-changes/.
174 The IJN provides a historical lesson of a failure to size or protect the logistics force. Before the war, the IJN only 
acquired a small oiler and tanker fleet. During much of the war, the IJN did not escort its tankers, and a lack of secure 
communications for non-combatant tankers allowed U.S. naval intelligence to predict the fleet’s maneuvers by tracking 
the advance movements of its fleet tankers and oilers. Subsequent tanker shortfalls severely limited the IJN fleet’s 
operational freedom and greatly contributed to its demise in major actions, such as the Battle of Leyte Gulf. 
175 The Navy’s planned FFG(X) should be well-suited for escorting other ships, which could be a leading indicator of the 
Navy’s growing embrace of the escorting mission. 
176 In addition to the proposed self-defense capabilities of logistics ships, it is essential for logistics ships to be escorted, as 
escorts not only provide another layer of defense, but also provide the ability to proactively or reactively attack threat 
platforms. 
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Torpedo Defense System [ATTDS])177, or new trainable launchers onto key ships. If the Navy 
installed both SeaRAM and ATTDS across all 29 CLF vessels, procurement and installation 
would cost approximately $46.6 million per ship and $1,351 million for the fleet. Although 
this is a large investment, it is a fraction of the cost of the assets protected. If during a conflict, 
these modifications and concepts saved two to three CLF vessels, the Navy’s investment 
would have paid off. These active defense systems are not stand-alone solutions but should 
instead be implemented alongside other survivability enhancements and concepts previously 
mentioned. Lastly, the Navy should embark a naval detachment to operate the largely stand-
alone defensive systems.178
FIGURE 40: SEARAM AND ANTI-TORPEDO DEFENSIVE SYSTEMS
SeaRAM defensive system (left); Anti-Torpedo Torpedo Defense System (right). Images courtesy of Windows713 and Applied Physics Laboratory.
Recoverability
As a final hardening line of effort, the Navy should improve ships’ ability to recover from 
damage. As discussed in the sections on towing and salvage and expeditionary maintenance 
and repair, modern anti-ship weapons are deadly. Yet, with robust designs and training, ships 
can withstand significant damage.179 However, many MSC and all commercial sealift ships 
are built to commercial standards that do not necessarily emphasize armoring and internal 
compartmentalization that aid in recoverability.180 Even so, some commercial designs 
177 Sam LaGrone, “Navy Develops Torpedo Killing Torpedo,” USNI News, June 20, 2013, available at https://news.usni.
org/2013/06/20/navy-develops-torpedo-killing-torpedo.
178 On some classes of ships the naval detachment may be permanently embarked, while on other classes it could be 
embarked during contingencies. This detachment would also support EMW operations. Civilian mariners would legally 
be capable of operating defensive systems; however, in order to maximize tactical proficiency with these systems, it may 
be advantageous to leave their operation to naval detachments. Of note, the United Kingdom’s Royal Fleet Auxiliary 
developed a model where they trained their civilian government mariners to conduct tactical operations and operate the 
associated defensive equipment. 
179 Gerry Roncolato, “Fitzgerald Proves Damage Control Is Exhausting,” Proceedings 143, no. 7, July 2017, available at www.
usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2017-07/fitzgerald-proves-damage-control-exhausting. 
















have proven resilient due to industrial safety demands. Informed by the historical record and 
assessments of current and future threats, MSC and MARAD should continue and as neces-
sary deepen a realistic damage control training program. It should also recognize the tradeoffs 
inherent in some commercial designs: in some cases, low survivability commercial designs 
may have great value due to their low cost and operational contribution. 
Incorporating Logistics into Navy System Design
The most far-reaching improvements to afloat logistics may come from designing ships and 
other platforms to be more efficient, more resilient, and more logistically independent. This 
section consequently highlights three areas: modifications to current and future systems to 
improve efficiency and reduce costs, emerging technologies with major logistics impacts, and 
logistics requirements for future system design.
First, the Navy should pursue modifications to current naval ships and aircraft that improve 
efficiency and reduce sustainment costs for both financial and operational reasons. Given 
ship service lives measured in decades, even modest improvements in efficiency and life-
cycle cost can have major savings over time. There are a variety of new technologies that 
merit examination on new and existing ships and aircraft to reduce logistics demands and 
lower lifecycle costs. Integrated electrical storage systems and hybrid electric drives are a set 
of promising technologies that can provide logistical and tactical advantages. For example, 
battery-powered electric drives on surface ships can allow ships to more precisely control their 
propeller output, thus improving ships’ fuel efficiency and reducing their fuel consumption.181 
Additionally, battery-powered electric drives on surface ships can reduce the level of vibra-
tion caused by the power plant and cavitation caused by the propeller, especially when silently 
operating on battery power, which in turn reduces ships’ acoustic signatures and generates a 
tactical advantage. Lastly, battery-powered electric drives can be easily integrated with a ship’s 
electric and directed energy sensors and weapons (or their own energy storage systems), thus 
making it easier for the fleet to introduce new high-power radars, electronic warfare systems, 
railguns, lasers, and high-powered microwaves.
In terms of other technologies, the Navy should consider installing fins to increase propul-
sive efficiency on some ships; using epoxy coatings instead of paints on some ships and areas 
of ships to minimize support costs; incorporating lighter ship components when appropriate 
to decrease ship weight and improve fuel efficiency; and automating logistics status data 
181 In 2016 the Navy announced it would begin outfitting DDG-51 Flight IIAs with a hybrid-electric drive (HED) to 
propel the ship at speeds under 13 kn, such as during ballistic missile defense or maritime security operations. 
This technology is expected to extend a DDG’s time on station before refueling and save fuel costs. In March 
2018, the Navy announced the HED would complete installation onto the USS Truxtun (DDG-103) but halted 
upgrades of further DDGs, given other priorities and a desire to see if the technology can be improved before 
more widely outfitting it to the fleet. David Larter, “US Navy Canceling Program to Turn Gas-guzzling Destroyers 
into Hybrids,” Defense News, March 8, 2018, available at https://www.defensenews.com/naval/2018/03/08/
the-us-navy-is-cancelling-a-program-to-turn-gas-guzzling-destroyers-into-hybrids/.
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collection on ships to inform predictive logistics development. Overall, greater platform self-
sufficiency and reduced demand result in a more agile force.
Second, DoD should pursue emerging technologies with major logistics impacts. DoD is 
currently developing a range of new technologies to improve its combat performance in great 
power conflict. Modernization of logistics systems should be on par with modernization in the 
combat arena, as both areas can generate tactical and operational advantage. Technologies to 
consider include novel propulsion technologies (such as the aforementioned integrated elec-
trical storage and propulsion systems and compact nuclear fusion and fission reactors that 
could be used to power manned and unmanned warships and possibly aircraft) and light-
weight and wide diameter semi-rigid hoses and new receptacles that would enable higher 
UNREP fuel transfer rates (thus decreasing the total time ships spend distributing fuel and in 
turn reducing their vulnerability). Many of these systems could significantly reduce sustain-
ment demands. Overall, technologies with the potential for revolutionary impacts on logistics 
chains should be critically examined and pursued. 
Third, major logistics demand reductions may be achieved by setting logistics-conscious 
requirements and performance parameters for future system designs. The Navy should imple-
ment a systematic approach that accounts for how proposed ships and aircraft will impact the 
current and projected logistics architecture. This should explicitly include quantification of 
potential requirements for additional logistics assets. Looking to the near future, the Navy’s 
FFG(X) program, Large and Medium USV programs, Orca unmanned underwater vehicle 
program, and examination of light or medium aircraft carrier concepts all require careful 
logistics consideration, including how the technical parameters and concepts of operation for 
these capabilities may impact broader Navy fleet logistics.
Overall, the Navy should carefully consider the impact of system design choices on logistics 
requirements. Over the past decade, lowering lifecycle costs has been an increasingly impor-
tant element of ship and aircraft design. Moving forward, this emphasis on lifecycle cost 
reduction should be continued and complemented with a pursuit of logistics technologies and 
approaches that generate tactical and operational advantage. 
Organizing for Sustainment Success
In addition to improving concepts and capabilities, improvements in the organization and 
coordination of the defense maritime logistics community should be pursued to address gaps 
in the current and future U.S. maritime logistics architecture. In general, the U.S. Government 
should focus on three lines of effort: improving coordination within the Government (espe-
cially between DoD and MARAD), improving coordination externally with the Merchant 
Marine and broader commercial sector, and enhancing cooperation with allies and partners. 
Organizationally within DoD, MSC should restructure the grouping of assets in order to 
promote greater specialization and transparency. MSC’s organizational structure should 
be reformed to reflect the more diverse force structure needed to meet requirements. MSC 
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should begin by shifting management of tankers that would conduct at-sea fuel transfers in 
conflicts to the CLF. This proposed arrangement will help ensure a clearer distinction between 
Navy-supporting CONSOL/MFDS tankers and Joint Force-supporting sealift tankers and 
will discourage double-counting of assets (in which the tankers that are needed to support 
Navy ships afloat in contingencies are assumed to be simultaneously supporting Strategic 
Sealift requirements). T-AOLs and other refueling platforms that would support Navy at-sea 
requirements should be incorporated into the CLF. Similarly, the proposed T-AKER cargo and 
T-AKM munition reload ships discussed in this report should fall under the CLF. Additionally, 
MSC should consider reorganizing the Service Support force to place hospital ships, tenders, 
proposed FLO/FLOs, and other related auxiliaries in a new Mobile Logistics Force (MLF) 
focused on expeditionary sustainment, maintenance and repair, and medical requirements 
that would mimic the role played by Service Squadron 10. This reformed organizational struc-
ture is shown in Figure 41.
FIGURE 41: REORGANIZATION OF MSC ASSETS 
Furthermore, the Navy and MARAD should carefully examine what organizational reforms 
are needed to engender innovation and training in the logistics enterprise. This includes an 
improved alignment of conceptual development with resource sponsorship and opportunities 
for cultivating, disseminating, and rewarding bottom-up approaches to logistics innovation. 
Lastly, the Navy and MARAD must better organize to leverage its personnel. In addition 
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examine how to leverage its active and reserve pool better in contingencies. In particular, the 
Navy should examine designating a portion of Selected Reserve or Individual Ready Reserve 
sailors and officers to augment Strategic Sealift Officers as military detachments aboard 
commercial U.S.-flag vessels used in contingencies. 
Externally, DoD should better organize its interactions with the Merchant Marine and 
broader commercial sector. In general, rather than assuming the U.S. or foreign commer-
cial sectors will be willing and capable to provide assets and personnel during contingencies, 
DoD should carefully assess and track the markets and support the U.S. commercial logis-
tics community. Just as DoD commanders intimately know their military order of battle, they 
should understand the capabilities and limitations of their supporting commercial order of 
battle. To support this, as an example, DoD should more closely incorporate cleared U.S.-flag 
ship operators and providers of key supplies in wargames and exercises. Additionally, DoD 
should establish contingency contracts with commercial providers that accelerate contingency 
activities in cyber exploited or degraded environments. DoD should also develop and imple-
ment capabilities to interact with the commercial sector in a more secure manner, which may 
include the proliferation of more opaque solicitations, as well as a separate non-Internet-
based communications and command and control/management network for preferred, 
cleared contractors. 
As a third line of effort, DoD should increase its logistics cooperation with allies and partners. 
DoD routinely operates in concert with many of its allies and partners in peacetime and has 
plans to execute operations in crises or conflicts. The Summary of the 2018 National Defense 
Strategy emphasizes “Resilient and Agile Logistics” with allies as one of eight capability 
modernization areas.182 There are three areas rich for cooperation with allies and partners. 
First, DoD should deepen efforts to establish a shared understanding of potential threats and 
desired operating patterns through exchanges to more effectively identify opportunities for 
complementary and additive cooperation. Second, DoD should reform existing Acquisition 
and Cross-Servicing Agreements to expand their scope to more items, streamline approval 
processes (for peacetime and conflict usage), and securely introduce greater transparency into 
the availability of parts and consumables. Similarly, Foreign Military Sales procedure reforms 
are needed to expedite the purchase of items (especially key parts and consumables needed 
to maintain system availability rates at high levels). These reforms could include standing 
Indefinite Delivery, Indefinite Quantity-type contracts that allow key FMS partners to more 
rapidly order and receive approved items. The third area for cooperation is improved mutual 
access to logistics infrastructure in the United States and in other countries. These efforts 
would aim to increase the number of logistics support locations and increase the resilience of 
existing U.S. and Allied or partner operations.183 
182 DoD, Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy, p. 7.
183 A Design for Maritime Superiority calls on the Navy to build on existing logistics partnerships with allied nations and 
expand relationships with partner nations. Richardson, A Design for Maintaining Maritime Superiority, p. 15. 
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CHAPTER 7
Building the Future Fleet
This chapter discusses how the recommendations contained in this study may be imple-
mented alongside the Navy’s FY 2019 30-Year Shipbuilding Plan and in light of the Navy’s FY 
2020 30-Year Shipbuilding Plan. It examines how the Navy might attempt to meet this study’s 
proposed logistics requirements by either FY 2033 in one implementation scenario or FY 
2048 in another. Implementation scenarios are described and costed in FY 2019 dollars.184 
This chapter examines not only the Battle Force Fleet, which includes MSC’s CLF ships and 
several other classes of auxiliaries but also examines sealift procurement, MSC charters, and 
MSP expansion. Without these communities, a full accounting of the National Fleet’s maritime 
logistics architecture cannot be made. 
The FY 2019 and FY 2020 Shipbuilding Plans & the Maritime 
Logistics Baseline
The Navy’s 2016 Force Structure Assessment, the first since 2012, revised the Navy’s Battle 
Force Fleet requirement upwards from 308 to 355 ships.185 These changes have been reflected 
in subsequent shipbuilding projections. Compared to the force of the FY 2017 30-Year 
Shipbuilding Plan, which was aligned with the 308-ship requirement, the FY 2019 30-Year 
Shipbuilding Plan, which is aligned more closely with the 355-ship requirement, reflects revi-
sions to Navy shipbuilding plans as it works towards a larger force. The FY 2019 plan (shown 
in Figure 42) constitutes an average 19 percent increase in per-year ship procurement and a 
nearly $150 billion cumulative difference in procurement spending by FY 2046, compared to 
the FY 2017 plan. 
184 Additional explanation of the costing methodology can be found in Appendix C on Cost Methodology. 
185 “2016 Fleet Force Structure Assessment Executive Summary,” U.S. Navy, December 15, 2016, available via Politico at 
http://static.politico.com/b9/99/0ad9f79847bf8e8f6549c445f980/2016-navy-force-structure-assessment-fsa-executive-
summary.pdf.
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FIGURE 42: RELATIVE CHANGE IN BATTLE FORCE PROJECTION, FY17, FY19, AND FY20
The Navy’s FY 2019 30-Year Shipbuilding Plan (and other shipbuilding plans over the past 
few decades) resourced fleet logistics well below historical levels. The current period of great 
power competition is more analogous to the late Cold War period, when the Navy planned 
for war against the Soviet Union, than the last two and a half decades of conflict in (from a 
maritime perspective) permissive environments and presumed U.S. geopolitical dominance. 
Between 1962 and 1988, the CLF alone received an average of four percent of the shipbuilding 
budget.186 In the FY 2017 plan, across years FY 2019-FY 2046, CLF accounted for 2.07 percent 
of anticipated total procurement. This proportion fell in the FY 2019 plan to 1.78 percent over 
the same period, or 1.95 percent across the entire 30-year period. This falls far short of the 
historic ‘great power competition’ era level of CLF expenditure.187 
The historic four percent figure was for CLF alone, not accounting for the larger fleet of 
tenders, expeditionary repair, and other logistics auxiliaries in the Navy at that time. Even 
broadening the Navy’s shipbuilding plans to account for all logistics procurement still fails to 
meet that relative 4 percent marker. Funding for CLF, the T-ATS towing and salvage replace-
ment program, a future submarine tender, T-EPF expeditionary fast transports, and the 
remaining T-ESB expeditionary mobile bases accounted for 2.86 percent of total planned 
procurement in FY 2019-FY 2046 years of the FY 2017 Shipbuilding Plan. Total logistics auxil-
iary funding fell in the FY 2019 Shipbuilding Plan to 2.56 percent over the same period, or 
2.67 percent across the entire 30-year plan. In absolute terms, the FY 2019 shipbuilding plan 
186 James Blum, Issues and Options for the Navy’s Combat Logistics Force (Washington, DC: Congressional Budget Office, 
1988), p. xiii, available at www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a530785.pdf. 
187 Using relative spending as an argument that the Navy is likely spending too little on logistics can be met with 
counterarguments that a) combatant complexity has increased far more than auxiliary complexity, driving increased 
relative cost, b) the adoption of commercial standards and derivative designs where possible has reduced CLF costs, or 
c) a combination of both trends. The “right” level of relative spending on CLF and other maritime logistics forces in the 
modern era may consequently be different than in the past. What this exercise demonstrates, however, is that the Navy’s 























































































spends $147 billion more than the FY 2017 plan over the overlapping period. Of this additional 
amount, only $4.3 billion is spent on logistics ships. 
The Navy’s FY 2020 30-Year Shipbuilding Plan continues this downward trend. In spite of 
growth to a 355-ship Battle Force inventory, the FY 2020 shipbuilding plan decreases the 
proportion of CLF and Command and Support ships from 21 percent at the end of the FY 
2019 plan to 19.7 percent at the end of the FY 2020 plan. In general, the plan keeps the same 
number of logistics ships as the FY 2019 plan, while significantly increasing the number of 
other ships, thus exacerbating projected logistics gaps.
In summary, although the Navy faces more sophisticated adversaries that can specifically 
target fleet logistics and other joint logistics support. This reality is not accounted for in 
current inventory planning. In the face of these threats, the Navy seeks to operate in a more 
distributed fashion and enhance fleet resiliency. Yet in terms of budgeting, the Navy’s relative 
effort on the logistics to support this shift has declined. 
Requirements for a Fully-Supported Maritime Logistics Force
TABLE 6: LOGISTICS AUXILIARY REQUIREMENT RECOMMENDATIONS
FY 2019 FY2033 FY2048
Ship Type Navy, Current CSBA, Proposed Navy, Projected CSBA, Proposed Navy, Projected CSBA, Proposed
Fuel
Fast Combat Support Ship (T-AOE) 2 2 2 2 + TBD 0 TBD
Replenishment Oiler (T-AO) 15 19 18 22 20 24
Light Oi ler (T-AOL)*** 12 20 23
CONSOL Tanker (T-AOT)** 4 19 4 20 4 22
Cargo and Munitions
Dry Stores Ship (T-AKE) 12 12 12 13 12 15
CONSOL Cargo Ship (T-AKER)*** 4 4 4




5 8 8 16 8 17
Float-On/Float-Off Heavy Li ft Ship** 8 8 8
Maintenance and Repairs
Submarine Tender (AS)* 2 5 2 5 2 5
Surface Combatant Tender (AD)* 4 4 4
Unmanned System Tender 5 8
CSAR and Medical
Hospital Ship (T-AH)* 2 2 TBD 2 TBD 2
Expeditionary Medical Ship (T-AHL) 5 5 5
Navy Battleforce Fleet**** 299 315 325 347 337 364
* Potential candidate for the Common Hull Auxiliary Multi-Purpose (CHAMP) vessel.
** Portions of this fleet may be applicable for long-term charter or a variant of the Maritime Security Program. Current CONSOL tankers are MSC longer-term charters and not counted in the Navy Battleforce.
*** Portions of this fleet may applicable for placement into the Ready Reserve Force. 
**** Current Navy Battleforce counting rules omit many types of auxiliaries. The CSBA, Proposed Battleforce count projections have added to the Navy, Projected Battleforce count any additional buys for 
planned Navy programs (T-AO 205, AS(X)), along with Surface Combatant Tenders, Unmanned System Tenders, and Light Hospital Ships. T-AOTs, T-AKERs, T-AKMs, and T-AOLs are, for all intents and 
purposes, part of the CLF in the view of this study, but partial placement into the RRF, in MSP, or on MSC long-term charter complicates their counting as part of the Battleforce.
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To more fully support the Navy’s proposed Battle Force Fleet described in the Navy’s FY 2019 
30-Year Shipbuilding Plan, this study recommends the following logistics force, displayed in 
Table 6. Requirements are based on demands identified in Chapter 6.
Implementation Scenarios
This study developed two logistics shipbuilding scenarios that build off the Navy’s FY 2019 
30-Year Shipbuilding Plan. The first emphasizes correcting the Navy’s existing logistics deficit 
and achieves most recommended auxiliary counts by FY 2033. The second largely delays logis-
tics vessel construction until after the coming shipbuilding procurement bow wave, beginning 
in the late 2020s and ending in FY 2036, to meet requirements by FY 2048. Figure 43 below 
compares the cost of both plans. Furthermore, two other sections assess costs for this study’s 
recommended strategic sealift force and for this study’s expansion of the MSP and long-term 
charters. 
FIGURE 43: ADDITIONAL COST OF FY33 AND FY48 IMPLEMENTATION SCENARIOS 
COMPARED TO FY19 30-YEAR SHIPBUILDING PLAN
Shipbuilding: Implementation by FY 2033
This scenario achieves most recommended Navy logistics requirements by FY 2033. It does so 
at an estimated cost of less than $16 billion over FY 2020 to FY 2035, or for little more than 
2.1 percent additional cost beyond the Navy’s current FY 2019 30-Year Shipbuilding Plan. It 
adds 68 ships to the Navy’s fleet (as shown in Figure 44), although most would be operated by 
MSC and a portion would be placed in the RRF. The plan’s above-baseline costs peak in years 
FY 2028-FY 2029 at above $2 billion per year, before falling just ahead of the Navy’s planned 
procurement peak between FY 2030 and FY 2036. To meet requirements, it uses a mix of 
acquisition, MSC long-term charters, MSP stipends, and support to the domestic fleet. The 


























FIGURE 44: FY33 IMPLEMENTATION, NEW ACQUISITION ALONGSIDE BATTLE FORCE FLEET
FIGURE 45: FY33 IMPLEMENTATION, LOGISTICS FLEET COMPOSITION
Shipbuilding: Implementation by FY 2048
Compared to the preceding scenario, this approach achieves this study’s logistics recommen-
dations more gradually, targeting implementation by FY 2048 and the end of the Navy’s FY 
2019 30-Year Shipbuilding Plan. This is depicted in Figure 46. Due to both slower build rates 
and the greater impact of outyear ship cost inflation, this approach costs $20.4 billion in 
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of the same ships as called for in the above scenario, with the exception of dropping the two 
T-AH replacements in favor of the disaggregated approach. This approach keeps additional 
logistics costs low until FY 2026 and then continues more evenly through the completion of 
the 30-year plan. The plan never exceeds more than $1.3 billion in additional funds beyond 
the baseline in any given year. 
FIGURE 46: FY48 IMPLEMENTATION, NEW ACQUISITION ALONGSIDE BATTLE FORCE FLEET
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This approach spreads acquisitions out over a longer period. In general, apart from refueling 
assets, this scenario delays T-AKER CONSOL cargo ship, T-AKM missile rearmament ship, 
and FLO/FLO heavy lift ship procurement until the mid- to late-2030s, after the procurement 
peak under the FY 2019 30-Year Shipbuilding Plan. The composition of the fleet is depicted in 
Figure 47.
Sealift
The Navy’s FY 2019 30-Year Shipbuilding Plan included planned procurement of sealift ships 
under the Auxiliary Vessel Plan appendix. Procurement funding for sealift recapitalization 
is separate from other Navy Shipbuilding and Conversion procurement funding, and these 
vessels are not included in the Navy’s Battle Force Fleet. The Navy’s FY 2019 Plan called for 
18 new, U.S.-built RO/RO sealift vessels by 2040, along with 20 used vessels procured off the 
open market. Used vessels will be procured in the near-term, along with SLEP for select ships, 
to cover capacity until the new ships are delivered. 
The proposed scenario shown in Figure 48 was driven by three major considerations, elab-
orated upon in Chapter 6. First, the existing sealift fleet is rapidly approaching the end of 
its useful life. Aggressive replacement will buy down risk below what is currently planned. 
Second, used foreign-built RO/ROs will allow the sealift fleet to gain the requisite capacity 
to offset the aging out of ships in the short to medium term. Third, a stable U.S.-built RO/
RO line could help to avoid some challenges associated with recurring sealift recapitalization 
surges in the future. 
FIGURE 48: FY19 SEALIFT SHIPS ACQUIRED AND PROCUREMENT COSTS 
Includes program of record and proposed plans.
For these reasons, and to help increase the size of the sealift fleet to deal with current and 
future challenges, the proposed sealift procurement plan acquires 29 used and 24 new, U.S.-
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nearly the same timespan as in the Navy’s proposed plan. The first RO/RO is procured in FY 
2025, as opposed to FY 2028 in the Navy’s submitted plan, and production continues at one-
ship per year through the end of the 30-year plan (until FY 2048), instead of concluding in 
FY 2040. This proposed scenario has a combined cost of $10.1 billion, or $3.3 billion beyond 
the existing sealift plan. This additional cost procures 15 additional ships and more than 3.5 
million additional square feet of militarily useful cargo space; it reduces the average sealift 
fleet age at a faster pace and maintains an active shipbuilding line for military sealift to help 
avoid a similar sealift recapitalization crisis in the 2040s. 
As an alternative, DoD should consider acquiring U.S.-built RO/ROs with a smaller capacity 
of approximately 185,000 square feet per ship, instead of larger 370,000 square feet per ship 
RO/ROs, since they provide greater fleet resilience in the face of potential attrition and greater 
access to port locations. If 185,000 square foot RO/ROs were acquired, this study estimates a 
total of 73 ships (31 foreign-built and 42 U.S.-built) would be needed between FY 2019 and FY 
2048. 
Maritime Security Program and Other Non-Shipbuilding Support
Beyond Navy shipbuilding and sealift, the U.S. Merchant Marine fleet and mariner base 
require substantial investment if they are to remain capable of supporting DoD’s wartime 
needs. Previous chapters have identified a growing need for CONSOL tankers to support Navy 
operations, tankers to support strategic sealift, FLO/FLO and towing and salvage vessels for 
contingency operations, and an expanded merchant mariner base to provide enough sailors to 
activate the RRF and support protracted maritime logistics operations. Sustaining this fleet in 
peacetime is not without cost. 
The proposed expanded fleet assumes that MSC’s existing charters continue and that MSC 
charters an additional five tankers for prepositioned fuel stores afloat, which would be 
released for further use in a conflict after unloading their initial stocks.188 It also assumes 
that changes in DLA contracting for DoD fuel could support an additional seven U.S.-flagged 
tankers, for a total of 13 tankers supporting joint fuel demand via DLA. Each of these char-
tered vessels is assumed to cost MSC approximately $15 million per year. If all these vessels 
were chartered, MSC’s annual charter expense would more than double from roughly $150 
million to around $340 million.189 
This analysis did not dramatically alter the composition of the RRF. Given that the RRF 
requires increasingly scarce mariners to remain viable, the proposed implementation scenario 
stressed long-term MSC charter and MSP vessels over vessel procurement and placement into 
the RRF. The exceptions to this rule were T-AOLs, T-AKERs, T-AKMs, and T-ATS purchased 
188 Existing charters include prepositioned container ships for Army and Air Force needs, one dry cargo ship, four CONSOL-
equipped tankers, and two other tankers providing fuel shipment support to DLA.
189 Costs associated with the USNS Lawrence H. Gianella, MSC’s sole tanker owned outright for polar resupply, are not 
included in these figures.
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and/or modified by the Navy in excess of peacetime requirements. These vessels had mili-
tary-specific features that may make them unsuitable or more uncompetitive for commercial 
operation. In all, this scenario assumes up to 12 modified T-AOLs, two T-AKERs, three 
T-AKMs, and seven T-ATS may be candidates for placement into the RRF. Although the cost 
of maintaining these additional vessels may add up over a 30-year span, the relative difference 
between status quo and this revised fleet is modest compared to other fleet adjustments.
MSP, run by MARAD, would need to grow. If expanded to meet the requirements suggested by 
this study, MSP may need to more than double from its current 60 billets to 139. This larger 
figure accounts for all present-day MSP members, five new FLO/FLO members, 21 CONSOL 
tankers to support Navy CLF operations, and 53 additional U.S.-flagged tankers engaging in 
international trade to help meet USTRANSCOM’s Joint sealift tanker requirements without 
undue reliance on foreign-flagged ships.
Using the existing MSP ships and those added above, a cost estimate was projected for the 
next 30 years. This plan would increase MSP’s annual cost from roughly $300 million at 
present to more than $800 million per year beginning in 2030 when fully realized (as shown 
in Figure 49).190 This annual investment would help revitalize the U.S. Merchant Marine, 
increase demand for the Merchant Mariner base, increase planning stability for U.S. ship 
operators, support the U.S. shipbuilding and ship repair industry, increase U.S. military mari-
time logistics resiliency, and also provide other strategic benefits in a period when China’s 
clout in international maritime trade grows ever larger. 
FIGURE 49: MSP, RRF, AND MSC CHARTER COSTS
190 MSP stipends were sustained at $5 million in FY 2019 dollars for most ship classes, increased to $7 million for tankers, 
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The final cost category included here is aggregate DoD (likely through MARAD) stipends to 
vessels engaged in U.S. domestic commercial activity that may be militarily useful. As previ-
ously suggested, a minor stipend of $500,000 was used as a placeholder to cover costs borne 
by exercises and modifications necessary to support military needs during a contingency. If 
half of the 46 militarily-useful tankers engaged in U.S. domestic trade participated, annual 
costs would amount to $11.5 million. 
Observations on Requirements and Implementation
A National Fleet approach combining the more rapid (but less expensive) FY 2033 ship-
building scenario, the proposed sealift plan, and the expansion to MSC charters and the MSP 
fleet would cost more than $47.8 billion over the next 30 years. This would require funding 
increases for the maritime logistics portions of Navy Shipbuilding and Conversion, Navy 
sealift procurement funds, MARAD’s MSP and RRF maintenance, and MSC’s working capital 
funds and operational costs. There would also be uncalculated additional costs for Navy opera-
tions and sustainment (O&S), and for procurement of other items like an expanded CMV-22B 
or amphibious aircraft buy, defense features for auxiliaries, secure logistics communications 
and cyber networks, additional spare parts, components, and systems, and additional muni-
tions and other expendables. It would require Congressional buy-in, along with expanded 
cooperation with U.S. shipbuilders and the U.S. Merchant Marine. This exercise charts an 
admittedly aggressive course towards maritime logistics resiliency and adaptability. 
Despite the cost, these efforts ultimately appear affordable. Assuming that these estimates 
are roughly correct, $47.8 billion represents little more than a 6 percent plus-up for these 
accounts. Increases to maritime logistics accounts could either be funded with additional 
total resources or by reallocating a small portion of currently-planned combatant resources 
in favor of a more resilient logistics fleet that would generate outsized positive effects for the 
combatant force. 
Most of the suggested additions to the Navy shipbuilding plan leverage existing Navy or 
commercial-derivative designs. The technologies underpinning proposed alternative auxilia-
ries are mature. U.S. tanker and other ship operators can reflag their vessels within a relatively 
short period provided incentives align properly. These aggregate outlays represent a low rela-
tive cost for a renaissance in U.S. maritime logistics and the commensurate resiliency and 
force multiplication effects for the U.S. Joint Force. Further, these investments could have 
powerful secondary effects on the American economy, while providing strategic options for 
combating PRC maritime economic coercion in peacetime.
These are initial estimates that warrant follow-on analysis. Gaps remain, particularly for Navy 
O&S costs. This exercise, however, suggests such a National Fleet Approach could be well 
within the reach of the Navy and broader U.S. maritime sector if senior leadership decided to 




The United States’ current and programmed defense maritime logistics force is not adequate 
to support U.S. strategy and operational concepts against China or Russia. It faces two major 
challenges. First, the Navy’s at-sea logistics force is vulnerable to both current and emerging 
threats, while increasingly lagging behind in the capabilities and capacity necessary to support 
the Navy’s distributed warfighting concepts. It has been repeatedly cut to minimize cost and 
optimized to provide support from secure, forward bases in generally uncontested locations. 
Second, the sealift force faces an imminent decline in capacity as ships age out and a shortage 
of mariners, both of which endanger the nation’s ability to rapidly project power. These chal-
lenges erode traditional U.S. strategic competitive advantages of operating effectively on 
exterior lines and projecting power abroad. Collectively, they risk undercutting deterrence 
and inviting aggression that takes advantage of U.S. weaknesses in sustaining forces over 
protracted conflicts. Ultimately, they could cause the United States to lose a war—especially 
against China in the vast Indo-Pacific.
U.S. maritime logistics evolved throughout the 20th century in phased bursts of innovation 
and construction.191 For example, in the Interwar Period between the two world wars, the 
Navy developed novel logistics concepts and technologies and made some logistics invest-
ments to support the fleet, but it was not until World War II that the Navy surged logistics 
forces from the U.S. Merchant Marine and rapidly constructed additional assets. In 2019, if a 
major conflict broke out, it is unlikely the Navy would be able to build, buy, or surge to address 
logistics gaps in a strategically-relevant timeframe (if at all). China’s growing influence in 
the international maritime industry, the smaller size of the U.S. Merchant Marine and ship-
building industrial base, and the need to rapidly respond to adversary aggression to defend 
allies and partners means the Navy needs to develop appropriate logistics concepts and forces 
now. 
191 This history can be summarized into Anchorage, Expeditionary, Fast Logistics, and Forward Presence Eras. For additional 
information, see Chapter 4 on the Evolution of U.S. Maritime Logistics. 
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The Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy specifically notes “resilient and agile 
logistics” as one of eight capability areas that need to be strengthened to prepare the United 
States for an era of renewed great power competition.192 In spite of this, the Navy’s FY 2019 
30-Year Shipbuilding Plan decreased relative spending on logistics auxiliaries to less than half 
of the proportion spent during the Cold War, and the Navy’s FY 2020 30-Year Shipbuilding 
Plan continues this downward trend.
Whether or not the Navy shifts into a new era of fleet logistics that addresses current threats 
and emerging fleet demands remains to be seen. Based on the historical record of change, 
a shift into a new era will require not only novel concepts and capabilities for an improved 
logistics architecture, but also bureaucratic champions inside and outside the Navy that, like 
Admiral Burke in 1957, are able to reject the status quo and call for and fund new approaches 
at significant scale. In short, the Navy must not only talk about new logistics concepts, such 
as Operational Logistics in Contested Maritime Environments but commit to developing and 
buying the requisite logistics forces. 
Thankfully, there are viable options for the United States to improve the resilience of its mari-
time logistics force. Through a National Fleet approach that leverages the best attributes of 
the Navy, MARAD, and broader Merchant Marine, the United States can rapidly and rela-
tively economically transition to a resilient maritime logistics architecture. Prioritizing combat 
effectiveness and resiliency over peacetime efficiency, this new architecture would allow the 
Navy to fight in a distributed manner (that more effectively targets the enemy and counters 
enemy targeting), at a higher tempo (that denies compellence aims and keeps pressure on 
the enemy), and in a sustained manner if conflict becomes protracted, while bolstering Joint 
power projection through improved sealift. 
A new maritime logistics architecture would not only draw forces from DoD (predominantly 
the Navy) but would also require robust support from the U.S. Merchant Marine. Deeper 
cooperation with the Merchant Marine allows the nation to grow capacity more economi-
cally, supports the creation of a robust commercial fleet that directly helps the rest of the 
U.S. economy, and provides Merchant Mariners for MSC and MARAD positions (in addi-
tion to commercial billets). Moreover, as this report’s analysis demonstrates, for both Navy 
at-sea logistics requirements and for sealift requirements, the wartime force requirement is 
now significantly larger than the peacetime requirement. A National Fleet approach helps 
to economically bridge the growing gap between smaller peacetime requirements and larger 
wartime requirements, by maintaining a sizable portion of wartime surge requirements in the 
Merchant Marine. This approach also helps insulate the United States and its allies from a 
PRC maritime strategy designed to augment its coercive economic power while reducing U.S. 
global access. 
192 DoD, Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy, p. 7.
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Current U.S. Government policies are designed to maintain a minimum Merchant Marine fleet 
size necessary for DoD, rather than a healthy commercial sector that supports U.S. commer-
cial and defense needs. Additionally, the Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard Cooperative 
Strategy for 21st Century Seapower does not discuss cooperation, much less integration, 
with MARAD and the broader Merchant Marine. At present, the United States is running a 
dangerous experiment: can a country be the preeminent naval power without being a strong 
overall maritime power? One of the chief recommendations of this report is that the U.S. 
Government develop, release, and implement a comprehensive, national strategy to increase 
the competitiveness of and grow the U.S. Merchant Marine and broader U.S. maritime sector. 
This will require not only MARAD, but also the Navy, the rest of DoD, and the Coast Guard 
to all champion and promote the U.S. maritime sector. Although Congress called for the DOT 
to develop such a strategy in 2014, it has yet to be released as of early 2019.193 Future Service 
seapower strategies should also incorporate MARAD and the broader Merchant Marine.
This report has considered new concepts, capabilities, capacities, and posture and evalu-
ated them to identify those that result in the greatest operational benefit relative to cost as 
expressed in both money and operational risk. It has also sought executable recommenda-
tions on how to address identified shortfalls in a time-phased and affordable manner. The 
core elements of this report’s proposed architecture could be acquired through a mix of modi-
fications, chartering and stipends, and new construction within 15 years. Including Navy 
combatant, auxiliary, and sealift procurement costs, MSC charters, the MSP program, and 
changes to RRF sustainment, this report’s proposed approach may cost roughly 6 percent 
above what the U.S. government already plans to spend in these areas. Given the current logis-
tics deficit incurred by both the Navy and commercial maritime sector, this corrective cost 
would be relatively low as the United States reorients for great power competition. Moreover, 
given that these investments improve Navy lethality and remove potentially mission-ending 
vulnerabilities, they would have an outsized impact on the operational performance of the 
force. Overall, the United States can field a maritime logistics force that is numerically larger, 
more differentiated, and—through some of the options highlighted in this report—only moder-
ately more expensive.
Figure 50 depicts key units of the proposed fleet maritime logistics architecture, identifying 
requirements for supporting projected Navy fleet requirements in FY 2019, FY 2033, and FY 
2048. Figure 51 depicts the proposed strategic sealift fuel transport and over-the-shore distri-
bution fleet and dry cargo and munitions fleets.
193 “In 2014, Congress statutorily mandated that the DOT develop two national strategies related to the U.S.-flag fleet, one 
a national sealift strategy focused on ensuring the long-term viability of the U.S. Merchant Marine (U.S. flag vessels 
and U.S.-citizen mariners) and the other a national maritime strategy focused, among other things, on increasing the 
competitiveness of internationally trading U.S.-flag vessels.” Von Ah, Maritime Security: DOT Needs to Expeditiously 
Finalize the Required National Maritime Strategy, p. 10.
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FIGURE 51: PROPOSED STRATEGIC SEALIFT FUEL TRANSPORT AND OVER-THE-SHORE 
DISTRIBUTION FLEET AND DRY CARGO AND MUNITIONS FLEETS
Today’s maritime logistics force emphasizes peacetime efficiency over wartime effectiveness. 
It is too small and vulnerable to support U.S. strategy and operational concepts against China 
or Russia, and as threats advance and the U.S. fleet grows and matures novel operational 
concepts, it will be increasingly inadequate. Absent decisive change, weaknesses in U.S. mari-
time logistics will constrain the ability of U.S. forces to fight in preferred ways and could cause 
the United States to lose a war—especially against China in the vast Indo-Pacific.
This report’s proposed maritime logistics architecture responds to changes in threats and 
Joint Force demands. It proposes new logistics concepts, capabilities, capacities, and posture 
that would improve the performance of the force. Leveraging mature technology and a 
National Fleet approach, the key platforms of the proposed architecture could be acquired 
through a mix of modifications, chartering and stipends, and new construction for roughly 
6 percent above the U.S. Government’s currently planned expenditures in this area. That 
six percent would harden an Achilles’ heel of U.S. power projection and do more to ensure a 
prompt and sustained response to aggression than many other options imagined today. To 
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of this plan to improve maritime resiliency. If wholly implemented, however, this logistics fleet 
would be larger, more differentiated, and more resilient. The combatants this logistics force 
supports could fight more aggressively, for longer, and with greater confidence in overcoming 
adversary challenges. 
These investments are not a ‘logistics tax’ or distraction from Navy investments in future 
combatants. They would instead be a powerful signal of U.S. resolve and credibility, a revi-
talizing charge to the American maritime industry, and a force multiplier for the U.S. Joint 
Force. In World War II, the Navy struggled for nearly two years to muster the logistics capa-
bility necessary to engage in major offensive operations in the Central Pacific. The United 
States may not have such a luxury of time in future great power conflicts. As former Secretary 
of Defense James Mattis is fond of saying, “Americans have no God-given right to victory on 
the battlefield.”194 Forethought and effective planning with regard to maritime logistics will be 
an important part of ensuring the Navy and broader Joint Force have the tools necessary to 
seize victory despite current and future challenges.
194 James Mattis, “Remarks as Delivered by Secretary of Defense at Air Force Association 2017 Air, Space and Cyber 




Summary of Near-Term Recommendations by U.S. Government Entity
TABLE 7: U .S . NAVY RECOMMENDATIONS
Year Recommendations
FY 2019 Conduct force size, shape, and posture studies for the following maritime logistics areas: refueling, dry cargo and 
munitions, towing and salvage, expeditionary maintenance and repair, SAR (to include CSAR), and medical support 
afloat. Include attrition of both combatants and logistics forces in these analyses, along with new Navy fleet operating 
concepts, and when possible conduct integrated assessments across logistics areas. Incorporate insights from studies 
(even if preliminary) in 2019 Force Structure Assessment.
Reassess the required number of CMV-22B in the fleet
Assess options to increase hardening of maritime logistics assets, including the placement of defensive armaments 
aboard CLF and select other maritime logistics ships
More closely incorporate cleared U.S.-flag ship operators and providers of key supplies and services in wargames and 
exercises
Consider chartering U.S.-flag commercially-owned sealift ships to complement Government-owned ones and consider 
the utility of Dual-Use Vessel programs
FY 2020 Aggressively increase inventories of supplies, spare parts, preferred munitions, and other expendables
Realistically incorporate all aspects of the maritime logistics enterprise into wargaming and exercises, including long-
duration large scale exercises where the maritime logistics enterprise is subject to risk and losses
Begin incorporation of systems to harden maritime logistics forces aboard vessels
Convert an OSV into a light oiler and use it to experiment refueling combatants
Reorganize MSC to incorporate platforms that provide at-sea support to CLF ships into the CLF, and create a new Mobile 
Logistics Force (MLF)
Begin recapitalizing sealift fleet via SLEP and acquiring used foreign and new U.S.-built ships; consider CHAMP for 
specialty ship and other auxiliary requirements and an LMSR-based design for RO/RO requirements
In cooperation with USTRANSCOM, DLA, other Services, and MARAD, begin development of capabilities to interact with 
the commercial sector in a more secure manner, which may include the proliferation of more opaque solicitations for 
logistics services and supplies, as well as a separate non-Internet-based communications and network for preferred, 
cleared contractors
Prepare to accelerate T-AO 205 procurement to continuous two per year in FY 2021 (“2 for 1 in ‘21”)
Research and develop new ship-to-shore bulk fuel transfer system
Generate a series of plans for the major expansion of the U.S. shipbuilding and U.S. ship operating industries in case of 
a national emergency in cooperation with USTRANSCOM, DLA, other Services, and MARAD
FY 2022 Conduct at-sea demonstration of VLS Rearming at Sea using Navy ships
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TABLE 8: U .S . DOT (INCLUDING MARAD) RECOMMENDATIONS
TABLE 9: USTRANSCOM RECOMMENDATIONS
TABLE 10: DLA RECOMMENDATIONS
TABLE 11: U .S . ARMY, U .S . MARINE CORPS, AND U .S . AIR FORCE RECOMMENDATIONS
TABLE 12: U .S . COAST GUARD RECOMMENDATIONS
Year Recommendations
FY 2019 As mandated by Congress in 2014, develop and release a National Maritime Strategy in cooperation 
with the Navy, the rest of DoD, the Coast Guard, and NOAA
Identify actions to decrease the time and cost of bringing vessels under the U.S. flag
Assess appropriate rates for a specialized MSP stipend for tankers and FLO/FLO ships; assess the ability 
of U.S. Merchant Marine (including through the addition of reflagged ships) to supply additional ships 
and crews for additional MSP cargo, tanker, and FLO/FLO slots
Identify options to revitalize the Voluntary Tanker Agreement, including providing small stipends to VTA 
participants in international and domestic trade to equip, organize, and train operators to support naval 
operations
Identify tax, liability, and other reform options for Congress that would increase the competitiveness of 
U.S.-flag operators
In cooperation with the Navy, carefully track and assess the foreign-flagged market of militarily-useful 
vessels
Year Recommendations
FY 2019 Build on findings of Mobility Capabilities and Requirements Study 2018 to critically examine options to 
meet the sealift dry cargo and tanker requirements
Year Recommendations
FY 2020 Shift purchases of 100 percent of currently tanker-delivered Outside the Continental United States fuel 
from foreign refineries to U.S. refineries and 25 percent of its currently pipeline-delivered Outside the 
Continental United States fuel from foreign refineries to U.S. refineries
Year Recommendations
FY 2019 Factor potential attrition of sealift assets with force equipment into force-sizing and posture assessments
Provide inputs to Navy and USTRANSCOM on current and emerging concepts that would require the 
delivery of fuel over the shore
Year Recommendations
FY 2019 Identify actions to decrease the time and cost of bringing vessels under the U.S. flag
Begin development of criteria to inform potential manning rule changes
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TABLE 13: CONGRESS RECOMMENDATIONS
Year Recommendations
FY 2019 Request and upon receipt critically review and consider implementing recommendations of the forth-
coming National Maritime Strategy
Critically review findings of Mobility Capabilities and Requirements Study 2018 and request follow-on 
analyses as necessary
Provide oversight on the aforementioned Navy maritime logistics force size, shape, and posture studies 
to ensure they adopt realistic assumptions; ensure maritime logistics forces appropriately included in 
2019 Force Structure Assessment.
Encourage U.S. Government agencies to adopt the aforementioned recommendations
FY 2020 Improve MSP to increase the length of its coverage, expand the number of slots, and provide specialized 
slots and stipends for tankers and FLO/FLO ships
Mandate increasing percent of LNG and crude oil product to travel on U.S.-built and U.S.-flagged vessels, 
starting in 2023
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APPENDIX B
Quantitative Assessments
This study conducted peacetime and wartime assessments that informed the shaping, sizing, 
and posture of the maritime logistics force. The methodologies used for both the peacetime 
and wartime refueling, cargo, and reloading assessments are based on the methodologies and 
models employed by the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations (N42) and CNA in the 2011 
T-AO(X) Analysis of Alternatives and subsequent analyses, with some deviations, in partic-
ular to account for T-AOT and T-AOL refueling and T-AKE, T-AKER, and T-AKM resupply 
and reloading. The methodologies used for the towing and salvage assessments, expeditionary 
maintenance and repair assessments, and personnel recovery and medical assessments were 
summarized in the body of the report.
To assess peacetime capacity requirements, the study examined the historical frequency of 
logistics activities (especially refueling) of U.S. ships and Allied ships by region and used 
that data to extrapolate future peacetime logistics frequency demand, assuming an increase 
in logistics demand commensurate with an increase in fleet size. It then compared logistics 
frequency demand with available supply (the average and 75th percentile capabilities of CLF 
vessels to conduct resupply operations in areas where they are postured). If additional vessels 
were needed to address demand, then the CLF requirement for a given fleet would increase. 
To identify wartime requirements, this study’s analysis employed a deterministic model to 
calculate the number of logistics vessels needed to maintain levels of support (especially in 
terms of fuel, cargo, and munitions) of given battle forces. This study adopted a set of quan-
tifiable, conservative planning factors to aid in sizing a resilient logistics force capable of 
sustaining a large portion of the fleet at a high operating tempo. Five of the most important 
factors and their impact on modeling outcomes are depicted in Figure 52 on the subsequent 
page. 
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APPENDIX C
Cost Methodology
To evaluate the feasibility of our recommended maritime logistics fleet, this study includes 
estimates of the cost of new ship construction for both the Navy’s President’s Budget FY 2019 
shipbuilding plan and CSBA’s recommended logistics enhancements. This methodology builds 
on the methodology behind CSBA’s 2017 Alternative Fleet Architecture Study, which was in 
turn largely informed by CBO’s shipbuilding cost estimation methodology.195 This study also 
includes rough order estimates for future MSP program stipends, RRF ship sustainment, and 
MSC charters.
Given many vessels analyzed are derivative of commercial designs or modifications of existing 
vessels, industry-provided cost figures substituted for areas where no existing Navy program 
was sufficiently similar for cost analogies. Similar conversations provided figures for MSC 
charter costs, MSP stipends, or special equipment. Where these figures weighed on the imple-
mentation scenarios, they were cited in the text for transparency. 
This study has sought reasonable cost estimates based on Navy or other official publications 
wherever possible to ensure accuracy. More important than accuracy, however, is that the 
same method was applied to both the Navy’s 30-year shipbuilding plan and CSBA’s alter-
natives, mitigating differences that may have arisen if different methodologies had been 
applied to both. For example, if cost growth curves are off, they will be off together across 
both shipbuilding plan estimates, allowing for meaningful relative comparison. Consequently, 
the largest remaining source of potential error that could impact relative cost comparisons 
involves the original cost estimation for new ship types performing unique logistics functions 
whose development costs may exceed the bounds of CBO’s analogous ship costing method. 
Although estimates for these ship types were informed by discussions with stakeholders in the 
maritime logistics community, they warrant further analysis and should be viewed as a first-
order treatment of the estimation problem. 
195 Clark, Haynes, McGrath, Hooper, Sloman, and Walton, Restoring American Seapower, pp. 130–131. For more on CBO’s 
cost estimation methods, see Eric Labs, How CBO Estimates the Cost of New Ships (Washington, DC: Congressional 




ABLTS Amphibious Bulk Liquid Transfer System 
ARG amphibious ready group
AS submarine tender
ASROC anti-submarine rocket
ATTDS Anti-Torpedo Torpedo Defense System 
bbl barrels
C3 command, control, and communications
CHAMP Common Hull Auxiliary Multi-mission Platform
CLF Combat Logistics Force
COD carrier onboard delivery
CONOP concept of operation 
CONSOL Consolidated Logistics 
CSAR combat search and rescue
CSG carrier strike group
DiAL Distributed and Agile Logistics
DL Distributed Lethality
DLA Defense Logistics Agency 
DMO Distributed Maritime Operations
DoD Department of Defense
EABO Expeditionary Advance Base Operations 
EMS electromagnetic spectrum
EMW Electromagnetic Maneuver Warfare
ESB expeditionary sea base
ESD expeditionary transport dock




IPDS Inland Petroleum Distribution System 
ISR intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance
JMSDF Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force
LCM landing craft, mechanized
LMSR large, medium-speed, roll-on/roll-off ship
LPI/LPD low probability of intercept/low probability of detection 
LRASM Long-Range Anti-Ship Missile
LST landing ship, tank
MARAD Maritime Administration 
MCRS Mobility Capabilities and Requirements Study
LIST OF ACRONYMS
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MFDS Modular Fuel Delivery System 
MLF Mobile Logistics Force
MPS Maritime Prepositioning Ship
MPSV multi-purpose support vessel
MR medium range
MSC Military Sealift Command
MSP Maritime Security Program 
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NDRF National Defense Reserve Fleet 
NDAA National Defense Authorization Act
O&M operations and maintenance
OPDS Offshore Petroleum Discharge System
OPLOG Operational Logistics in a Contested Maritime Environment
O&S operations and support
OSV Offshore Support Vessel
PLA People's Liberation Army
PLAN People's Liberation Army Navy
PNT positioning, navigation, and timing
PRC People's Republic of China
RAS rearming at sea
REFORGER Return of Forces to Germany
RF radio frequency
RRF Ready Reserve Force
RO/RO roll-on/roll-off 
SAG surface action group
SAR search and rescue
SLEP service life extension program
SM Standard Missile
STREAM Standard Tensioned Replenishment Alongside Method
T-AH hospital ship
T-AHL light hospital ship
T-AO fleet replenishment oiler
T-AOE fast combat support ship
T-AOL light oiler
T-AKE dry cargo/ammunition ship
T-AKM missile rearmament ship
T-AKRE dry cargo/ammunition, resupply, ship
T-ARF fleet ocean tug
T-ATF rescue and salvage vessel
T-ATS towing, salvage, and rescue ship
TLAM Tomahawk Land Attack Missile
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UAS unmanned aircraft system
UNREP underway replenishment
USTRANSCOM U.S. Transportation Command 
USV unmanned surface vessel
VERTREP vertical replenishment
VLS vertical launch system 
VTA Voluntary Tanker Agreement
WMD Weapons of Mass Destruction
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